Political political theory

PoliticalPoliticalTheory:AnInauguralLectureJeremyWaldronLaw,NewYorkUniversity;Politics,OxfordUniversityI.HUMEONPERSONSVERSUSINSTITUTIONSITisaquestion,saidDavidHume,“whethertherebeanyessentialdifferencebetweenoneformofgovernmentandanotherand,whethereveryformmaynotbecomegoodorbad,accordingasitiswellorilladministered,”1administeredwellbymenofvirtue—thatis,peopleofgoodcharacter,wisdom,andhighprinciple—oradministeredbadlybyfoolsandknaveswhoknoworcarenothingforjusticeandthecommongood.“Wereitonceadmitted,”Humecontinued,“thatallgovernmentsarealike,andthattheonlydifferenceconsistsinthecharacterandconductofthegovernors,mostpoliticaldisputeswouldbeatanend,andallzealforoneconstitutionaboveanother,mustbeesteemedmerebigotryandfolly.”2HumeimaginespeoplewhotakethatviewadoptingthemaximofAlexanderPopeintheEssayonMan:“ForformsofgovernmentletfoolscontestWhate’erisbestadminister’disbest.”3Institutionsorthecharacterofthosewhoinhabitthem?Shouldstudentsofpoliticsmakeastudyoftheoneortheother?Both,surely,wouldbetheobviousanswer.Theyshouldunderstandsomethingofpoliticalvirtueandthedemandsthattherequirementsofgoodgovernmentmakeonthecharacterofthosewhotakeonresponsibilityforpublicaffairs,evenifitisnomorethantheethicofresponsibilitythatMaxWeberrecommended.4Butmaybethereisaspecialreasonforstudyinginstitutions:tounderstandthewaysinwhichinstitutionalformscanbedesignedsoastooutwitandoutflankwhatHumecalled“thecasualhumoursandcharactersofparticularmen.”5Politicalwritershaveestablisheditasamaxim,that,incontrivinganysystemofgovernment,andfixingtheseveralchecksandcontroulsoftheconstitution,everymanoughttobesupposedaknave,andtohavenootherend,inallhisactions,thanprivateinterest.Bythisinterestwemustgovernhim,and,bymeansofit,makehim,ThisarticlewasdeliveredattheUniversityofOxfordonMay3,2012asanInauguralLecturefortheChicheleProfessorshipofSocialandPoliticalTheory.IammostgratefultotheeditorandrefereesfortheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophyfortheirsuggestionsinrevisingthisforpublication.1DavidHume,“Thatpoliticsmaybereducedtoascience,”inHume,Essays:Moral,PoliticalLiterary,ed.E.F.Miller(Indianapolis:LibertyClassics,1985),p.14.2Ibid.,pp.14–15.3Ibid.,p.14n.4MaxWeber,“Politicsasavocation,”FromMaxWeber:EssaysinSociology,ed.H.H.GerthandC.WrightMills(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1958),pp.120–6.5Hume,“Thatpoliticsmaybereducedtoascience,”p.15.TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy©2012BlackwellPublishingLtd.,9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX42DQ,UKand350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA.doi:10.1111jopp.12007notwithstandinghisinsatiableavariceandambition,cooperatetopublicgood.Withoutthisweshallinvainboastoftheadvantagesofanyconstitution,andshallfind,intheend,thatwehavenosecurityforourlibertiesorpossessions,exceptthegoodwillofourrulers;thatis,weshallhavenosecurityatall.6Theideathatwecandevisestructuresandprocessestobalancetheselfinterestofmenagainstoneanothertopromotethecommongood,evenwhenthatisnottheprimeaimoftheindividualswhosepoliticalhabitatwearedesigning,isfamiliartoAmericansfromJamesMadison’sdiscourseabouttheseparationofpowersinTheFederalistPapers:Ambitionmustbemadetocounteractambition.Itmaybeareflectiononhumannature,thatsuchdevicesshouldbenecessarytocontroltheabusesofgovernment.Butwhatisgovernmentitself,butthegreatestofallreflectionsonhumannature?Ifmenwereangels,nogovernmentwouldbenecessary.7ItisanticipatedpreciselyintheHumeanessaysIhavebeenquotingfrom,writtenagenerationearlierthanMadison.II.CHOICESFORPOLITICALTHEORYOneoftheplacesinwhichHumepursuedtheconsiderationsIhavementionedisinanessaydevotedtothequestionofwhetherpoliticsmaybereducedtoascience.Humeseemstohavebelievedthatpoliticalsciencewouldbeimpossibleifeverythingdependedonindividualcharacter.Nopoliticalscience,justbedsidebiographies.However,fortunatelyforthescientist,“theforceoflaws,andofparticularformsofgovernment,”issogreatandhas“solittledependenceonthehumoursandtempersofmen,thatconsequencesalmostasgeneralandcertainmaysometimesbededucedfromthem”asthosewecandeduceinthenaturalandmathematicalsciences.8Now,thechairwhosesixthoccupancywasinauguratedinthislectureisnotdevotedtopoliticalscience;itisdevotedtosocialandpoliticaltheory.Butwith6DavidHume,“Ontheindependenceofparliament,”Essays:Moral,PoliticalLiterary,p.42.7JamesMadison,“FederalistNo.51,”inJamesMadison,AlexanderHamilton,andJohnJay,TheFederalistPapers,ed.I.Kramnick(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1987),p.319.SeealsoImmanuelKant’sinsistenceintheessayonPerpetualPeacethat“[t]heproblemoforganizinganationissolvableevenforapeoplecomprisedofdevils,ifonlytheypossessunderstanding.”AccordingtoKant,theproblemisthis:“Soorderandorganizeagroupofrationalbeingswhorequireuniversallawsfortheirpreservation—thougheachissecretlyinclinedtoexempthimselffromsuchlaws—that,whiletheirprivateattitudesconflict,thesenonethelesssocanceloneanotherthatthesebeingsbehavepubliclyjustasiftheyhadnoevilattitudes”;ImmanuelKant,PerpetualPeaceandOtherEssays,trans.TedHumphrey(Indianapolis:Hackett,1983),p.124.ForsomeskepticismaboutMadison’sversionofthisideaseeDarylLevinsonandRichardPildes,“Separationofparties,notpowers,”HarvardLawReview,119(2006),2312–86,atp.2317:“Madison’svisionofcompetitivebranchesbalancingandcheckingoneanotherhasdominatedconstitutionalthoughtabouttheseparationofpowersthroughthepresent.YetithasneverbeenclearexactlyhowtheMadisonianmachinewassupposedtooperate.”8Hume,“Thatpoliticsmaybereducedtoascience,”p.16.2JEREMYWALDRONregardtothepoliticaltheory,therearesimilarchoicestobemade.Whereshouldwedirectourphilosophicalenergies?Shouldwefocusoninstitutions?Orshouldwefocusonthevirtues—looking,forexample,totestMachiavelli’sclaimthatpoliticsdemandsasetofvirtuesquitedifferentfromthoseextolledintheChristiantradition,9ortheclaimofsomepoliticaltheoriststhatrepublicananddemocraticformsofgovernmentcannotsurvivewithouttheprevalenceofcertainvirtuesofselfrestraintamongthepoliticallyactivesectionofthepopulation?10Isthatcorrect?OristhereaversionoftheHumeMadisonthesisforsubjectsaswellastheirrulers?Canwesodesignourinstitutionsinamoderndemocracythatademocraticconstitutioncansurvivethecorruptionofthepeople,theirobsessionwithmaterialwealth,andtheirrevealedunwillingnesstosacrificeanythingfortheircountry?Whatmatters—structuresorcharacter,institutionsorvirtue?III.G.A.COHENMypredecessorintheChicheleChairofSocialandPoliticalTheorywasG.A.Cohen.OneofthemoststrikingargumentspursuedbyCoheninhisrecentworkinvolvedaversionofourHumeanquestion.Cohenasked:whenweareconsideringwhatisnecessaryforajustsociety,shouldweconsideronlythepossibilityofchangestothesociety’sinstitutionalstructureormustweconsideralsothepossibilityofchangesatthelevelofthevirtuespossessedbythemembersofthesocietythatwewanttomakemoreequal?11Itisnotexactlyaneitherorquestion,sinceinstitutionsdonotchangebymagic.Wecannotimaginethechangesthatwouldbenecessarytomakethebasicstructureofoursocietymoreequalwithoutchangesofheartonthepartofthosewhohavecontroltheinstitutionsandonthepartofthosewhopressurethemandvoteforthemoragainstthem.StillCohenpressedaversionofHume’squestion.Apartfromwhateverchangesofheartarenecessarytogenerateinstitutionalchange,canasocietyreallybejustifweimagineonlyitsstructuresbeingchanged,notthecharacterofthecitizens—inRousseau’sformulation,takingmenastheyareandlawsastheymightbe?12CohenfocusedthisquestiononaparticularsuggestionbyJohnRawls,totheeffectthatoneofhisprinciplesofsocialjustice,callingfortheameliorationofthepositionoftheworstoffgroupinsociety,mightrequireinequality.Thetalented9Machiavelli,ThePrince,ed.Q.SkinnerandR.Price(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988),chs15–19,pp.54–72.10See,forexample,Montesquieu,TheSpiritoftheLaws,ed.A.M.Cohler,B.C.MillerandH.S.Stone(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),bkIII,ch.3,pp.22–4.11G.A.Cohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2008),pp.68–86,116–50.12JeanJacquesRousseau,TheSocialContract,trans.MauriceCranston(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1968),p.1.POLITICALPOLITICALTHEORY3mightrequireincentivestoexercisetheirtalents—adoctor,forexample,mightneedtobepaidmanytimesmorethanapoorworkerinordertopersuadehimtoofferhismedicalservicestothepoor.Anyattempttolowerdoctors’salariesintheinterestsofequalitywouldmakethepoorpeopletheyserveevenworseoff,becausethatlowsalarywoulddeprivedoctorsoftheincentivetheypresentlyhavetoexercisetheirskillsinpoorareasofthecountry.ThatwasRawls’sposition.13Cohen’sresponsewasthatthisassumesthedoctor’sapproachtothematteriswhollyselfinterested,andthathe(thedoctor)isnotimbued,inhisdailylife,withthespiritofequalityorconcernfortheworstoffgroupwhichissupposedlymotivatingtheRawlsianenterprise.Rawlswashappytoproceedonthatbasis.ButCohenbelievedthatweshouldrethinkthisassumptionandconsiderthepursuitofjusticeinasocietywherethereisnotthisgapbetweensocialandindividualends.14SoIguessCohenisaddressingaversionofHume’squestion:hisanswerwasthatwehavetolookatindividualvirtueandnotjustthebasicstructure.ExceptthatitisnotquitetheHumeanquestion.ForCohenwasnotcontrastinganinterestinvirtuewithaninterestinformsofgovernment.Whenhetalkedofinstitutions,hemeanttheinstitutionsofpoliticaleconomy:themarket,thesystemofproperty,thestructureofcorporations,thewelfarestate,andthingslikethehealthsystemandtheeducationsystemthatdeterminepeople’schancesinlife.ItwasRawls’sviewthatwecouldconfineourattentiontothese;Cohensaidwealsohadtolookatthecharacterandmotivationofthosewholiveandworkwithinthem.Notonlythat,buteverythingCohensaidabouttheclaimsofvirtueandabouttheclaimsofinstitutionswassaidintheshadowofhistheorizingaboutjustice.Itwasultimatelyjustice(orequality)thatmatteredforCohen,notdemocracyorlegislaturesorthelegalsystemortheseparationofpowers.Inapaperentitled“HowtodoPoliticalPhilosophy,”15Cohenidentifiedthreequestionsthathethoughtwerecrucial:(i)Whatisjustice?