关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响英文文献翻译（可编辑）

关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响英文文献翻译（可编辑） 关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响英文文献翻译 The Impact of Capital Structure on Agency Costs [Abstract] This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the agency costs hypothesis which suggests that increase of leverage may reduce agency costs. Both multivariate tests and univariate tests are employed in this study. The multivariate tests reveal that general relationship between leverage and agency costs is significantly negative. Univariate tests are further used to assess whether agency costs are significantly different when a firm has a relatively higher debt to asset ratio from when it is less leveraged. Similar supporting evidence is found for the agency costs hypothesis. Moreover, results from the univariate tests also indicate that this general negative relationship no longer holds when an extremely high level of leverage is present [Keywords] Agency costs, Leverage, Agency costs hypothesis, and Opposite effect 1. Introduction In their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling 1976 point out that agency costs occur due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and the owner’s interests. The separation of ownership and control may generate agency costs. Two types of agency costs are identified in the paper by Jensen and Meckling 1976: agency costs derived from conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-managers, and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. From then on, a great amount of research has been devoted to demonstrate the interaction between agency costs and financial decisions, governance decisions, dividend policy, and capital structure decisions Much empirical evidence collected by researchers, for example, Ang et al. 2000, and Fleming et al. 2005, shows that agency costs generated from the conflicts between outside equity holders and owner-manager could be reduced by increasing the owner-managers’ proportion in equity, i.e., agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership. However, the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders would be more complicated. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling 1976 argue that there should be an optimal capital structure, under which the lowest agency costs of a firm can be deduced from an independent variable --- “the ratio of outside equity to the whole outside financing”. The locus of agency costs, which is equal to agency costs of outside equity and the ones of debt, would be a convex curve. This implies that agency costs should not be monotonic any more Some researchers such as Grossman and Hart 1982; Williams 1987, argue that high leverage reduces agency costs and increases firm value by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of equity holders. This argument is known as the agency costs hypothesis. Higher leverage may reduce agency costs through the monitoring activities by debt holders Ang et al., 2000, the threat of liquidation which may cause managers to lose reputation, salaries, etc. William, 1987, pressure to generate cash flow for the payment of interest expenses Jensen 1986, and curtailment of overinvestment Harvey et al., 2004 However, as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases beyond a certain point, the opposite effect of leverage on agency costs may occur Altman, 1984 and Titman, 1984. When leverage becomes relatively high, further increases may generate significant agency costs. Three reasons are identified in the literature which can cause this opposite effect: first reason is the increase of bankruptcy costs Titman 1984. Second reason is that managers may reduce their effort to control risk which result in higher expected costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, or