企业税收筹划外文翻译

企业税收筹划外文翻译 外文文献翻译 2011 届 译文一:企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用(上) 译文二:企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用(下) 学生姓名 周伟 学 号 07062136 院 系 经济与管理学院 专 业 会计 指导教师 许庆高 完成日期 2010年12月2日 Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives (?) John D. Phillips University of Connecticut ABSTRACT This study investigates whether compensating chief executive officers and business-unit managers using after-tax accounting-based performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporate executives, the relation between effective tax rates and after-tax performance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-step approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias associated with firms' decisions to compensate managers on a pre- versus after-tax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating business-unit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an after-tax basis leads to lower effective tax rates. KEYWORDS tax planning; performance measures; endogenous treatment effects. I. INTRODUCTION Effective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2002) as tax planning that maximizes the firm's expected discounted after-tax cash flows, requires managers to consider their decisions' after-tax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning effectiveness.1 The ETR, an income-statement-based outcome measure calculated as the ratio of total income tax expense to pre-tax income, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher after-tax income. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy for tax savings and does not always imply that after-tax income and/or cash flows have been maximized.2 Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corporate tax department performance (Douglas et al. 1996). Also, lowering the ETR is frequently cited as a way to increase earnings (e.g., Ziegler 1997) and increase share price (e.g., Mintz 1999; Swenson 1999). Accounting research has addressed the relation between accounting-based compensation and managers' actions (e.g., Larcker 1983; Healy 1985; Wallace 1997). This paper is the first to address whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures motivate managers to take actions that help lower their firms' ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and business-unit (SBU) manager levels. Prior after-tax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of compensation CEOs using pre- versus after-tax earnings (e.g., Newman 1989; Carnes and Guffey 2000; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000) and provides no evidence concerning after-tax compensation's effectiveness in lowering a firm's tax liability. Extending this investigation to the SBU level is motivated out of the apparent conflict between arguments that taxes should be allocated to SBU for incentive compensation purposes (e.g., McLemore 1997) with empirical observations that a majority of firms do not do so (e.g., Douglas et al. 1996).4 The current investigation provides evidence concerning the incremental effectiveness of explicitly motivating CEOs and SBU managers to incorporate tax consequences into their operating and investment decisions. A common issue in cross-sectional studies that attempt to link a particular management accounting choice to an outcome measure is that all sample firms may be optimizing with respect to the choice being investigated (Ittner and Larcker 2001). Without addressing the endogeneity of a firm's choice, it is difficult to provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to an improved outcome. To address this issue, the relation between ETR and CEO and SBU-manager after-tax performance measures is estimated using a two-step approach that helps correct for