On the Search for Civil Society in China

http://mcx.sagepub.com/ Modern China http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/19/2/199 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/009770049301900206 1993 19: 199Modern China Heath B. Chamberlain On the Search for Civil Society in China Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:Modern ChinaAdditional services and information for http://mcx.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://mcx.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://mcx.sagepub.com/content/19/2/199.refs.htmlCitations: What is This? - Apr 1, 1993Version of Record >> at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 199 On the Search for Civil Society in China HEATH B. CHAMBERLAIN University of British Columbia There has been a lot of speculation lately about the emergence of &dquo;civil society&dquo; in China, especially in the wake of the massive dem- onstrations in Beijing and other major cities in the spring of 1989. Much evidence has been marshaled to support the case: the manifestly high level of political awareness and sophistication among students involved in the demonstrations; the insistent student demands for autonomy; the warm support given to the students not only by &dquo;white- collar&dquo; professionals but also by the bulk of ordinary citizens; the seeming ability of the demonstrators to police and govern them- selves in the midst of chaotic conditions; the aura of goodwill and &dquo;civility&dquo; pervading the streets of Beijing and other cities during this period; and so on. The brutal suppression of the movement by the military, imprisonment of many of the demonstrators, and subsequent repression of dissent, although seen as effective in the short run, have generally been regarded as ineffective in the long term-as flimsy barriers against an inevitable resurgence of the tide. &dquo;The ruthless campaign of suppression that began on June 4,&dquo; writes Thomas Gold (1990: 31 ), &dquo;revealed in turn the degree to which the [CCP] remains unwilling and unable to accept the reality of nascent civil society in China.&dquo; Civil society is a thorny concept, fraught with theoretical and moral implications. Among China scholars, many have come to see it as the &dquo;missing link&dquo; between Western and non-Western political experi- ences. Against the assertion that Asian political cultures are generally inimical to Western liberal-democratic norms, the argument is now heard that civil society, which has recently emerged under communist regimes in Eastern Europe, is currently appearing in somewhat similar MODERN CHINA, Vol 19 No 2, April 1993 199-215 5 © 1993 Sage Publications, Inc. at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 200 guise in China, bringing in its train &dquo;democracy&dquo; (albeit &dquo;with Chinese characteristics&dquo;). Moreover, the term has come to signify nothing less than the &dquo;reign of virtue.&dquo; Whatever political arrangement-whatever configuration of state and society-encourages its development is deemed good and worthy of support, and whatever arrangement stands in its way is to be condemned and altered. To apply (or misapply) the term to contemporary China is to affect profoundly the way we perceive and treat that nation. This is all to say, it matters a lot how we define the concept and employ it. I think that most recent studies misinterpret and misuse it. All too often the term serves to embellish rather than inform discussion, creeping into the concluding remarks where we are told that what has just been described constitutes the &dquo;germ of Chinese civil society.&dquo; But even where authors take the trouble to define the concept, they frequently do so in a way that trivializes it or strips it of theoretical and analytical value. This article deals first with some of the recent studies of civil society in China. It then examines the concept more closely, offering a defini- tion somewhat different from the one that seems to govern much of the literature. Finally, it reassesses the current state of civil society in China, suggesting ways in which we might more fruitfully examine it. CHINA: AN EMERGING CIVIL SOCIETY? Arguments on behalf of an &dquo;emerging civil society&dquo; in China tend to fall into one of several categories: (1) those that treat civil society as the product of a &dquo;revolutionary moment,&dquo; a sudden forging of a united front among disparate social elements, taking shape essentially &dquo;at the barricades&dquo;; (2) those that see it as a recently emergent &dquo;counterelite structure,&dquo; restricted mainly to urban-based intellectuals and students, yet firmly established and potentially expandable; and (3) those that view it in longer-range historical perspective, as a phenomenon clearly evident decades, if not a century ago-and now, after years of forcible suppression, reasserting itself. The work of Lawrence Sullivan (1990) is a good example of arguments in the first category. Drawing on ideas of Rousseau and Montesquieu, Sullivan contends that civil society-a &dquo;moral and at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 201 collective body&dquo; in which &dquo;each person gives himself to all and not to any one individual&dquo;-~an quite &dquo;literally come on a moment’s notice.