Belief in Control

Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China* Pitman B. Potter ABSTRACT This article examines the regulation of religion in China, in the context of changing social expectations and resulting dilemmas of regime legitimacy. The post-Mao government has permitted limited freedom of religious belief, subject to legal and regulatory restrictions on religious behaviour. However, this distinction between belief and behaviour poses challenges for the regime’s efforts to maintain political control while preserving an image of tolerance aimed at building legitimacy. By examining the regulation of religion in the context of patterns of compliance and resistance in religious conduct, the article attempts to explain how efforts to control religion raise challenges for regime legitimacy. The relationship between religion and state power in China has long been contested. Dynastic relations with religious organizations and doctrine included attempts to capture legitimacy through sponsorship of ritual, while folk religions continued to thrive in local society despite ongoing attempts at official control.1 In addition, religion was a significant source of resistance to imperial rule, often in the form of secret societies attempting to remain aloof from official control,2 as well as through peasant uprisings inspired by religious devotion.3 During the Maoist period, programmes of socialist transformation challenged the social bases for traditional Chinese folk religions, while policies of political monopoly attacked those limited examples of organized religion that could be identified and targeted.4 In post-Mao China, the regime adopted a somewhat more tolerant perspective on religion.5 As a component of a new approach to building * The research for this article was made possible by a strategic grant on Globalization and Social Cohesion in Asia from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), for which I am grateful. I would like also to thank Meera Bawa, a graduate student and law student at UBC for her research assistance. 1. See generally Stephen Feuchtwang, “School-temple and city god,” in Arthur P. Wolf (ed.), Studies in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 103–130; C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). 2. See e.g. David Ownby, Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in mid-Qing China: The Formation of a Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 3. See generally, Elizabeth J. Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) and Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980); Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). 4. See generally, Rennselaer W. Lee III, “General aspects of Chinese communist religious policy, with Soviet comparisons,” The China Quarterly, No. 19 (1964), pp. 161–173. 5. See generally Liu Peng, “Church and state relations in China: characteristics and trends,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 5, No. 11 (1996), pp. 69–79; Donald E. MacInnis, Religion in China Today: Policy and Practice (Maryknoll NY: Orbis, 1989); Chang  The China Quarterly, 2003 318 The China Quarterly regime legitimacy,6 the government accepted a trade-off of broader social and economic autonomy in exchange for continued political loyalty. Thus, beginning in the 1980s, a “zone of indifference”7 into which the government chose not to intervene was cautiously expanded in areas of social and economic relations. While the government’s concession of socio-economic autonomy was not enforceable through formal institu- tions or processes, it remained an important source of popular support that could not easily be repudiated except in response to perceived political disloyalty by the citizenry. This tension between autonomy and loyalty is particularly evident in the area of religion. While China’s expanding participation in the world economy has seen increased international criticism on human rights grounds of policies aimed at controlling religious practices,8 the import- ance of the regulation of religion rests primarily on domestic factors of authority and legitimacy. Religion represents a fault line of sorts in the regime’s effort to build legitimacy through social policy. As a rich array of religious belief systems re-emerges,9 the regime faces continued challenges of maintaining sufficient authority to ensure political control while still presenting a broad image of tolerance. This article examines the regulation of religion in China in the context of these dimensions of legitimacy and political authority. Regulation of Religion: Maintaining the Balance Between Autonomy and Loyalty As with many features of social regulation in China, the regulation of religion proceeds essentially from the policy dictates of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which are then expressed and enforced in part through law and administrative regulation. Dissemination and enforce- ment of Party policies on religion is the responsibility of an intersecting network of Party and governmental organizations.10 Prior to his retire- ment following the 16th National CCP Congress, Politburo Standing Committee member Li Ruihuan had particular responsibility for religious affairs, while Politburo member in charge of propaganda Ding Guangen footnote continued Chi-p’eng, “The CCP’s policy toward religion,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 19, No. 5 (September 1983), pp. 55–70. 6. See generally Pitman B. Potter, “Riding the tiger – legitimacy and legal culture in post-Mao China,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1994), pp. 325–358. 7. Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 18. 8. See e.g. Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion (1997), Human Rights Watch/Asia, Continuing Religious Repression in China (1993), US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “China country report on human rights practices, 2000” (23 February 2001). 9. See generally, Chan Kim-Kwong and Alan Hunter, “Religion and society in mainland China in the 1990s,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 30, No. 8 (August 1994), pp. 52–68; Julia Ching, “Is there religious freedom in China?” America, Vol. 162, No. 22 (9 June 1990), pp. 566–570. 10. See generally, Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion (1997), ch. 3; MacInnis, Religion in China Today, pp. 1–5. 