(ii)Whatshouldthestatedo?(iii)Whichsocialstatesofaffairsoughttobebroughtabout?Thosewereallquestionsofaimsandideals.Hewasmuchlessinterested,theoretically,inthepoliticalinstitutionsandprocessesthatwouldberequiredforthepursuitoftheseends.1613SeeJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice,rev.edn(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),pp.67–8.14Cohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality,pp.121ff.15Cohen,OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice,ed.M.Otsuka(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011),pp.235–55,atp.227.16ThereisnotmuchbyCohenonpoliticalinstitutions—apartfromsomebriefdiscussionofthepropositionthatfairvalueofpoliticalequalitymightrequiresubstantialmaterialequalityintheRawlsianscheme:“Ibelievethatelectionregulation,ofasortthatRawlswouldendorse,canproducepoliticaldemocracyunderawideinequalityofincomeandwealth”(Cohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality,p.385).4JEREMYWALDRONIV.THEDOMINANCEOFJUSTICEThisisnotuntypicalofmodernpoliticaltheory.IthinkitindicatesthatwehavetoexpandHume’stwofoldchoicebetweenanemphasisonvirtueandanemphasisoninstitutions.Thereisalsoathirdoption,perhapsthemostimportantone.Maybeourmainfocusoughttobenotonvirtue,notoninstitutions,butontheaimsandidealsthatdirectourpolitics.Imeanidealslikejustice,equality,humanrights,toleration,liberty,community,prosperity,wealthmaximization,andthecommongood.WeneedtoreplaceHume’sdichotomywithatrichotomy.Thequestionnowiswhetherweshoulddirectourtheoreticalenergytoquestionsabout(1)theindividualvirtuesthatgoodgovernancerequires,or(2)thepoliticalinstitutionsthatareneededinagoodsocietyformedofhumansratherthanangels,or(3)theendsandidealsthatagoodsocietyshouldbeseekingtopromote.17Ithinkitisfairtosaythat,forsometimenow,thefocusinpoliticaltheory—bothinourteachingandinourwriting,particularlyintheUK—hasbeenon(3),theendsandidealsthatagoodsocietyshouldseektopromote.Indeed,anenormousamountofenergyhasbeendevotedandisbeingdevotedtonormativeargumentandconceptualanalysisabouttheendsofpoliticalaction—beginningmostprominentlywithRawls’sdetailedandarticulatetheoryofjustice,publishedin1971.Rawls’sworkhasinspiredawholeindustrycomprisingthinkersasdiverseasRobertNozick,RonaldDworkin,AmartyaSen,MichaelWalzer,andofcourseG.A.Cohentoo.18Thesetheoristsexaminenotonlyjusticebuttheideaofequalityinrelationtojustice;theyaskaboutthecurrencyofequality(whatsortofequalityweshouldbeaimingfor);theyaskaboutwhetherequalityshouldbeouraimor,instead,apriorityofconcernfortheneedsofthosewhoareworstoff;andtheyrespondtocriticsofequality,byexaminingtheimportanceofindividualchoicesindeterminingunequaloutcomes;andthemoralsignificanceofbrutebadluckinrelationtoequalityandjustice.Allofthisisfocusedontopic(3),theaimsandpoliciesofagoodsocietyandthebasicstructureofitspoliticaleconomy.Someofthistheorizingaboutouridealsisalsoprojectedoutintotheworld—inthestudyofglobaljustice,forexample,andtheconditionsforbeingabletosaythatgrossdisparitiesinlifechancesbetweenpeopleindifferentpartsoftheworldadduptosomethinglikeinjustice.17Terminologycanbeaproblemhere,becauseitispossibletousethelanguageofvirtuetorefertosomethinglikejustice.WecansaywithRawlsthatjusticeisthefirstvirtueofsocialinstitutions(ATheoryofJustice,p.3),butthenwearenottalkingaboutpersonalcharacteristicsinthewaythatHumewas,althoughwemaybetalkingaboutpersonalcharacteristicsinthewaythatCohenwas.18See,forexample,RobertNozick,Anarchy,StateandUtopia(Oxford:Blackwell,1974);RonaldDworkin,SovereignVirtue(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002)andJusticeforHedgehogs(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002);AmartyaSen,TheIdeaofJustice(Harmondsworth:Penguin,2009);MichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks,1983);andCohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality.POLITICALPOLITICALTHEORY5Initselfthisisallfineandvaluablework.IwantnothingIsayheretobereadasdenigratingthestudyofjusticeandequalitybymycolleagues.Itoohavecontributedtotheproject,includinganarticleexploringanddefendingtheideaoftheprimacyofjusticeamongthevaluesandidealsthatmaybeexploredinpoliticalphilosophy.19ButIworryneverthelessthatitisalittleonesided.Forpreciouslittleattentionispaidinthejusticeindustryortheequalityindustrytoquestionsaboutpoliticalprocess,politicalinstitutions,andpoliticalstructures,includingthestructures,institutions,andprocessesthatmightbeimplicatedinthepursuitofjusticeorequalityatanationalorgloballevel.V.ISAIAHBERLINSometimesIworrythatpoliticaltheoryisunderstoodasjustappliedmoralphilosophy.Apartfromhisworkinthehistoryofideas,thisseemstohavebeentheviewofanotherofmyChichelepredecessors:IsaiahBerlin,whoheldthechairfrom1957until1967.Askedina1997interviewafewmonthsbeforehisdeath,“Whatdoyouthinkarethetasksofpoliticalphilosophy?”Berlinreplied:“Toexaminetheendsoflife,”20andheaddedthat“[p]oliticalphilosophyisinessencemoralphilosophyappliedtosocialsituations.”21Admittedly,Berlinwentontosaythatthesocialsituationstowhichmoralphilosophyisapplied“ofcourseincludepoliticalorganization,therelationsoftheindividualtothecommunity,thestate,andtherelationsofcommunitiesandstatestoeachother.”Buthegavenoindicationthatthesewereworthstudyintheirownright.22Thebusinessofpoliticalphilosophyistoexaminethevalidityofvariousclaimsmadeforvarioussocialgoals,andthejustificationofthemethodsofspecifyingandattainingthese.Itsetsitselftoevaluatetheargumentsforandagainstvariousendspursuedbyhumanbeings.Thisisthebusinessofpoliticalphilosophyandhasalwaysbeensuch.Notruepoliticalphilosopherhasomittedtodothis.23InfactBerlinhimselfundertookaratherlargeragendathanthis,lookingnotjustattheendsoflifebutatbroadzeitgeistissuessuchastheclashbetweenromanticnationalismandhumanindividualism,24andbigpicturediagnosisofthepathologiesofcertaingeneralcurrentsofthoughtaboutmaninsociety.Onceagain,Idon’twanttoconveytheimpressionthatanyofthisisunimportant.But19SeeJeremyWaldron,“Theprimacyofjustice,”LegalTheory,9(2003),269–94.20RaminJahanbegloo,ConversationswithIsaiahBerlin(NewYork:CharlesScribner’sSons,1991),p.46.21Ibid..22Iamtold—byPeterPulzer,inconversation—thatBerlinhadaconsiderableinterestinpoliticalinstitutions,intheUS,intheUK,andelsewhere,evenifitdidnotmakeitswayintohispublishedwritings.ButseeBerlin’sintroductiontoWashingtonDespatches,1941–45:WeeklyPoliticalReportsfromtheBritishEmbassy,ed.H.G.Nichols(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1981),manyofwhichhehadhimselfwritten.23Jahanbegloo,ConversationswithIsaiahBerlin,pp.46–7.24See,e.g.,IsaiahBerlin,“Politicalideasinthetwentiethcentury,”inIsaiahBerlin,FourEssaysonLiberty(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969),pp.1–40,atp.21.6JEREMYWALDRONIdothinkthereareproblemswiththisasaspecificationofanagendaforpoliticaltheory.25ToreadalmostanyofBerlin’sworkistoreadessaysthatareresolutelyuninterestedinthedetailedcharacterofpoliticalstructure.Beyondairytalkoffreedomandopenness,Berlinwasunconcernedwiththewaysinwhichliberalordemocraticpoliticalinstitutionsmightaccommodatethelibertyanddiversityhethoughtsoimportantinhumanlife.26Invitedbyhisinterviewertoconsider“[w]hatpossiblesupportcanyourtheoryofpluralismgivetotheproblemofdemocracy?”,Berlinsimplyrepeatedthecommonplacethat“[d]emocracyneednotbepluralistic,”27indicating,byanimmediatefocusontheprospectofthetyrannyofthemajority,howhisunderstandingofpoliticaltheoryhadinheritedphilosophy’sancientgrudgeagainstdemocracynurturedsincethetrialandexecutionofSocrates.VI.REALISMVERSUSMORALISMSoisthatit?Ispoliticalphilosophyjustastudyoftheendsoflife?Veryrecently,wehavebeguntogetglimpsesofadifferentview,forexampleinsomeoftheessaysthatBernardWilliamswrotetowardstheendofhislife.IhaveinmindWilliams’scritiqueofwhathecalled“politicalmoralism,”ofthealleged“priorityofthemoraloverthepolitical,”theapplicationofwhatisessentiallymoralphilosophytotheresolutionofsocialissues.28ButWilliams’salternativewastoturnawayfrommoralidealsandtolookfordistinctivelypoliticalideals,likesecurity.Hewasinterestedintherelationbetweenlegitimacyandwhathecalled“the‘first’politicalquestion—ThomasHobbes’squestionabout‘thesecuringoforder,protection,safety,trust,andtheconditionsofcooperation.’”29Williamswashelpinguscultivateorrecallasenseofdifferentanddistinctiveendsforpolitics—differentfromjustice,forexample.3025Thedistinctionbetweenpoliticaltheoryandpoliticalphilosophydidn’tseemtomakeanydifferencetoBerlin’sagenda,forhealsosaidthat“politicaltheoryisabouttheendsoflife,aboutvalues,aboutthegoalsofsocialexistence,aboutwhatmeninsocietylivebyandshouldliveby,aboutgoodandevil,rightandwrong”;Jahanbegloo,ConversationswithIsaiahBerlin,pp.57–8.26ComparethefollowingobservationbyJohnRawlsinPoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),p.197n:“ForBerlintherealmofvaluesisobjective,butvaluesclashandthefullrangeofvaluesistooextensivetofitintoanyonesocialworld;notonlyaretheyincompatiblewithoneanother,imposingconflictingrequirementsoninstitutions;butthereexistsnofamilyofworkableinstitutionsthatcanallowsufficientspaceforthemall.”27Jahanbegloo,ConversationswithIsaiahBerlin,p.143.28SeeBernardWilliams,“Realismandmoralism,”inaposthumouscollectionofhispapers,IntheBeginningwastheWord,ed.G.Hawthorn(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006),pp.1–17,atp.8.29Ibid.,p.3.30Again,thereisnothinginappropriateaboutWilliams’semphasisonvalueslikesecurity.ForanattempttoanalyseitusingsomeofWilliams’sownwork,seemyessay“Safetyandsecurity,”inWaldron,Torture,TerrorandTradeoffs:PhilosophyfortheWhiteHouse(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),pp.111–65,esp.atp.150.Stillonewantsthisworktobecomplementedbyanaccountoftheinstitutionalcontextsinwhichthisvaluemightbepursued.POLITICALPOLITICALTHEORY7Hiswasnotanattempttolocatethedistinctivesubjectmatterofpoliticaltheoryintherealmofpoliticalinstitutions.VII.TOPICSANDPRINCIPLESItistimetolaymyowncardsonthetable.Ithinkpoliticalinstitutionsare