&dquo; For Sullivan, the hallmark of civil society is the sudden capacity of once alienated groups within society to overcome their differences and present a solid front in the face of an intransigent regime. And that, he tells us, is precisely what occurred in the streets of Beijing in the spring of 1989. &dquo;Students and workers alike were now identifying their individual, personal will with the national interest, putting aside the divisions that had obstructed a united front ever since the first expres- sion of popular discontent in the late 1970s&dquo; (Sullivan, 1990: 136). Civil society as &dquo;solidarity at the barricades&dquo; is a theme running implicitly through a number of post-Tiananmen studies. Clemens Ostergaard (1989: 40), for example, writes of &dquo;the new and [to the Party leadership] dangerous prospect ... of a nationwide autonomous organization of the discontented,&dquo; and of a &dquo;sudden, massive spread of civil society&dquo; in the spring of 1989. Jonathan Unger (1991: 6) suggests that &dquo;within the course of only one or two weeks in May 1989 [the term shimin (citizen)] was on everyone’s lips across the country,&dquo; with everyone now &dquo;having a common identity.&dquo; Edward Friedman (1990) highlights the active, supportive role played by peasants in the largely urban-centered events of May-June 1989. This approach is problematic on two counts. First is the matter of evidence: did the spring of 1989 indeed witness (in Sullivan’s words) &dquo;the emergence of a cohesive popular consciousness&dquo;? As time goes on and the dust settles, it becomes increasingly clear that different observers had very different impressions of the degree of solidarity in the streets. Although some accounts tell us that intellectuals, students, and workers were able to &dquo;put aside their divisions&dquo; and present a united front, others assert that such unity was fragile at best.’ Even among the core demonstrators-the students themselves-&dquo;solidarity&dquo; was elusive. Looking back at events, student leader Shen Tong ( 1990: 228) has reflected: &dquo;There were so many of us, so many groups, often going off in different directions, that the government couldn’t possibly have been sure what we were asking for and who was asking for it.&dquo; Even granting some measure of &dquo;instant cohesiveness&dquo; among the demonstrators, how should we interpret it? The changing, volatile nature of life at the barricades may be an essential feature of &dquo;social movement,&dquo; but does it necessarily have much to do with &dquo;the emer- at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 202 gence of civil society&dquo; ?2 If by the latter concept we mean to measure progress away from one mode of social existence to another, surely we need more than a series of snapshots taken during the heat of a revolutionary moment. We need to focus on more profound and abiding changes in the ways that people interrelate. Other studies more properly emphasize the enduring nature of civil society. Vladimir Tismaneanu ( 1990: 17), for example, dubs it &dquo;the counterstructure that escapes government control,&dquo; while Martin Whyte ( 1992: 77) stresses the idea of &dquo;institutionalized autonomy&dquo; of social relations vis-A-vis the state. To allow otherwise-to concede, as does Sullivan (1990: 130), that &dquo;prospects for long-term self-management were undoubt- edly limited&dquo;-is to render civil society ephemeral and risk trivializing the concept altogether. The second approach makes a more convincing case in this regard. Merle Goldman (1991), Andrew Nathan (1990), Michel Bonnin and Yves Chevrier (1991), among others, have discerned a nascent Chi- nese civil society in the successful creation of networks of independent organizations &dquo;outside state control&dquo; (Goldman, 1991: 16) by such intellectuals as Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming in the period preceding the spring of 1989. No sweeping assertions here of an &dquo;emerging popular consciousness&dquo;-indeed, in a more recent article, Nathan (1991: 32) explicitly dismisses Sullivan’s central thesis. Rather, we are told, the constituent elements of a nascent civil society are rela- tively limited in number, largely urban based, mainly centered in the intellectual-student community. Where the first approach sees civil society as blossoming suddenly at the barricades, this one conceives of it as germinating more gradually in a &dquo;seedbed&dquo; tended primarily by urban-based intellectuals and students. Although this perspective provides more shape and visibility to an otherwise nebulous phenomenon-giving &dquo;structure&dquo; to the &dquo;movement&dquo;-it raises another troubling question. Is the intellectual seedbed, structured though it may be, truly &dquo;independent&dquo; and outside state control? Do intellectuals in China generally see themselves as confronting the state, as part of an emergent structure seeking auton- omy from government? I suspect not. As Goldman’s own studies suggest, relations between intellectual and state in China are exceed- ingly complex (see, for example, Goldman, 1981). No doubt some at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 203 intellectuals strive for independence from the state, but the vast majority likely see themselves as actually (or potentially) part of the state, seeking power (or more power). Few so far have made the leap from &dquo;priest to professional,&dquo; in Timothy Cheek’s terms: &dquo;The close relationship between members of the educated elite and the state has been a constant feature of Chinese history, including the revolutionary era, and continues to help shape the post-Tiananmen period, despite the traumatic events of 1989&dquo; (Cheek, 1992: 124; see also Perry, 1992: 158). The intellectual’s vision of civil society, in other words, is not so much &dquo;counterstructure&dquo; as it is &dquo;alternate structure&dquo;-a way of organizing and staffing the state apparatus differently, rather than challenging it altogether. The third approach, taking a longer-range historical perspective, sees the first stirrings of civil society in China more than a century ago, on the eve of the modern republican and communist revolutions. With the traditional state system in rapid decline and incapable of responding effectively to the challenges posed by Western imperialist powers, it is argued, society-based local elites increasingly took the initiative, asserted their powers, and generally acted as &dquo;public author- ity.&dquo; Such developments were slowed if not completely halted by the imposition from above of revolutionary dictatorships-first National- ist, then Maoist. Nevertheless, this argument continues, the forces making for a civil society never entirely dissipated, but survived in embryonic form through the years.3 The dominant image at work here is of an already existent civil society &dquo;resurfacing&dquo; after a long period of suppression by an antag- onistic state system. The process of reemergence, we are told, has been underway since at least the early 1980s, stimulated primarily by the reforms-especially economic initiatives-launched by Deng Xiaoping and his allies. Chinese civil society, now &dquo;flourishing in the fertile soil of autonomous economic activity&dquo; (Gold, 1990: 31), can be seen as a direct descendant of the &dquo;structural changes&dquo; noted by R. Keith Schoppa (1982) in the &dquo;core areas&dquo; of late nineteenth-century Zhejiang. This is no overnight crystallization at the barricades, nor is it limited to the world of intellectuals and students. Rather, it is the outcropping of a deep and long-term development. at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 204 This is a compelling argument insofar as it captures the enduring structure missing in the first approach and the counterstructure prom- ised but undelivered in the second. But the putative link between the &dquo;public sphere&dquo; of a century ago and civil society of today is very tenuous indeed. As I understand the term, public sphere refers to that realm of essentially local community-centered activities, unattended by state officials, requiring the cooperation and coordination of private individuals and groups for their accomplishment: &dquo;areas of ex- trabureaucratic community interest&dquo; (Rowe, 1990: 18), &dquo;in which consensual decisions were articulated by community leaders and services were managed by local men&dquo; (Rankin, 1986: 15). Although Rowe, Rankin, and others may be right that the public sphere expanded dramatically in the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion and into the early decades of the twentieth century, there is little to suggest that these developments were tantamount to the &dquo;early stirrings of civil society.&dquo; In fact, the very opposite may have been the case. If the assertion of local elite control had the effect of reinforcing parochial outlooks and traditional social relations, it may have hindered more than enhanced any real movement toward civil society. The main problem with this approach is that it conflates the terms society and civil society. They are not the same. The qualifier &dquo;civil&dquo; connotes, among other things, &dquo;concern with the commonweal.