the potential endogeneity bias associated with these two choice variables. As a first step in implementing this approach, the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle is used to model a firm's decisions to adopt after-tax CEO and SBU-manager performance measures. To include a particular measure in a manager's compensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater 2 than the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after- tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a manager's incentive compensation contract only if the manager's involvement in tax-planning efforts leads to a difference between pre-tax and after-tax accounting results, which is generally reflected in the ETR. Consistent with prior research, the pre- versus after-tax CEO and SBU-manager selection models include variables that control for a firm's tax-planning opportunities because the presence of such opportunities reflect the extent to which a manager's actions can be expected to lower the ETR. Even if a manager's efforts are expected to lead to a lower ETR, a firm will use an after-tax performance measure only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs of doing so. An after-tax performance measure is expected to lead to a lower ETR because it motivates the manager's increased cooperation with tax professionals to help identify, develop, and execute tax-planning strategies. McLemore (1997, 1) cites Hewlett Packard's tax director to support the need for SBU-manager involvement in tax-planning efforts: Tax planning is only as good as being involved in the early stages of such things as business planning, strategic planning, and merger and acquisition work....Your tax department has to be represented at the table when those decisions are made. The evolving model for the future is the tight integration of tax people with business unit planning. Costs associated with using after-tax performance measures include the additional wage that must be paid to compensate the manager for the increased risk due to potential tax law changes and the increased effort that results from including income tax expense in the compensation contract. Other potential costs associated with after-tax compensation include the administrative cost of allocating tax expense to a firm's SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring after-tax compensation's benefits via observed ETR, there are no clear empirical surrogates for after-tax performance measures' costs. This study thus focuses on the realized benefits of compensating managers on an after-tax basis but does not provide evidence of the associated costs' magnitude. Proprietary data obtained in a survey of corporate executives are used to construct certain test variables, including those indicating whether CEOs and SBU 3 managers are compensated using after-tax accounting-based performance measures. Publicly available data are used to construct ETR and other test variables. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating SBU managers, but not CEOs, on an after-tax basis leads to lower ETR, resulting in an estimated median tax savings of $13.3 million annually. Sensitivity tests performed on a subsample of firms with high simulated MTR (Graham 1996) provide further evidence that low-MTR firms' potential ETR-lowering actions that could have ambiguous effects on cash flows and after-tax profits are not driving this result. Further sensitivity tests help rule out the proportion of tax function outsourcing as an alternative explanation for the statistically and economically significant negative relation between after- tax SBU-manager compensation and ETR. The results contribute to the accounting-based compensation literature by linking after- tax accounting-based performance measures to SBU-manager involvement that is incrementally effective in lowering firms' ETR. Consistent with Guidry et al. (1999) who document bonus-induced earnings management at the SBU level, this finding provides additional insight into the effect that SBU-manager accounting-based incentives have on managers' actions. Also, the estimated explicit tax savings resulting from after-tax performance measures provide corporate decision makers with information relevant to the design of SBU-manager incentive compensation plans. