【朝鲜】2010 South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea

South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea: The Evolution of the Engagement Policy and Its Impact upon U.S.-ROK Relations Author(s): Jong-Yun Bae Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 50, No. 2 (March/April 2010), pp. 335-355 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010.50.2.335 . Accessed: 18/09/2013 16:52 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 2, pp. 335–355. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2010.50.2.335. 335 JONG-YUN BAE South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea The Evolution of the Engagement Policy and Its Impact upon U.S.-ROK Relations ABSTRACT Despite agreements in 2007 in the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. and South Korea have had trouble reaching consensus in dealing with subsequent nuclear crises spawned by North Korea. This study focuses on South Korean strategic thinking about and policy toward North Korea and Korean unification, and their changes since the 1990s. KEYWORDS: United States, South Korea, North Korea, engagement policy, strategic thought Despite the Six-Party Talks agreements of February 13 and Octo- ber 3, 2007, fundamental solution of the North Korean nuclear issue had been suspended in the Bush administration. Even after new governments of both the U.S. and South Korea took it over from their predecessors, there was little progress on the issue until the winter of 2009. In addition to North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy, difficulties between the U.S. and South Korean administrations in reaching consensus on how to deal with North Korea and its nuclear program have left a troubled legacy for the chal- lenges ahead. Almost every administration of both countries, such as Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton in 1993, Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in 2001, and Roh Moo-hyun and Bush in 2003, faced nearly the same difficul- ties. For this reason there is a strong possibility that these will re-emerge. By reviewing these issues, we can draw lessons for President Lee Myung-bak in Jong-Yun Bae is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, and was a Research Associate of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies at Princeton University. He thanks Gilbert Rozman, Chung- in Moon, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on this article. Email: . AS5002_04_Bae.indd 335 4/29/10 5:22 PM This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 336 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:2 South Korea and U.S. President Barack Obama in finding a fundamental solution to North Korea’s nuclear crisis. International attention had focused on Bush’s handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis, often under the influence of neoconservative advisors and accompanied by characterizations of Roh Moo-hyun’s disagreements with Bush. These discords were likewise attributed to ideologically inclined advisors but from the progressive camp, and we saw a more sustained pat- tern of South Korean strategic thinking diverging from that of the U.S. It would be short-sighted to attribute these differences only to the predisposi- tions of the two leaders or to temporary circumstances, such as South Korea’s progressive regimes over the past 10 years or anti-American senti- ment that spread in 2002. Understanding the fundamental factors in South Korean strategic thinking about North Korea and unification is needed. This study begins by reviewing three policy differences and then analyzes how the South’s objectives have evolved along with its thinking about the process of reunification. THREE CASES OF POLiCY DiSCORD BETWEEN THE U.S . AND SOUTH KOREA For a long time, political leaders in Seoul and Washington had found little reason to disagree about how to manage relations with Pyongyang. Recall- ing the Korean War when their states fought together against North Korea and Cold War experiences where they were joined in armed and rhetorical standoff against an unyielding adversary, they stood firmly together. As the Cold War was ending, however, the situation grew more complicated. Would dialogue or pressure work better in changing the North’s behavior? What compromises were needed to secure Moscow’s or Beijing’s coopera- tion? How did U.S. concerns with global threats, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), contrast with South Korean worries about an assault on Seoul from nearby? Why would U.S. universal values highlight- ing human rights coincide with South Korean nationalist sentiments to- ward compatriots? The potential for disagreement was growing even before the Cold War had ended. First, if we examine reasoning about the overall approach toward the re- gime in North Korea, we can trace differences back to the Roh Tae-woo presidency (1988–93), with the gap coming clearly into the open during the AS5002_04_Bae.indd 336 4/29/10 5:22 PM This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BAE / KOREAN STRATEGiC THiNKiNG • 337 first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993.1 Although the U.S. has left little doubt about its preference for regime change in the North, and the South has increasingly recognized the necessity of dealing with the regime, the issue came to the fore when the U.S. prepared for military action in 1993–94 against the North’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor. The new president, Kim Young Sam, emphasized in his inaugural address in February 1993 the need to preserve the northern part of the nation more than the alliance with the U.S. Kim strongly opposed U.S. President Bill Clinton’s plan of preemptive attack on the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. During the second crisis, Bush considered a preemptive attack and, over a longer period, powerful sanctions that might induce regime change,2 treat- ing the North as part of the “Axis of Evil” or what was earlier called “a rogue state.”3 But then-President Roh Moo-hyun, who