[欧盟口译训练A1，英语].Euit-en-10091901

策马翻译培训 EU interpretation training | A zh-en 1 www.cemachina.com Euit EU interpretation training 欧盟口译训练 cemachina.com Copyright © 2010 CEMACHINA.COM, All Rights Reserved 策马翻译培训 EU interpretation training | A zh-en 2 www.cemachina.com 节俭者为挥霍者埋单？ Now the prudent will have to bear the cost of profligacy You have enjoyed a debt-financed spending spree. But times are now harder: you find it impossible to roll over your debt; you have to pay much higher interest rates than before; or you find that the value of the assets you pledged as collateral is now less than your loan. What can you do? Provided enough of you are in trouble, you call for help from the fairy government-mother. 你已经享受了一场举债负担的支出盛 宴。但如今的境况更为艰难：你发现自己不 可能偿还贷款；你不得不支付比以往更高的 利率；或者你发现自己拿来充当抵押品的资 产价值目前低于贷款额。你能够做些什么 呢？假若有足够多的人像你一样陷入困境， 你可以呼吁让政府这个救星施以援手。 Thus, George Magnus of UBS, among the wisest analysts of this crisis, has already observed, with some approval, that the crisis “is spawning an array of well scripted but highly unconventional public policy responses” – that is to say, rescues of various kinds.* 因此，作为此轮危机最明智的 分析 定性数据统计分析pdf销售业绩分析模板建筑结构震害分析销售进度分析表京东商城竞争战略分析 师之 一，瑞银 (UBS)的乔治•玛格纳斯 (George Magnus)已经注意到，此轮危机“正带来一系 列认真计划但明显有违常规的公共政策反 应”——也就是说，各种各样的纾困行动。* 他的观点得到了一些人的认同。 Over-indebted individuals have just three choices: reduce spending below income, sell assets they own to somebody else or, if the worst comes to the worst, default. But one person's debt is another person's asset, one person's expenditure is another person's income; one person's sale is another person's purchase and one person's default is another 举债过度的个人只有三种选择：将支出 减至收入水平以下，向他人出售自有资产， 或者，在最最糟糕的情况下出现违约拖欠。 但是，一个人的债务等于另一个人的资产， 一个人的支出等于另一个人的收入；一个人 出售等于另一个人购买，而一个人违约就等 于另一个人蒙受损失。 策马翻译培训 EU interpretation training | A zh-en 3 www.cemachina.com person's loss. If very many individuals reduce their spending, in order to pay down their debt, the economy slumps. If many try to sell assets they own, their prices crash. If many default on their debts, financial intermediaries implode. The economics of an entire economy are not the same as the economics of a single household. That was perhaps the most important point John Maynard Keynes made. 如果许多个人减少自己的支出，以偿还 债务，那么经济会出现衰退。如果许多个人 试图出售自己拥有的资产，那么价格会暴跌。 如果许多个人债务违约，那么金融中介机构 就会倒闭。整个经济体的经济情况与单个家 庭并不相同。这或许是约翰•梅纳德•凯恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes)最重要的观点。 Thus, argues Mr Magnus, today “there is a quite serious risk that the de-leveraging downturn could run amok: credit contraction causes economic contraction, which causes further write-downs and capital destruction, which leads to more credit contraction and so on ” . On the upside, the fairy government-mother stood on the sidelines, applauding the enthusiasm of her charges. On the downside, she is dragged in, as risk-addiction turns into risk-aversion. 因此，玛格纳斯辩称，目前“存在一种 相当严重的风险，降低负债水平所带来的低 迷有可能失控：信贷紧缩导致经济萎缩，这 将造成进一步的减记和资本耗损，从而带来 更为严重的信贷紧缩，凡此种种”。从好的方 面来看，政府救星置身局外，为自己操控的 热情击节叫好。从坏的方面来看，当趋险变 为避险，政府救星也被拖下水。 Between its low in the first quarter of 1982 and its high in the second quarter of 2007, the share of the financial sector's profits in US gross domestic product rose more than six-fold. Behind this boom was an economy-wide rise in leverage (see chart). Leverage was the philosopher's stone that turned economic lead into financial gold. Attempts to reduce it now risk turning the gold back into lead again. 