liquidation Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2005. Finally, inefficient use of excessive cash used by managers for empire building would also increase agency costs Jensen, 19862. Literature Review Jensen and Meckling 1976 identify agency costs derived from conflicts between equity holders and owner-managers as “residual loss” which means agent consumes various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the firm to imize his own utility. Related to this issue, Harris & Raviv 1990, Childs et al. 2005 and Lee et al. 2004 argue that managers always want to continue firm’s current operations even if liquidation of the firm is preferred by investors. Also, Stulz 1990, Alvarez et al. 2006 and Kent et al. 2004 suggest the manager always want to invest all available funds even if paying out cash is better for outside shareholders, and conflict between the manager and equity holders cannot be resolved through contracts based on cash flows and investment expenditures Agency theory becomes more complicated when debt holders’ interest is considered. As a financing strategy, debt is widely discussed in capital structure literatures. Modigliani and Miller 1963 demonstrate that in order to raise the value of a firm, the amount of debt financing should be as big as possible for tax subsidyii. However, their theory ignores the agency costs of debt. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling 1976 point out that the optimal utilization of debt is when the debt is utilized to the point where marginal wealth benefits of the tax subsidy are just equal to the marginal wealth effects of agency costs A number of researchers focus on the issue of improvement of firm efficiency by reducing agency costs. Some of them focus on the methods to control managers’ behaviors. For instance, Fama 1980 conducts a discussion of how the pressure from managerial labor markets helps to discipline managers. He points out that the key condition to acquire absolute control of managerial behavior through wage adjustments is that the weight of the wage revision process is sufficient enough to resolve any potential managerial incentives problems. Another example is Chance’s 1997 argument on a derivate substitution of executive compensation. He suggests giving the manager stocks without right to vote, which could be beneficial in preventing an executive from wielding too much control. Other researchers are interested in the optimal capital structure under which value of firms could be imized while agency costs could be minimized. Based on these observations, the agency costs hypothesis stating that the leverage affects agency costs is put forward Jensen and Meckling 1976 argue that monitoring activities by debt holders will tend to increase the optimal level of monitoring and therefore will increase the marginal benefits. What’s more, banks which are one of the major sources of external funds especially for small firms also play a crucial role in monitoring the activities of managers However, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling 1976, the effect of leverage on total agency costs could not be monotoniciii. When the proportion of debt in total capital increases beyond a certain point, the loss would increase due to negative net present value projects, and the firm will not be able to meet current payments on a debt obligation, thus bankruptcy will occur Terje et al. 2006. Although Haugen and Senbet 1978 argue that bankruptcy costs are an insignificant determinant of a firm’s capital structure, Altman 1984 finds that indirect costs associated with bankruptcy are not insignificant when these costs are accounted for the first time. Titman 1984 gives a possible theoretical link between liquidation and capital structure. It links the potentially substantial costs associated with liquidation with the event of