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets forth the hypotheses tested in this study. Section III outlines the empirical models and estimation procedures used in testing these hypotheses. Section IV provides a discussion of the data and sample, including a brief overview of the survey used to obtain proprietary compensation data. Results are presented in Section V. The final section provides the conclusion and a discussion of the study's limitations. II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Newman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2000), and Atwood et al. (1998) investigate firms' choices of after-tax earnings as the contracting variable in CEO bonus plans. These studies hypothesize that firms with greater tax-planning opportunities, consistent with the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, are more likely to use after-tax performance measures. Using proxies for tax-planning opportunities, these 4 studies collectively find that multinational status, number of operating segments, firm size, and capital intensity are positively associated with after-tax CEO compensation. Atwood et al. (1998) also presents evidence that leverage is negatively associated with this choice. 企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用(上) 约翰 ?菲利普斯 康涅狄格大学D 摘 要 本研究探讨首席执行官是否修正主管和业务部门经理利用税后会计为基础的 绩效措施，导致较低的实际税率，以报酬激励用于税收筹划的有效性。企业的主 管由于被激励获得的专有报酬的数据，运用建模和估计这两个步骤来研究有效税 率和税后性能指标之间的关系来更正企业的管理人员的决定，以修正相关的内生 性偏置前与后的计税基础。结果与假设一致修正了业务部门经理，但是没有修正 主管，关于税后导致较低的实际税率。 关键词税收计划;性能指标;内源性的处理效果 5 引言 有效的税收筹划，根据斯科尔斯等人的定义(2002)，税收筹划，即最大限度地提高公司的预期税后净现金流量，要求管理者要考虑他们的决定所造成的税后结果。在本文中，研究是否以税后会计为基础的绩效措施，将导致较低的实际出口退税税率。实际的经验替代了出口退税的税务规划效力，一个基础的收入结果被合适的计量，所得税费用总额作为税前收入的一定比例，通常测量减税策略将导致更高的税后收入的有效性。较低的出口退税，然而，仅能够代理节税以及通常并不意味税后收入或者是现金流已经达到最大值。尽管有这一局限性，出口退税还是被用来衡量税收功能性支出的有效性(米尔斯，1998)和企业各部门税务绩效(道格拉斯，1996)。另外，降低出口退税是经常被作为一种增加收入(齐格勒，1997)和使股价上升的手段(e.g. Mintz 1999; Swenson 1999)。 会计研究处理了以会计绩效为基础的薪酬和经理的行为之间的关系(e.g., 1983; 1985; 1997)，本文是第一个从事这方面研究的文章:LarckerHealy Wallace 是否以税后会计为基础的绩效管理措施鼓励经理人员采取行动来降低他们公司的出口退税，并且首席执行官和事业部经理也要求做。在此之前的税后业绩计量研究只集中于首席执行官们的报酬的决定因素为预先的税后收益 (e.g., Newman 1989; 2000; 1998; 2000)，没有提Carnes and Guffey Atwood et al.Dhaliwal et al.供任何证据说明降低一个公司的税务负担与税后报酬的关系。这项调查扩展到了事业部层次，这些部门的报酬激励动机与减少税收的目的目的之间存在明显的冲突( 1997)以及观察的经验是，大多数企业没有这样做(e.g., McLemoree.g., Douglas 1996)。目前的研究提供的证据关于明确激励首席执行官和事业部管理人员et al. 纳入其经营和投资决策的税务结果的增量效益。 以某个侧面来研究出口退税与管理层薪酬的共同课题，衡量的结果是所有样本公司可优化关于被调查的选择( 2001)。如果不解决公司选择的Ittner and Larcker内生性，很难提供一致的证据关于这选择导致改善的结果。为了解决这个问题，首席执行官和事业部经理关于税后绩效与出口退税的联系依旧采用两步方式估计，可以帮助对潜在的内生性与相关偏见这两个变量做出正确的选择。作为实施这一方法的第一步，(1988) 可控性原则是用来模拟一个公司the Antle and Demski 的决定,通过对首席执行官和事业部经理税后绩效指标的衡量。要包括一个特别措施在经理人的薪酬 合同 劳动合同范本免费下载装修合同范本免费下载租赁合同免费下载房屋买卖合同下载劳务合同范本下载 中，这一原则要求持有一个衡量预期收益和负责任的经理 6 更加努力工作来规避所支付的附加工资之间的额外风险。因此，税后绩效指标应作为一个激励经理人的获取额外报酬的方法，只有当经理的税务规划工作的参与导致了税前和税后核算结果之间的差异，这通常反映在出口退税上面。与以前的研究相一致，包括与首席执行官和事业部经理选择税后模型的变量，对于一个企业的税务筹划的机会控制，因为这种机会的存在会在某种程度上反映了经理人的行动，可以预期，将会降低出口退税。 即使通过经理人的努力，预计将导致较低的出口退税，公司将使用税后绩效指标只有当预期收益超过预期成本才这样做，税后业绩措施预计会导致较低的出口退税，因为它促使管理人员和税务专业人员加强合作以达成一致的，发展的，执行税收筹划策略，(1997, 1)引用惠普公司的税务主任支持税务规划McLemore 工作需要事业部经理参与的必要性: 税收筹划这种事情也只有在被作为业务规划的早期阶段，战略上的规划，兼并和收购工作„„你的税务部门要在会议上，代表这些部门做出决定。对未来的 发展模式是税务策划人与业务部门紧密合作完成的。 与使用税后业绩的措施有关的费用包括附加工资必须支付给经理以弥补由于潜在的税法变化增加的风险，使经理加倍的努力，包括，从合同中补偿个人所得税方面费用的增加的结果。