从 1982 年第一季度的低点，到 2007 年 第二季度的高点，其间金融行业利润在美国 国内生产总值(GDP)中所占的比例增长了 6 倍以上。在此轮繁荣的背后，是经济各领域 杠杆水平的普遍上升（参见图表）。杠杆是将 经济“铅块”变为金融“黄金”的点金石。 目前如果试图降低杠杆水平，就可能面临黄 金变回铅块的风险。 Hé lè ne Rey of the London Business School has demonstrated this process for the financial sector.** She describes three ways in which markets have malfunctioned: via the originate-to-distribute model, with its weak incentives to assess loan quality and wide diffusion of assets of unknown quality; via the vicious spiral in credit default swaps, with rising prices forcing a higher cost of funds on 伦敦商学院(London Business School)的 埃莱娜•雷伊(Hélène Rey)为金融领域论证了 这一过程。**她描述了市场失灵的三种方式： 通过发起到分派的模式，这种模式评估贷款 质量的动力不足，容易出现质量不明资产泛 滥；通过信用违约掉期的恶性循环，不断上 涨的价格促使银行资金成本上升，信用状况 由此下降，等等；最后，通过资产市值不断 下跌，交投清淡的市场上出售问题资产，导 策马翻译培训 EU interpretation training | A zh-en 4 www.cemachina.com banks, so worse credit standing and so forth; and, finally, via tumbling market valuation of assets, with distressed sales in thin markets lowering solvency and forcing further sales. 致偿付能力下降，并造成进一步的出售。 Each drowning institution drags others down with it. The solution they all desire is for the government to act as lender of last resort against illiquid instruments and buyer of last resort of impaired ones. While the former activity has been known since the days of Walter Bagehot's Lombard Street, the latter is an overt bail-out. But for the sector as a whole, any other way of reducing excessive liabilities is far too slow, collectively ruinous, or both. 每一家陷入困境的金融机构会把其它 机构一起拖下水。它们都渴望的解决办法， 是由政府充当流动性不佳信贷工具的最后贷 款人，并作为减损资产的最后买家。前一种 行为自沃尔特•白居特 (Walter Bagehot)朗伯 德街(Lombard Street)时代以来颇为人知，而 后一种则是明显的纾困行为。但对整个金融 行业而言，其它减少过度负债的方式不仅过 于缓慢，而且具有全面的破坏性，抑或两者 兼而有之。 Now consider a second crucial sector: US households. They have been spending more than their income for a decade. Indeed, this spending has been the single most important counterpart of the persistent US surplus on the capital account (or deficit on the current account). In the process, households have accumulated ever more debt. 现在看看第二个关键的领域：美国家 庭。10 年来，他们的支出水平一直超过自己 的收入。事实上，这种支出一直是美国资本 账户持续盈余（或经常账户赤字）最为重要 的一个对应因素。在此过程中，美国家庭积 累了越来越多的债务。 How might households seek to reduce their indebtedness, collectively? They can try to sell assets. But they can sell houses only to one another, which would not, in aggregate, help. They can sell equities to the rest of the world, but their prices might crash first. They can default. Indeed, many seem likely to do so. But that would damage the financial sector's solvency and, through that, either the government's balance sheet, via bail-outs, or the balance sheet of other households, via losses on financial assets. 家庭如何谋求集体地减少债务呢？他 们可以尝试出售资产。不过，他们只能把房 产出售给其他家庭，总体而言这起不到什么 作用。他们可以向全球其它地区出售证券， 但其价格可能首先暴跌。他们可以违约。事 实上，许多家庭似乎都可能会这么做。但这 将损及金融行业的偿付力，从而影响政府的 资产负债状况（通过纾困），或其它家庭的资 产负债状况——通过金融资产的损失。 Finally, they can cut back on spending. But that would guarantee a recession, if not a slump. In the fourth quarter of 2007, household savings were still as low as ever, at 2 per cent of GDP. Imagine that they rose 最后，他们可以缩减支出。但此举就算 不会导致经济大萧条，也肯定会带来经济衰 退。