Meno(美诺篇)
Meno(美诺篇)
MENO
MENO
Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
1MENO
INTRODUCTION.
This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks,
'whether virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet
know what virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he
cannot have met Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met
him, but he has a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will
Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from
that of Gorgias? 'O yes--nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a
woman, of an old man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and
state of life, all of which may be easily described.'
Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues
and not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a
second attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to
this, again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those who
obey, as well as of those who command; and the power of command must
be justly or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice
is virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, such
as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and black
and white are colours, and yet there are other figures and other colours.
Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to define them.'
Meno confesses his inability, and after a process of interrogation, in which
Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in multis,' Socrates
himself
defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' But some one may object
that he does not know the meaning of the word 'colour;' and if he is a
candid friend, and not a mere disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him
with a simpler and more philosophical definition, into which no disputed
word is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Meno imperiously
insists that he must still have a definition of colour. Some raillery follows;
and at length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of
form, sensible, and in due proportion to the sight.' This definition is
exactly suited to the taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language
of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract
or dialectical definition of figure is far better.
2MENO
Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general
definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words
of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to have the
power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he has yet
made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or
popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, 'that
the honourable is the good,' and as every one equally desires the good, the
point of the definition is contained in the words, 'the power of getting
them.' 'And they must be got justly or with justice.' The definition will
then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of getting good with justice.' But
justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with a
part of virtue. The definition repeats the word defined.
Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a
torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty
to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him.
Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because
he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how,
asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does
not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, saves a
great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a real
difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find a reply.
The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:--
He has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of
an immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of
existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of
ancient crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and
under world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by
association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of one
kindred; and every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed into
all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by
the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of
Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations of
geometrical figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal is double
the square of the side--that famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in
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honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a
hecatomb--is elicited from him. The first step in the process of teaching
has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's
shock' given him, and is the better for the operation. But whence had the
uneducated man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this
world; nor was it born with him; he must therefore have had it when he
was not a man. And as he always either was or was not a man, he must
have always had it. Compare Phaedo.
After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching,
the original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he
professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing to argue
the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will assume
that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. This was the stage
of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.
Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that
goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge.
Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where
are
the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging.
Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows
that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable.
In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-
to-do citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno, who happens
to be present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the Sophists and be
taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall
Meno go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman--to the great
Athenian statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere
Laches, Prot., that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, had sons
to whom they would surely, if they could have done so, have imparted
their own political wisdom; but no one ever heard that these sons of theirs
were remarkable for anything except riding and wrestling and similar
accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his
favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to belong;
he breaks off with a significant hint. The mention of another opportunity
of talking with him, and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian
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people a service by pacifying him, are evident allusions to the trial of
Socrates.
Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is
teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of it:
for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do not profess
to teach. But there is another point which we failed to observe, and in
which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. This is
the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance of right
opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for practical
purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, and is
also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk off,' because not bound
by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is possessed by
statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only inspired or
divine. The higher virtue, which is identical with knowledge, is an ideal
only. If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach what he knew,
he would be like Tiresias in the world below,--'he alone has wisdom, but
the rest flit like shadows.'
This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be
taught? No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern
times. But in the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind
could rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular
virtues of courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of
this ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of
the teachableness of virtue could be resolved.
The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems
rather intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge,
and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore
in this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The
teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their
pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only produce
out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire into what
you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates replies by his
theory of reminiscence.
To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly
5MENO
tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found
than it vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and
where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of
systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be
attained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a
single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word;
that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in their
pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or impart to them ready-
made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty drachms.' Plato is desirous
of deepening the notion of education, and therefore he asserts the paradox
that there are no educators. This paradox, though different in form, is not
really different from the remark which is often made in modern times by
those who would depreciate either the methods of education commonly
employed, or the standard attained--that 'there is no true education among
us.'
There remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if
there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of
education,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing or
divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to
others. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the
circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons.
Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or
philosophers, but they are inspired and divine.
There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms
the concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean
to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of human life.
To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the most
divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that 'probability
is the guide of life Butler's Analogy.;' and he is at the same time desirous
of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a higher wisdom.
There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of the human mind
which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds cannot always
be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent experience
which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach others, because
6MENO
he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or arranging his ideas.
He has practice, but not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of
psychology, which is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far
from saying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to
be regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the
poet or man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the
virtue based upon ideas.
Also here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge
an unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only
has knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may
be a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is
no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding
the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or of oracles
in the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the
daemonium of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as
well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to
include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes
the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the
expression of it.
This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of
reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight,
even slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had abstract
ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls
therefore must have always existed. For they must always have been either
men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And
Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds
immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not
altogether confident.' Compare Phaedo. It may be observed, however,
that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but partial
view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association of ideas.
Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not in the
previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, not actual,
and can only be appropriated by strenuous exertion.
The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than
7MENO
in the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas
of justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything
but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained
more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the affinities
of nature ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses. Modern philosophy says
that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the ancient
philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed that
out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was
converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the
association of ideas compare Phaedo became a real chain of existences.
The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be gathered
from the 'words of priests and priestesses:' 1 that true knowledge is a
knowledge of causes compare Aristotle's theory of episteme; and 2 that
the process of learning consists not in what is brought to the learner, but in
what is drawn out of him.
Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as 1 the acute
observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished
with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or 2 the shrewd
reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to
ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes; this must
surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could get
a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker; or 3 the remark
conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the labour of
thought and enquiry ouden dei to toiouto zeteseos. Characteristic also of
the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, 4 the proposal to discuss the
teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the
mathematicians; and 5 the repetition of the favourite doctrine which
occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives
a colour to all of them--that mankind only desire evil through
ignorance;
6 the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth
which is latent in him, and 7 the remark that he is all the better for
knowing his ignorance.
The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual
circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten
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thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about
the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious-- a
spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the great
king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired with an ardent desire of knowledge,
and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. He may be
regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias as Hippocrates
in the
Protagoras to the other great Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on
whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, just as in the Charmides,
the Lysis, and the Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is made the subject of
a similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a half-playful manner
suited to his character; at the same time he appears not quite to understand
the process to which he is being subjected. For he is exhibited as ignorant
of the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed to
instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue as 'the power and desire of
attaining things honourable,' like the first definition of justice in the
Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers have a sophistical ring, and at
the same time show the sophistical incapacity to grasp a general
notion.
Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is
indignant at innovation, and
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