与税后报酬有关的其他潜在费用包括向一个公司的事业部分配行政费用开支，税务检查成本增加，并增加税务机关审查频率。相反，通过观察出口退税的好处来衡量税后报酬，有没有税后业绩计量的成本效益明显的有经验代理人。因此，本研究着重于在管理者的基础上实现的税后补偿效益，但不提供相关的成本，规模的证据。 在企业主管的调查中所获得的专有数据用于构造并测试某些变量，说明是否包括那些首席执行官和事业部的经理们使用税后会计基础的绩效指标。公开数据用于构造出口退税和其他变量来测试，结果与假设一致，即事业部经理的报酬，但不包括公司首席执行官的，与税后导致较低的出口退税有关，估计使每年平均节省1330万美元的税款。模拟公司进行敏感性测试的子样本中，边际税率(Graham 1996)提供进一步的证据表明，低边际税率的公司将会有降低潜在出口退税的行动，可能对现金流量和税后利润不吻合这一结果产生模棱两可的影响。敏感性测试有助于进一步排除了税收职能外包的比例，作为另一种解释，统计上和经济上 显示事业部经理的税后报酬和出口退税呈负相关。 研究结果有助于薪酬以会计为基础的著作，通过实施事业部经理参与的以税后会计为基础的绩效措施，是逐步降低企业出口退税的有效措施。符合 Guidry et al. (1999)表明了奖金导致事业部盈余管理水平的不同，这一发现提供了更多的有洞 7 察力的影响，事业部经理以会计绩效为基础对管理人员的行为进行激励。另外，明确的表明企业的决策者 设计 领导形象设计圆作业设计ao工艺污水处理厂设计附属工程施工组织设计清扫机器人结构设计 降低所得税费用的公司税后业绩会使管理层人员获得更多薪酬的措施来激励事业部经理。 该文章的过程如下:下一节阐述了在这项研究中测试的假设。第三节概述了经验模型和估计程序在测试中使用的一些假说。第四节提供了数据和样本的讨论，包括用于获得所有的用于调查的报酬数据的简要概述。结果列于第五章最后一节提供了一个结论，即关于该研究的局限性的讨论。 II. 假说发展 (1989),(2000), (1998)调查作为Newman Cares and Guffey and Atwood et al. 税后盈利企业对首席执行官奖金计划包含变量的选择。这些研究假设，企业有更大的税收筹划的机会，与 (1988)的可控性原则一致，更有可能Antle and Demski 使用税后业绩的措施。利用税收筹划的机会代理，这些研究都发现了跨国公司的地位，经营分部的数量，企业规模，首席执行官的报酬和资本密集度呈正相关， (1998)还提出证据，充分利用这一负相关的选择。 Atwood et al. Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based 8 Incentives (?) John D. Phillips University of Connecticut Dhaliwal et al. (2000) also focuses on the relation between a firm's tax-planning opportunities and the decision whether to use after-tax earnings in CEO bonus plans, but measures planning opportunities using only realized tax credits and absolute values of firms' permanent book-tax differences. They exclude temporary book-tax differences such as those resulting from accelerated tax depreciation because these differences do not impact a firm's after-tax accounting earnings, the performance measure used in after-tax accounting-based bonus plans. Similarly, the ETR used in the current study is computed using total tax expense in the numerator, thereby excluding the effects of temporary book-tax differences. Consistent with prior literature, Dhaliwal et al. (2000) find that firms with greater tax credits and absolute values of permanent book-tax differences are more likely to compensate their CEOs on an after-tax basis. Because permanent differences can either increase or decrease taxable income relative to book income, they provide no direct evidence of an association between after-tax CEO compensation and lower ETR. The current study investigates this relation between after-tax CEO compensation and ETR. The first hypothesis, stated in alternative form is: H1: Using after-tax performance measures in CEO accounting-based bonus plans leads to lower ETR. This paper also extends the pre- versus after-tax compensation analysis to SBU-manager incentive compensation plans. The need for SBU-manager involvement in tax-planning efforts is consistent with the coordination task that arises when specialists require input and cooperation from non specialists (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The firm's tax professionals not only need help from the firm's SBU managers in the identification of tax-planning opportunities, but also their cooperation in developing and executing strategies to capitalize on such opportunities. In the context of lowering the ETR and increasing after-tax accounting income, how do SBU managers participate in efforts that increase tax credits and lead to permanent differences that lower taxable income? Colgate-Palmolive's CFO states that "Colgate man- agers routinely watch for ways to time remittances from overseas [which 9 leads to higher foreign tax credits], maximize research and development tax credits...." (Mintz 1999, 2.) SBU managers can also help tax professionals formulate transfer prices (Ernst & Young 1999), which helps lower the ETR by decreasing (increasing) income reported in countries with tax rates