bankruptcy. Furthermore, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2005 suggest that in highly leveraged firms, managers may shift risk or reduce effort to control risk which would also result in expected costs of financial stress, bankruptcy, or liquidation. Additionally, inefficient use of excessive cash which is derived from higher than normal leverage level for empire building would also increase agency costs Jensen, 1986 Therefore, at low level of leverage, increases of leverage will produce positive incentives for managers and reduce total agency costs by reducing the counterpart of external equity. However, after reaching a certain point, where bankruptcy and distress become more likely and the agency costs of outside debt overwhelm the agency costs of outside equity, any further increases in leverage will then result in higher total agency costs The subject of the measurements of the agency costs magnitude and firm performance has been widely discussed in the literature. These measurements are usually taken by using ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market data. Ang et al. 2000 made one of the first attempts to measure the magnitude of agency costs by two ratios from financial statements. First ratio is a proxy for the so-called direct agency costs. In order to facilitate comparisons, it is standardized as operating expenses to sales ratio. Second ratio is a proxy for the loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization. This type of agency costs is derived from management’s shirking or from poor investment decisions. This ratio is calculated by annual sales to total assets. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 2006 take a different approach and employ profit efficiency as the performance measure. They use profit efficiency, rather than cost efficiency to evaluate the performance of managers, since profit efficiency explains how well managers raise revenues while reduce costs and it processes tighter relationship with the concept of value imization. Additionally, Saunders et al. 1990; Cole and Mehran 1998 use stock market returns and their volatility to measure agency costs and firm performance3. Data and Methodology Data used in this study are drawn from Datastream. 323 UK companies are selected from FTSE ALL SHARE index. We choose UK public companies in this study because of three reasons: First, The UK is a country with mature money and capital markets where debt financing is relatively easy to conduct by companies. Second, imization of shareholders’ wealth is the dominant goal of management in the Anglo-American world which is consistent with the theory this study is based on. Third, data of public companies could reflect the effect of leverage on agency costs more accurately and sensitively especially in the efficient markets like the UK There are five variables used in this study. Table 1 provides a summary of these variables along with definitions. Following Ang et al. 2000’s study, we focus on measuring the direct agency costs which is the ratio of operating expenses to sales. This ratio indicates how effectively the firm’s management controls operating expenses and it tends to capture the impact of agency costs such as excessive perquisite consumption. Operating expenses variable here excludes corporate wages, salaries and other labor-related items, interest expense, rent, leasing and hiring expenses, purchases, depreciation and bad assets written off. A series of checks and filters on the data have been conducted to reduce the sample from a imum of approximately 400iv firms to a final sample of 323 firms for Year 2004 to Year 2005. The top and bottom 5%v are also removed to avoid the possible outlier effect The measurements of leverage and agency costs are critical. Debt to asset ratio is employed which is total debts divided by total assets. However, we do not differentiate between long-term or short-term debt. Three other variables are considered to control other confounding effects: performance proxied by return on asset, firm size proxied by log of sales, and industry classification 13 industry dummies. Note that we include 13 industry dummy variables in this study because the ratio of operating expenses to sales varies across industries due to the varying importance of inventory and fixed assets. 