had focused on developing trust in inter-Korean relations and the institutionalization of peaceful coex- istence, prepared plans for economic cooperation with the North as a part- ner in the eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula.4 Although the gap between the White House and the Blue House has sometimes narrowed, the record over two decades indicates that South Koreans are more steadfast about engagement. Second, differences arose over control of the combined forces of the two allies, exacerbating divisions over how to deal with Pyongyang. As early as the 1990s, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command had prepared Con- cept Plan (CONPLAN) 5029. In 2003 they developed it into Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5029, a contingency arrangement in preparation for an un- expected incident in North Korea such as regime collapse or mass defections. Yet, nervous about how the U.S. might provoke or respond to a crisis of this sort, Roh’s National Security Council rejected OPLAN 5029 in January 1. Although there also were policy differences between the U.S. and South Korea in the Syng- man Rhee period (e.g., signing the Armistice Agreement), this study focuses on the North Korean nuclear crises and the engagement policy toward North Korea since the 1980s. 2. Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), pp. 24–91. 3. White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), pp. 14–16. 4. See the policy report of the Unification Ministry to Roh Moo-hyun on March 24, 2003, available on the website of Cheong Wa Dae (the Blue House) in the Presidential Archives of Korea, , accessed February 27, 2010. AS5002_04_Bae.indd 337 4/29/10 5:22 PM This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 338 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:2 2005, warning that it might constrain South Korean sovereignty.5 South Koreans did not want the U.S. army to make the sole military decisions against the North. Afterward, Roh stated his views to Bush at a summit in June 2005, making it clear that South Korea insisted on keeping the initiative in any military operation on North Korean territory.6 This case was perceived as one of many attempts to put relations between the U.S. and South Korea on a more equal footing. Third, the two states differ on the strategy for dealing with North Korea in the context of crisis negotiations. South Korea has stuck firmly to its deci- sion not to pursue unification by absorption; instead, it has emphasized unification by consensus, even when it has been urged to withhold economic benefits to put pressure on the North. In spite of the Bush administration’s requests at various junctures during the five years of the second nuclear cri- sis, the Roh administration had continued the basic theme of engagement— reconciliation, coexistence, and cooperation with the North—known as the “Sunshine Policy” of Kim Dae-jung and then reaffirmed by the “Peace and Prosperity Policy” of Roh. Indeed, as early as the mid-1990s, when North Korea was caught in a severe economic crisis, Kim Young Sam had tried to assist it by sending rice. The goal was to prevent the worst case scenario, re- gime collapse that could choke the life from the North Korean regime and lead to unification of the peninsula. Then Kim Dae-jung officially announced in his inaugural address in Feb- ruary 1998 that the South would give up the policy of unification via absorb- ing the North. Roh had acted in the same spirit by offering various eco- nomic benefits to the North if it would renounce its nuclear program;7 his goals were also to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table and keep the Six-Party Talks moving forward with economic incentives. These had led to repeated clashes with Bush over how to proceed. In the first five months of 2005 and again from October 2006, these differences were especially pro- nounced, as Bush failed to convince Roh to apply the pressure he sought. 5. DongA Ilbo [DongA Daily], April 16, 2005. 6. See the news briefing of Cheong Wa Dae on June 14, 2005. Ibid., June 15, 2005. And refer to the interview of Roh Moo-hyun with KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) on August 31, 2006. 7. On January 24, 2003, before the inauguration of Roh Moo-hyun, Assemblyman Chung Dong-young, who served as Unification minister in 2004–06, said that Roh had been preparing a reconstruction plan, i.e., “a Marshall Plan for the North.” Maeil Business Shinmun [Daily Business Newspaper], January 24, 2003. AS5002_04_Bae.indd 338 4/29/10 5:22 PM This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BAE / KOREAN STRATEGiC THiNKiNG • 339 The split on how to proceed came to a head after the North Korean nu- clear test in October 2006. Just afterward, the U.N. Security Council ad- opted Resolution 1718, which condemned the test and adopted sanctions against the North. Based on this resolution, as a tactical means for pressing the North, the U.S. government called on Roh to stop sending money, which could easily be used to defray the expenses of North Korea’s armed forces or even the costs of the nuclear weapons program. At a press confer- ence with the South Korean media on October 17, Christopher Hill, head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks, criticized public tours to the North’s Mt. Kumgang as a diversion of money to the North to be used at its discretion.8 Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, like- wise pointed out on October 18 that the Gaeseung Industrial Complex as well as the Mt. Kumgang tours should be reconsidered in light of the new international sanctions against North Korea.9 U.S. Secretary of State Condo- leezza Rice added to the chorus of U.S. voices on October 16 and 19, reminding the South of the importance of its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).10 The South Korean government’s responses, however, were defiant. Officials insisted on keeping these two projects moving forward without interruption and in the case of the Gaeseung project, even attempt- ing to enlarge it, while again refusing to join the PSI fully. Thus, even North Korea’s nuclear test did not cause Roh to yield to Bush’s appeals for joint tactical pressure. After November 2006, the Bush administration shifted direction in favor of direct talks with North Korea, making easier coordination with South Korea as well as China. Some critics charged that the Roh administration was hasty in resuming fertilizer assistance to the North in March 2007, long before the transfer of funds frozen in Macao was complete and the North had fulfilled its promise of shutting down the Yongbyon reactor. But the fact that South Korea withheld humanitarian assistance in the form of rice in 8. Kyunghyang Shinmun [Kyunghyang News], October 18, 2006. 