in excess of (lower than) the U.S. tax rate.5 Other examples of SBU-manager involvement that helps lower the ETR include (1) determining whether a potential employee qualifies for a payroll-based tax credit before the hiring decision is made, (2) consulting with the firm's tax professionals prior to domestic location decisions to incorporate varying state and local tax rates as a factor in such decisions, and (3) helping tax professionals gather data necessary to document tax return reporting positions. The above discussion suggests that SBU-manager involvement is helpful in lowering the ETR. It is possible that the pre- versus after-tax nature of the CEO's accounting-based bonus plan signals tax planning's importance and thus provides implicit incentives sufficient to motivate SBU managers to assist in efforts that lower the firm's ETR. If this were so, then explicit incentive pay would not be necessary to motivate such efforts. Wilson (1995, 12), however, cites an interview with a corporate executive to support his conclusion that after-tax measures motivate SBU managers to become involved in tax-planning efforts: We instituted after-tax divisional measures that we have continued to refine. This puts the business units in the position that they think about taxes as they make decisions. Similarly, Mintz (1999, 2) cites the Colgate-Palmolive CFO's argument for after-tax performance measures: Were pre-tax income to govern incentives, then employees with bonuses on their minds would pay far less attention to favorable tax implications....But because incentive compensation reflects after-tax earnings...managers are rewarded when taxes are lowered. The above arguments are consistent with evidence that mid-level managers respond to explicit bonus-based incentives (e.g., Kahn and Sherer 1990; Guidry et al. 1999). Compensating a firm's SBU managers on an after-tax basis is thus expected to promote efforts that lead to a lower ETR. The second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows: H2: Using after-tax SBU-manager accounting-based performance measures 10 leads to lower ETR. III. EMPIRICAL MODELS To test the hypotheses stated in the previous section, the following equations are estimated cross sectionally: Variable Definitions Endogenous Variables The effective tax rate (ETR) is defined as the ratio of total tax expense (TTE) to pre- tax income. An average annual ETR for the three-year period 1995-1997 is used to control for unexplained year-to-year fluctuations in the annual ETR. TTE is used in the numerator because only efforts that lower TTE decrease the ETR and increase after-tax earnings. Accordingly, the ETR as currently measured represents the appropriate theoretical construct for evaluating the effectiveness of using after-tax accounting-based bonus plans. There are at least two potential issues, however, regarding measurement of the ETR using TTE in the numerator. First, TTE excludes the effects of temporary book-tax differences, so tax-planning actions that result in a tax deferral are not reflected in the ETR. For example, a more favorable purchase price allocation in an asset acquisition, which leads to greater book-tax depreciation differences, is not reflected in the ETR. Similarly, investments in special purpose entities could lead to temporary differences that are not reflected in the ETR (e.g., Hanlon 2002). Locating a foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country and postponing the repatriation of the foreign earnings is another way to defer taxes and does not impact the ETR unless the firm takes the financial reporting position that the foreign earnings are permanently or indefinitely reinvested (Krull 2001). To the extent that a firm's CEO is compensated on an after-tax basis and is involved