关于资本结构中代理成本理论的影响 [导言] 本文旨在提供经验证据对代理成本假说这 表 关于同志近三年现实表现材料材料类招标技术评分表图表与交易pdf视力表打印pdf用图表说话 pdf 明增加的杠杆可以减少 代理成本。两个多元测试和单变量测试用于这项研究。多变量测试显示,一般关 系和代理成本显著杠杆消极。单变量的测试是用来评估是否进一步代理成本有明 显的不同,当一家公司有一个相对更高的债务资产比率从当它是更少的杠杆。类似的证据被发现为代理成本假说。此外,结果从单变量测试还表明这一普遍的负面关系不再适用,当一个非常高水平的杠杆是礼物。 [关键词] 代理成本、杠杆、代理成本假说,相反的效果 1.介绍 在他们的开创性工作,詹森和梅克林1976指出,代理成本发生由于不完全对齐的代理和业主的利益。所有权与控制权的分离可能产生代理成本。两种类型的代理成本中确定论文詹森和梅克林1976:代理成本之间的冲突源于股权持有人和负责人,外与矛盾,股权持有人和债务持有人。从那以后,大量的研究一直致力于证明代理成本之间的交互和财务决策、治理决策,股利政策和资本结构决策。 很多实证研究人员搜集的证据,例如,Ang et al. 2000,弗莱明et al.2005表明,代理成本之间产生的冲突外,股权持有人和老总可以减少通过增加所有者和管理者的比例股权,即代理成本成反比的变化与经理的所有权。然而,股权持有人之间的冲突和债券持有者将更为复杂。从理论上讲,詹森和梅克林1976认为应该存在一个最优的资本结构,即代理成本最低的一个公司可以推断,从一个独立的变量- - - - -“比外部股权整个外部融资”。这个轨迹的代理成本,这等于外部股权代理成本,那些债务,将是一个凸曲线。这意味着代理成本不应该单调更多。 一些研究人员如格罗斯曼和哈特1982;威廉姆斯1987,认为高杠杆降低代理成本,增加公司价值,鼓励管理者行为的利益,股权持有人。这个论点是被称为代理成本假说。高杠杆可能减少代理成本通过监测活动由债券持有者Ang et al.,2000,这可能导致威胁清算经理失去声誉,工资,等等。威廉姆,1987、压力产生的现金流支付利息费用詹森1986,和缩减的过度投资Harvey等人,2004。 然而,随着比例的债务资本结构增加到一定程度,相反的效果,利用代理成本可能发生奥特曼,1984年Titman。当杠杆变得相对较高,进一步增加可能产生重要的代理成本。三个原因中确定文学会导致该相反的效果:第一个原因是破产成本的增加Titman 1984。第二个原因是,经理可能会减少他们的努力控制风险,导致更高的财务困境的预期成本、破产或清算伯杰和Bonaccorsi di帕蒂,2005。最后,利用效率低,过度的现金使用的经理也会增加帝国的建立代理成本延森,1986。 2.文献综述 詹森和梅克林1976确定代理成本来源于股票持有者之间的冲突和所有者和管理者为“剩余损失”这意味着剂消耗各种经济和耐公司受益最大化自己的效用。与此相关的问题,Harris &雷维夫1990,蔡尔兹et al.2005和李et al.2004认为,经理总是想继续公司的当前操作即使清算公司青睐的投资者。同时,以及1990,阿尔瓦雷斯et al.2006和肯特et al.2004建议经理总是想投资所有可用资金即使支付现金是更好的为外部股东和经理之间的冲突和股票持有者通过 合同 劳动合同范本免费下载装修合同范本免费下载租赁合同免费下载房屋买卖合同下载劳务合同范本下载 无法解决基于现金流和投资支出。 代理理论变得更加复杂当债券持有者的利益考虑。作为一个融资策略,债务资本结构文献的广泛讨论。莫迪利阿尼和米勒1963表明,为了提高公司的价值,债务融资的数量应尽可能大的税收。然而,他们的理论忽略了债务的代理成本。从理论上讲,詹森和梅克林1976指出,最优利用债务是当债务是用来点财富的边际效益税收补贴只是等于边际财富效应的代理成本。 许多研究者关注的问题,提高公司效率,减少代理成本。他们中的一些人关注的 方法 快递客服问题件处理详细方法山木方法pdf计算方法pdf华与华方法下载八字理论方法下载 来控制经理的行为。例如,法玛1980进行讨论如何管理劳动市场的压力有助于纪律管理者。他指出,关键条件获得绝对控制的管理行为通过工资调整,工资的重量修订过程足以解决任何潜在的管理激励问题。另一个例子是机会1997的参数在一个衍生物替代的高管薪酬。他建议给经理股票没有选举权,可以有效防止执行从挥舞着太多的控制。其他研究人员感兴趣的最优资本结构下,公司的价值可以最大化而代理成本可以最小化。基于这些观察,代理成本假说指出杠杆影响提出了代理成本。 詹森和梅克林1976认为监测活动由债务持有人将倾向于增加最优水平的监测,因此会增加边际效益。更重要的是,银行的一个主要来源的外部资金尤其是小公司也发挥着至关重要的作用在监测活动的管理者。 然而,詹森和梅克林所显示1976的影响,利用总不能代理成本。当比例的债务在总资本增加到一定程度,损失会增加由于负净现值的项目,该公司将无法满足当前支付债务,因此破产会发生部et al. 2006。尽管Haugen和Senbet1978认为,破产成本是一个微不足道的行列式的公司资本结构、奥特曼1984发现,间接成本与破产相关不多但当这些成本占了第一次。Titman1984给出了一个可能的理论和资本结构之间的联系。清算它把潜在的大量的相关成本与破产清算的情况。此外,伯杰和帕蒂2005表明,在高杠杆公司,经理可能转移风险或减少努力控制风险,也会导致预期成本的金融压力,破产,或清算。此外,利用效率低,过度现金来自杠杆水平高于正常为帝国的建立也会增加代理成本延森,1986。 因此,在低水平的杠杆,杠杆的增加将会产生积极的激励经理和降低代理成本总额减少所对应的外部股权。然而,在达到某一点,破产和痛苦会变得更有可 能和代理成本的外部债务压倒了代理成本的外部股权,进一步增加杠杆将导致更高的总机构成本。 测量的主题的代理成本规模和公司业绩已广泛在文献中讨论。这些测量通常被使用比率由财务报表或股票市场数据。Ang et al.2000的第一个试图衡量代理成本的大小由两个比率从财务报表。第一个比是一个代理为所谓的直接代理成本。为了便于比较,它是标准化作为营业费用销售比率。第二比是一个代理的收入损失归因于低效资产利用率。这种类型的代理成本来自管理层的逃避或从糟糕的投资决策。这个比例计算年度销售总资产。伯杰和帕蒂2006采用一种不同的方法和采用利润效率作为衡量工作表现的。他们使用利润效率,而不是成本效率性能的评价管理者,因为利润效率解释了如何提高收入,同时减少成本经理和这过程紧密关系与价值最大化的概念。此外,桑德斯et al.1990;科尔和迈赫兰1998使用股票市场回报率和波动率度量代理成本和公司业绩。 3.数据和方法论 本研究中使用的数据来自323名英国公司DataStream数据。选自富时全股指数。我们选择英国上市公司在这项研究中,因为三个原因:第一,英国是一个国家货币和资本市场成熟,债务融资相对容易通过公司进行。第二,最大化股东的财富是占主导地位的管理的目的在英美国家是符合本研究的理论依据。第三,数据可能反映了上市公司的财务杠杆率的影响在代理成本更准确和敏感特别是在有效市场喜欢英国。 有五个变量用于这项研究。表1 总结 初级经济法重点总结下载党员个人总结TXt高中句型全总结.doc高中句型全总结.doc理论力学知识点总结pdf 了这些变量以及定义。遵循盎et al.2000的研究中,我们关注测量直接代理成本,营业费用的比例来销售。这个比率表明公司的管理如何有效地控制成本,它往往抓住影响代理成本如过度特权消 费。营业费用变量这里排除了企业工资、薪水和其他劳动相关物品,利息费用、租金、租赁和招聘费用、购买、折旧和不良资产注销。一系列的检查和过滤数据进行了减少样本最多约400四世公司最后一个样本的323家公司的2004年到2005年。顶部和底部5% v也删除,以避免可能的异常效应。 测量的杠杆和代理成本是至关重要的。债务资产比率是就业这是负债总额除以资产总额。然而,我们并不区分长期或短期债务。其他三个变量被认为控制其他混杂效应:性能代理收益资产,公司规模出具日志的销售,和行业分类13个行业假人。请注意,我们包括13个行业虚变量在这项研究中,因为比营业费用有所不同行业的销售由于不同存货及固定资产的重要性。