9. Alexander Vershbow pointed out the critical problems of South Korea’s cash payment to the North such as the North Korean laborers’ salary in Gaeseung and South Korean tourists’ entrance fee at Mt. Kumgang. Hankyoreh Shinmun [Hankyoreh News], October 19, 2006. 10. After meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, Rice urged Seoul’s full participation in PSI for the successful economic sanctions against the North in order to prevent its exporting of WMD or conventional weapons and related skills. See Condoleezza Rice’s news brief- ing on October 16, 2006, , accessed April 19, 2007; Seoul Shinmun [Seoul Newspaper], October 20, 2006. AS5002_04_Bae.indd 339 4/29/10 5:22 PM This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 340 • ASiAN SURvEY 50:2 May 2007 was recognized as a sign of some restraint. Yet, Roh impatiently sought to leave a legacy of engagement. Bush, for his part, insisted on con- ditionality in order to leave no doubt in Kim Jong-il’s mind that he must proceed with disabling and disclosing his nuclear programs and full, verifi- able denuclearization. The contrasting strategies leave a legacy that Lee Myung-bak may try to overcome. It reflects strategic thinking that has be- come embedded in South Korean policy-debating circles even if it some- times becomes distorted—by progressives who get carried away with ratio- nalizations for the North Korean regime and by conservatives who blame the past two presidents for dilemmas that could have been avoided. GOALS OF KOREAN UNiFiCATiON POLiCY AND CHANGES iN STRATEGiC THiNKiNG At the heart of the differences between South Korea and the U.S. is the Ko- rean unification policy. Even if the South Korean government is pragmatic about not trying to unify the peninsula as soon as possible, while recognizing the value of maintaining and stabilizing the division, it has never shown any sign of giving up the goal of unification. Without exception, presidents of South Korea have always said that unification is the mission they intend to accomplish, emphasizing the policy in their inaugural addresses.11 Such thinking on unification was not developed either to solve the nuclear issue with force or to produce North Korean regime change. Indeed, South Ko- rea’s engagement policy toward the North has an almost 40-year history, starting from the Park Chung-hee period. President Park’s June 23, 1973, Declaration12 was followed by the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification of Chun Doo-whan in 1982, the Korean National 11. Office of the President of ROK, Kim Young Sam Daetongryong Yonseolmunjip [Speech collec- tions of President Kim Young Sam], vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of the President of ROK, 1994); idem, Kim Dae-jung Daetongryong Yonseolmunjip [Collected speeches of President Kim Dae-jung], vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of the President of ROK, 1999), pp. 59–66; idem, Roh Moo-hyun Daetongryong Yonseolmunjip [Collected speeches of President Roh Moo-hyun], vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of the President of ROK, 2004), pp. 25–31; in case of Lee Myung-bak’s inaugural speech translated in English, refer to , ac- cessed February 28, 2010. 12. On June 23, 1973, Park Chung-hee announced the “Special Foreign Policy Statement Regard- ing Peace and Unification” (the so-called June 23 Declaration), which emphasized the willingness of a good neighbor and friendship with North Korea and of no opposition to North Korea becoming a member of the U.N. It was a meaningful start to engagement policy in South Korea. Ministry of AS5002_04_Bae.indd 340 4/29/10 5:22 PM This content downloaded from 137.222.163.60 on Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:52:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BAE / KOREAN STRATEGiC THiNKiNG • 341 Community Unification Formula of Roh Tae-woo in 1989, the National Community Unification Formula of Kim Young Sam in 1994, the Sunshine Policy or “Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy” of Kim Dae-jung, the “Peace and Prosperity Policy” of Roh Moo-hyun, and the “Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity Policy” of Lee Myung-bak. All emphasized peaceful coexistence, reconciliation, and cooperation with the North. The names of the policies have changed, but the basic theme of engage- ment has been kept by both conservative and progressive regimes in South Korea. Despite efforts by then President-elect Lee’s transition team to inte- grate the Ministry of Unification with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2008, the former, in charge of all matters related to Korean unifica- tion and inter-Korean relations, is still operating in the Lee administration. Moreover, in December 2005, new legislation was passed known as the Inter- Korean Relations Development Act, which obligates Seoul to pursue the development of inter-Korean relations and unification. A divided nation conscious of more than 1,200 years of continuous unity remains committed to the dream of reunification. The United States traditionally has prioritized democratization over na- tionalist aspirations for reestablishing a single state after a period of division, particularly when Washington sees a communist regime on one side insistent on imposing its totalitarian ways. The U.S. government interfered in th