in decisions that involve the potential deferral of tax, which is likely to be the case in foreign location decisions and the formation of special purpose entities, the ETR will not capture the CEOs' tax-planning efforts. The second measurement issue regarding the ETR is that TTE excludes the tax benefit of deductions resulting from the exercise of nonqualified employee stock options (ESO). Firms that have little or no tax liability because of their ESO deductions could have high ETR, which can be problematic in studies that attempt to use the ETR to measure a firm's tax burden or to evaluate a firm's incentive to engage in tax-planning actions (e.g., Hanlon and Shevlin 2002). Arguably, these firms have little incentive to engage in costly tax- planning actions and are unlikely to use after-tax performance measures. Adjusting the ETR to reflect the tax benefit of the ESO deductions would result in lower ETR for these firms, despite the appropriate use of pre-tax compensation, and would bias toward failing to reject the null hypotheses of no association between 11 after-tax performance measures and ETR. CEO TAX is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO receives an annual bonus based, at least in part, on an accounting measure determined on an after-tax basis, and 0 otherwise. BUATAX equals 1 if the firm uses a unit-based accounting measure in the compensation plans of a majority of its BU managers and this measure reflects the allocation of at least one unit-specific income tax item.8 If a firm does not use a business-unit-based accounting measure, then BUATAX equals 1 if the firm uses an after-tax firm-wide accounting measure to compensate its BU managers. The ETR model also includes two selectivity correction variables, A CEO and SBU, which represent the double-selection analogs to the Heckman (1976) single-equation inverse Mills' ratio. These variables, which are calculated based on the results of the bivariate probit estimation of the CEOATAX and BUATAX models, are included in the ETR model to achieve consistent coefficient estimates using OLS (Tunali 1986). These variables are described in more detail below in the "Estimation" subsection. Exogenous Variables Common to the ETR and Compensation Equations All three equations contain variables that proxy for a firm's tax-planning opportunities. The rationale for including these variables in the ETR equation is that a firm's ETR differs from the statutory rate only to the extent it has opportunities to take actions that either increase or decrease taxable income or tax credits (Mills et al. 1998). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Newman 1989; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000) and the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, the tax-planning opportunity variables are also included in the CEOATAX and BUATAX equations. Firms with multinational operations are expected to have greater tax-planning opportunities due to the tax effects of location, repatriation, and transfer pricing decisions. MULTI, the proxy for multinational operations, is computed as the ratio of foreign assets to the book value of total assets as of year-end 1997.9 CAPINT is computed as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to the book value of total assets (BVA) as of year-end 1997 and is included to control for opportunities related to investments in fixed assets. Larger firms, through the scope and scale of their operations, are expected to have greater opportunities to engage in tax-planning efforts. SIZE is computed as the natural logarithm of the BVA as of year-end 1997. Firms with greater leverage are also expected to have greater opportunities to engage in tax-planning efforts related to financing activities (Atwood et al. 1998). LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to BVA as of year-end 1997. Finally, tax laws vary on an industry-by-industry basis. IND is a vector of industry indicator variables for the mining and construction, transportation and communication, utilities, sales, financial institutions an insurance, and services industries. 