&dquo; &dquo;The virtue of civil society,&dquo; writes Edward Shils (1991: 16), &dquo;is the readi- ness to moderate particular, individual or parochial interests and to give precedence to the common good.&dquo; Few hold that societies are by nature civil in this regard; most see such concern for the commonweal as a mark of progress away from more traditional values to more modern norms of &dquo;citizenship.&dquo; This is all to say, it is important to distinguish between &dquo;social dynamics&dquo; and &dquo;civil-social dynamics.&dquo; Indeed, all three approaches share this flawed conception of civil society, insofar as they define it exclusively in terms of &dquo;counterstructure&dquo; -as &dquo;existing outside the orbit of the state,&dquo; &dquo;beyond the control of government,&dquo; &dquo;autonomous vis-h-vis state officials,&dquo; so forth. The underlying premise seems to be that the existence and viability of civil society vary directly with the distance (or absence) of state power. But this seriously distorts the meaning of the term. Historically conceived, civil society is as much a creature of the state as it is of society. The at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 205 interrelations among these three elements-state, society, and civil society-are far more complex than much of the recent literature allows. We need to reexamine our terms. STATE, SOCIETY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY To what extent is civility a natural emergent feature of society? To what extent does it depend upon imposition of order by the state? Simply stated, these queries lie at the heart of much of the debate over the meaning and origins of civil society. Few theorists have gone to the extremes of either Hobbes or Paine: the one convinced that civil society exists only by virtue of the presence of state power; the other, that it thrives only in the total absence of such power. Most see elements of both state and society as essential components of a healthy civil society. Nevertheless, there are strongly divergent views regard- ing (1) which element-state or society-is to prevail and which is to serve mainly to &dquo;check&dquo; the other; and (2) the degree to which a viable civil society is autonomous vis-A-vis both state and society.’ Although Hobbes and Paine had diametrically opposed views of the origins of civil society, they nevertheless agreed it had no meaning or existence apart from state or society. With theorists as diverse as Locke, Hegel, and Tocqueville, the nature of civil society becomes not only more &dquo;mixed&dquo; but also more independent and self-assertive. Locke firmly believed that state power was essential to the mainte- nance of social tranquillity, but he also admitted the possibility of a &dquo;natural&dquo; social solidarity. Accordingly, Locke’s civil society was neither Hobbes’s Leviathan nor Paine’s &dquo;minimum state.&dquo; It was essentially a collective, contractual arrangement undertaken by society’s elites to impose and accept order among themselves for the purposes of protecting and facilitating their individual enjoyment of certain natural rights. According to Zbigniew Rau (1987: 582-583), [Locke] treats civil society as the sum of independent moral beings whose rational choices place them in the Commonwealth. Briefly stated, his civil society is a collective effort to enforce the individually realized natural concept of justice. In other words, it is a voluntary organization of individuals, set up as the result of the social contract, at University of Sussex Library on November 25, 2013mcx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 206 and centered around moral purposes, to which they desire to give a political dimension in public life. This is the guarantee that in accor- dance with the principles of the workmanship model, man will be in a position to follow his calling in his social and political relationships. This line of thought moves us beyond an easy equation of civil society with either society or state: although not entirely separate from either, it is at the same time something quite different. Nineteenth-century theorists like Hegel and Tocqueville carried this tendency even further. For Hegel, civil society represented, among other things, a realm of individual producers engaged in economic exchange, relatively free from domination by a patriarchal society. From Tocqueville’s perspective, it was a realm of widespread associ- ational activity, relatively free from direct control by the state. Hegel saw civil society as an essential condition of individual freedom vis-A-vis society (Stillman, 1980); Tocqueville saw it as an essential condition of political democracy vis-A-vis the state (Keane,1988: 51 ). Hegel (like Hobbes) posed civil society as a necessary counter- weight to a defective natural soc