2007 年第四季度，美国家庭储蓄仍一如 既往地处于低水平，仅占 GDP 的 2%。想像 一下家庭储蓄迅速回升至上世纪 90 年代初 策马翻译培训 EU interpretation training | A zh-en 5 www.cemachina.com swiftly back to where they were in the early 1990s. That would be an increase of 4 percentage points of GDP. The result would be a deep recession. It is no surprise, therefore, that politicians are trying to rescue the housing market, while the Federal Reserve has been slashing interest rates with vigour. 的水平。这相当于 GDP 增长 4 个百分点。其 结果将是一场深度的经济衰退。因此，难怪 政客们正试图对住宅市场施以援手，而美联 储(Fed)则一直在积极降息。 In such predicaments, the government always emerges as the lender, borrower and spender of last resort. It will act by bailing out insolvent people and institutions, by either replacing or guaranteeing the lending activities of the private financial sector and, not least, by running larger fiscal deficits, as private-sector financial deficits shrink. 面临这种困境，政府总是以最后贷款 人、借款人和支出人的面目出现。政府将采 取行动，为资不抵债的个人和机构纾困，取 代私营金融领域的放贷活动或为其提供担 保，还有重要的一点是，由于私营部门财政 赤字收窄，政府的财政赤字扩大。 It should be no surprise, therefore, that the principal balance-sheet effect of Japan's long crisis was a rise in the government's gross debt from 70 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 180 per cent at the end of last year. Leverage did not so much disappear as become socialised. 因此，日本长期危机对资产负债状况的 主要影响，是政府债务总额从 1990 年 GDP 的 70%升至去年年底的 180%，对此我们不应 感到奇怪。债务并没有消失，而是被社会化 了。 Similarly, a rise in the indebtedness of the US government is an almost inevitable consequence of any prolonged financial crisis. A jump in public debt is an invisible increase in long-term private obligations. But this is socialised private debt: the prudent pay for the profligate. 同样，一旦出现长期金融危机，美国政 府负债水平上升将几乎是不可避免的。公共 债务大幅增加，意味着长期私人债务无形的 增加。但这是社会化的私人债务：节减者将 为挥霍者埋单。 An escape from the public sector's debt trap exists: the mass default known as inflation. By destroying the purchasing power of money, the government can engineer a speedy reduction in indebtedness across the economy, at the expense of creditors, principally the elderly and foreigners. Inflation is a magic tax on creditors whose proceeds are directly transferred to debtors. 目前存在一个逃脱公共部门债务陷阱 的出口：被称之为“通货膨胀”的大规模违 约。通过破坏货币的购买力，政府可以操纵 整个经济的负债水平迅速下降，这是以牺牲 债权人的利益为代价的，主要是那些老年人 和外国人。通胀是对债权人征收的“神奇” 赋税，他们的收益被直接转给了债务人。 The bottom line is simple. Neither households nor the financial sector, as a whole, can de-leverage swiftly, other than via 结论非常简单。无论家庭还是整个金融 行业，都无法迅速降低负债水平，除非通过 灾难性的大规模违约，或将其债务转移到其 策马翻译培训 EU interpretation training | A zh-en 6 www.cemachina.com a calamitous mass default or by shifting their debt elsewhere, usually on to the government. For an entire economy, particularly a huge one, to recover from debt-addiction is hard. However much one may loathe the idea, a private-sector financial mania will finish up as public-sector pain. 它地方——通常是转移给政府。对整体经济 ——尤其是大型经济体——而言，要戒除举 债瘾十分困难。不过，很多人可能会憎恶这 个观点：私营部门的金融狂热最终将成为公 共部门的痛楚。 * UBS Investment Research, 27th March; george.magnus@ubs.com ** ‘Globalisation, asset prices and the recent turmoil', www.banque-france.fr *《瑞银投资研究》 (UBS Investment Research) ， 3 月 27 日 ， george.magnus@ubs.com； **《全球化、资产价格和近期震荡》 (Globalisation, asset prices and the recent turmoil)，www.banque-france.fr / 节俭者为挥霍者埋单？ Now the prudent will have to bear the cost of profligacy ÛŸ�OiÃVrÐaÒdłŁ„&{ŠË�ÓΡ6*í(È�r�Á