12 From: Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives: The Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Jul., 2003). 企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用(下) (2000)还关注了“企业的税收筹划机会和决定，是否与首席执行Dhaliwaletal 官税后收益的奖金计划的之间的关系”，但有关措施只实现了税收筹划的机会使税收抵免和企业永远不变的缴税财产清单和税率的绝对值。但不包括那些临时缴税财产清单和税率差异造成的加速折旧，因为这些差异并不影响一个公司的税后会计盈余，用于测量税后会计绩效为基础的奖金计划。同样地，在目前的研究中使用的出口退税是利用计算器计算所得税费用总额，从而排除了临时缴税财产清 单和税率差异的影响。 与以前的文献相一致， (2000)发现有更大的税收抵免和缴税财Dhaliwal et al. 产清单和税率差异绝对值使公司更容易给首席执行官高的税后报酬。由于永久性差异可以增加或减少应税收入的相对预期收入，他们没有提供首席执行官的税后报酬和降低出口退税之间的直接证据。目前研究首席执行官的税后报酬和出口退 税的关系。第一个假设，阐明的另一种形式是: 13 H1: 利用企业税后业绩为基础来衡量首席执行官的奖金计划将导致出口退税的降低。 本文还扩展了税前税后报酬的分析，以作为激励事业部经理的薪酬计划。对于事业部经理参与协调税务规划工作的任务时，专家要求从非专业人员投入和合作保持一贯性( 1992)。该公司的税务专业人士不仅要帮助该Milgrom and Roberts 公司的事业部经理在税务规划机会的选择，而且在他们制定和执行战略，以利用这些机会合作。 在调低出口退税，增加税后会计收益方面，怎么使事业部经理更加的努力，增加税收抵免，并导致应纳税所得额永久性差异的降低,高露洁公司首席财务官说“高露洁人提供学习的机会经常留意海外[从而导致更高的外国税收抵免]时间 汇款的方式，最大限度地提高研究和发展的税收抵免” ( 1999, 2.)事业部Mintz 经理也可以帮助税务专业人士制定转移价格( 1999),这有助于降低Ernst & Young出口退税，通过国家 报告 软件系统测试报告下载sgs报告如何下载关于路面塌陷情况报告535n,sgs报告怎么下载竣工报告下载 反映的事业部经理参与减少(增加)收入的其他例子，有助于降低出口退税。包括:(1)在雇佣职工前看其工资是否具有抵免税收的资格，(2)向该公司的税务专业人士咨询公司设立的地点，因为公司所处的不同位置适用不同的税率，(3)协助税务专业人士收集申报纳税所需的数据文件。 上述讨论表明，事业部经理的参与对降低出口退税是有帮助的。在会议上传达税收筹划效果对首席执行官税后奖金的重要性，从而对他们产生足够的激励，以使事业部经理通过加倍努力来降低企业的出口退税。如果是这样的话，那么明确的奖励工资就没有必要去激励他们付出更多的努力了。(1995, 12),因此，Wilson 举一个有公司主管会谈记录，以支持他的结论，激励事业部经理税后措施应在税务规划工作中有所涉及: 我们建立了并不断完善部门的税后激励措施。这迫使经营单位站在对节税有 利的立场上考虑问题。 类似地， (1999, 2)列举了高露洁公司财务总监关于税后业绩计量的说Mintz 法: 是关于税前收入的管理激励，公司在考虑将支付给员工多少奖金时得多注意税收优惠的影响„„但是，由于激励的报酬取决于税后收益回报„„当公司税收降低会使经理得到更多的报酬。 上述论点的证据表明，与中层管理人员额外奖金的激励机制相一致(e.g., Kahn 1990; 1999)。一个公司的事业部经理额外报酬基于税后收and Sherer Guidry et al. 益，预计会使管理人员更加努力，导致较低的出口退税。第二个假设，为另一种 表现形式，如下: H2:对事业部经理使用会计为基础的绩效措施，将导致较低的出口退税。 14 III.经营模型 为了测试在上一节所述的假设，下面的等式通过部分估计: 变量定义内生函数 实际的出口退税率被定义为税收总收入的费用率关于税前收入。1995-1997年期间平均每年的出口退税是用来控制不确定的年与年之间在每年的出口退税上的波动。因为只有努力降低出口退税，才会增加税后收益。因此，出口退税当前被作为适当的理论用来 评价 LEC评价法下载LEC评价法下载评价量规免费下载学院评价表文档下载学院评价表文档下载 税后会计绩效为基础的奖金计划的效力。 至少有两个潜在的问题，然而，出口退税方面的测量，在计算中的使用。首先，计算时不包括临时账面税率差异的影响，因此税收筹划的行动，在税收延期结果方面，是没有反映在出口退税上。例如，一个更加有利的购买资产的收购，从而导致更大的账面折旧摊销的差异，是不会体现在出口退税上的。同样，有特殊目的实体的投资可能会导致的暂时性差异也未反映在出口退税上(e.g., Hanlon 2002)。设立一个外国子公司在低税率的国家和推迟遣返外国收入的另一种方式是推迟纳税并不会影响出口退税，除非该公司是以财务报告的立场，即外国收益永久或无限期地投资( 2001)。对于一个企业的首席执行官的薪酬是以企业税后Krull 绩效为基础的，涉及决定税收延期的可能，这很可能是国外设立公司的情况并形成特殊目的实体，出口退税将无法衡量首席执行官为税收筹划付出的努力。 第二次测量有关出口退税问题，计算时排除了由非限定员工股票期权产生的扣除税收优惠。企业很少或没有应纳税额，因为他们的股票期权中可以扣除更高的出口退税，这可能是不确定的研究，尝试使用出口退税来衡量一个企业的税务负担或评价一个公司的激励从事税务规划工作的行为(e.g., Hanlon and Shevlin 2002)。可以说，这些企业缺乏动力去从事代价高昂的税务规划行动并不太可能使用税后业绩的措施。调整出口退税反映了员工股票期权扣减的税务优惠会导致这些企业降低出口退税，尽管税前抵扣得适当使用，并表明企业税后业绩和出口退税之间没有联系的假设不成立。 如果首席执行官收到年度奖金，则总裁税的指标变量等1，一位首席执行官和事业部经理，它代表的赫克曼单方程逆米尔斯比双选模拟(1976)。这些变量，是在用模型，在计算的基础上对总裁税的估计结果，包括在出口退税模型，BUATAX 实现统一使用估计系数( 1986)。这些变量详细描述在下面“估计”小OLSTunali 节。 出口退税和补偿方程的共同外生变量 所有这三个方程包含变量，是一个企业的税务筹划的机会代理。包括在这些变量方程的理由是，各个公司的法定的出口退税率不同，因此有机会采取行动， 15 增加出口退税，从而减少应税收入或增加税收抵免( 1998)。与以前的研Mills et al.究相一致(1989; 1998; 2000)和e.g., Newman Atwood et al.Dhaliwal et al.Antle and (1988)可控性的原则，税务规划机会变量也包括在DemskiCEOATAX and 方程。由于所在地税务的影响，跨国经营的企业预计将有较大的税务规BUATAX 划机会，更多的遣返和转移定价决策，为跨国经营的代理，作为外国资产的比例，截至2006年年底，以1997.9作为财产的比例计算总资产的账面价值，厂 CAPINT 房和设备的总资产，截至2006年年底以1997年()账面价值，并列入有关BVA 控制固定资产投资的机会。规模较大的公司，通过其业务范围和规模，预计将有更多的机会进行税务规划工作。截至2006年的比例，以1997年年底的自然对数作为。以更大的杠杆公司也预计将有更多的机会，在从事筹资活动有关的工BVA 作时运用税收筹划( 1998)。是从1997年至2006年底的长期负Atwood et al.LEV 债比率。最后，税法是建立在不同的产业基础之上的。是一个采矿和建筑行IND 业的指标变数的向量，交通和通讯，公用事业，销售，金融机构和保险，服务业。 来源:企业税收筹划的有效性:基于对报酬的激励作用，会计评论78卷第3号(2003 年7月)。 内部资料 仅供参考 16 17