319Belief in Control also played an important role.11 The Party’s United Front Work Depart- ment is charged with detailed policy formulation and enforcement, sub- ject to general Party policy directives.12 The State Council’s Religious Affairs Bureau has responsibility for regulatory initiatives and supervi- sion aimed at implementing Party policy.13 Public Security departments have taken broad responsibility to enforce regulations controlling religious activities, and have participated actively in suppression cam- paigns. Party policy. Party policy on religion over the past 20 years has reflected a marked departure from the repressive policies of the Maoist period. The Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978 supported conclusions about the decline of class struggle.14 This led in turn to gradual acceptance of broader diversity of social and economic practices, including a relaxation of Party policy on religion. The official summary of CCP policy on religion issued in 1982 as “Document 19” stated the basic policy as one of respect for and protection of the freedom of religious belief, pending such future time when religion itself will disappear.15 While recognizing that religious belief was a private matter, and acknowledging that coercion to prevent religious belief would be counterproductive,16 Party policy nevertheless privileged the freedom not 11. See “Li Ruihuan meets religious leaders,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service 31 January 2000, in FBIS Daily Report – China (FBIS-CHI-2000–0201) 1 February 2000. In the official Xinhua report on the National Work Conference on Religion, 10–12 December 2001, Li Ruihuan was listed just after Li Peng and Zhu Rongji and ahead of Hu Jintao among the leaders attending. See “Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi zai jing juxing” (“National work conference on religion convenes in Beijing”) Renmin wang (People’s Net) (electronic service) (12 December 2001). Ding Guangen was listed first among the chairs of the Work Conference. 12. UFWD Director Wang Zhaoguo’s public statements on united front work regarding religion have echoed the central tenets of Party policy on issues of Party and state guidance of religion and the need for religions to adapt to the needs of socialism. See e.g. “Wang Zhaoguo on PRC united front work,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 8 January 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000–0110, 11 January 2000. 13. See e.g. Ye Xiaowen, “China’s current religious question: once again an inquiry into the five characteristics of religion” (22 March 1996), Appendix X in Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion (1997), pp. 116–144. 14. See “Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao” (“Communique´ of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee”), Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 1 (1979), pp. 14–21. 15. See “Guanyu woguo shehuizhuyi shiqi zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben zhengce” (“Basic viewpoints and policies on religious issues during our country’s socialist period”) (31 March 1982), in Xu Yucheng, Zongjiao zhengce falu¨ zhishi dawen (Responses to Questions about Knowledge of Law and Policy on Religion) (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1997), pp. 287–305, at p. 292. An English translation appears as “Document 19,” Appendix 2 in Mickey Spiegel, “Freedom of religion in China” (Washington, London and Brussels: Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1992), pp. 33–45. For discussion of circumstances surrounding the issue of Document 19, see Luo Guangwu, Xin Zhongguo zongjiao gongzuo da shi yaojian (Outline of Major Events in Religious Work in the New China) (Beijing: Chinese culture (huawen) press, 2001), pp. 298–304. 16. Herein perhaps lay a recognition of the limits of CCP policies that under Mao attempted to repress local religious practices and traditions. See generally, Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), esp. pp. 234–35, 268–270. Also see Stephan Feuchtwang, “Religion as resistance,” in Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (eds.), Chinese Society: Change Conflict and Resistance (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 161–177. 320 The China Quarterly to believe in religion. It also recognized only five religions, Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, in an effort to exclude folk religions, superstition and cults from the bounds of protection.17 The Party was also committed to unremitting propaganda to support atheism, and to using its control over the educational system to marginalize religious belief.18 Document 19 prohibited grants of “feudal privileges” to religious organizations and otherwise limited their capacity to recruit, proselytize and raise funds. Education of clergy and administration of religious organizations and buildings aimed to ensure that religious leaders remained loyal to principles of Party leadership, socialism, and national and ethnic unity. Document 19 also prohibited Party members from believing in or participating in religion.19 While the early 1980s signalled an important phase of liberalization in comparison to previous periods, the Party remained concerned primarily with enforcing social control, under the rubric of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the central role of Party leadership in the process of socialist modernization.20 Significant social unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in 1988–89,21 coupled with the nation-wide crisis created by the 1989 democracy movement, posed particular challenges. In 1991, the CCP Central Committee/State Council’s “Document No. 6” expressed the regime’s policy response that attempted to co-opt religious adherents while also repressing challenges to Party power.22 Document No. 6 emphasized increased regulatory control over all religious activities: “Implementing administration of religious affairs is aimed at bringing religious activities within the bounds of law, regulation, and policy, but not to interfere with normal religious activities or the internal affairs of religious organizations.”23 While the reference to non-interference seemed benign, the qualification that this extended only to “normal” activities suggested an overarching purpose to confine religion to the limits of law and policy. Document No. 6 grew out of the State Council’s National Work Conference on Religion on 5–9 December 1990, at which there was relatively frank discussion on the number of religious adherents in China and a recognition of the need for limited tolerance.24 Following Li Peng’s 17. Ibid. Also MacInnis, Religion in China Today, pp. 385–410. For parallels to religious policies under the Qing, see Ownby, Brotherhoods and Secret Societies; Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China. 18. See generally, MacInnis, Religion in China Today, pp. 411–19. 19. “Basic view points and policies,” pp. 299–301. 20. See Preamble to the 1982 Constitution of the PRC (Beijing: Law Publishers, 1986). 21. On Tibet, see Melvyn Goldstein, “Tibet, China and the United States: reflections on the Tibet question,” Atlantic Council Occasional Paper (April 1995), pp. 38–48. On Xinjiang, see Felix K. Chang, “China’s Central Asian power and problems,” Orbis, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 401–426. 22. “Guanyu jinyibu zuohao zongjiao gongzuo ruogan wenti de tongzhi” extracted in Luo Guangwu, pp. 434–37. English text appears as “Document 6: CCP Central Committee/State Council, circular on some problems concerning further improving work on religion” (5 February 1991), Appendix 1 in Spiegel, “Freedom of Religion in China,” pp. 27–32. 23. See Ibid. pp. 435–36. Also see Chan Kim-Kwong and Alan Hunter, “New light on religious policy in the PRC,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 21–36 24. For discussion of the work conference, see Luo Guangwu, pp. 428–432. 321Belief in Control exhortation to ensure strict enforcement of Party policy and state law on control of religion, Jiang Zemin took a more relaxed tack, calling for a united front approach that included tolerant management of religious organizations, policies on religion that were suited to broader pro- grammes of reform and opening up, and a recognition that religion “affects the masses of a billion people” (shejidao qian baiwan qunzhong) and that resolution of issues of religion would have significance for national stability, ethnic unity and the promotion of socialist culture. In anticipation of the issuance of Document No. 6, Jiang called the five leaders of national religious organizations to Zhongnanhai for a briefing, emphasizing the balance between limited tolerance of religious activities that conformed to Party policy, and repression of heterodoxy.25 Document No. 6 claimed to protect freedom of religious belief, while requiring believers to comply with imperatives of Party leadership, social stability and social interests. The document reiterated provisions of the 1982 Document No. 19, on the right not to believe in religion. Document No. 6 directed public security organs to take forceful measures to curb those who use religious activities to “engage in disruptive activities,” “stir up trouble, endanger public safety, and weaken the unification of the country and national unity,” or “collude with hostile forces outside the country to endanger China’s security.” Apart from their utility in justify- ing restrictions on religious activities in Tibet and Xinjiang and prohibi- tions against Christian practitioners from Taiwan,26 these provisions also limited proselytization, recruitment, fund-raising and other activities in support of organized religion.27 Despite efforts at official control, a religious revival in China gathered significant momentum through the 1990s.28 The Party’s policy response recognized five basic characteristics of religion that had been identified and formalized by the CCP’s United Front Work Department in the late 1950s and then reiterated in 1989.29 These stressed the long-term charac- ter of religion and its mass base, national and international aspects, and complexity. The long-term character of religion militated in favour of patient persistence in Party policies of co-optation and control. The mass character served as a cautionary note that the Party could not easily 25. Ibid. pp. 432–34. 26. With increased (albeit indirect) travel between Taiwan and the mainland in the 1980s, the links between Taiwan relations and religious affairs became a matter of particular concern. See Religious Affairs Bureau and Taiwan Affairs Office, “Institutional secret, national edict on religion” (guo zhongfa), No. 128 (13 November 1989), in Chan and Hunter, “New light on religious policy in the PRC,” pp. 21–36 at pp. 30–31. 27. Spiegel, “Freedom of religion in China,” pp. 8–13. 28. See generally, Jaime Florcruz et al., “Inside China’s search for its soul,” Time, Vol. 15, No. 14 (4 October 1999), pp. 68–72; Adam Brookes and Susan V. Lawrence, “Gods and demons,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 May 1999, pp. 38–40; Arthur Waldron, “Religious revivals in Communist China,” Orbis, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 323–332; Donald MacInnis, “From suppression to repression: religion in China today,” Current History, Vol. 95 (September 1996), pp. 284–89; Matt Forney, “God’s country,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 June 1996, pp. 46–48. 29. Ye Xiaowen “China’s current religious question: once again an inquiry into the five characteristics of religion” (22 March 1996), in Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion (1997), pp. 116–144 at pp. 117–18. 322 The China Quarterly ignore or control the some 100 million people believed to participate in religion. The links between religion and national and international ques- tions called for attention to the interplay between ethnicity in such areas as Tibet and Xinjiang and the imported religions of Buddhism and Islam. The complexity of religion was seen to require careful analysis of the processes of popular belief as a prerequisite for effective policy. In the face of these conditions, Party authorities on religion focused on strengthening administration of religious affairs according to law, and on actively guiding religions to enable them to adapt to socialist society.30 While the educational function of Party policy represented a method of indirect control over clergy and believers,31 administration according to law imposed criminal and administrative sanctions for religious activities used to “oppose the Party and the socialist system, undermine the unification of the country, social stability and national unity, or infringe on the legitimate interests of the state….”32 Party policy was less tolerant of local sects seeking broader autonomy from the Party and the govern- ment,33 while also urging vigilance against infiltration of China by hostile foreign elements under the guise of religion. The United States was portrayed as particularly interested in using religion to subvert China.34 The State Council’s 1997 “White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China” reiterated the point that “religion should be adapted to the society where it is prevalent” and the religions must “conduct their activities within the sphere prescribed by law and adapt to social and cultural progress.”35 Pursuant to these principles, t