Luddism Reassessed卢德主义重新评估

Luddism Reassessed卢德主义重新评估 Luddism reappraised page 1 LUDDISM REAPPRAISED: A PHILOSOPHY FOR THE NINETIES "Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities, all is vanity".(Eccl.1:2) The Luddites, it will be recalled, resisted the mechanization of work in a very direct way. They broke into factories and smashed the weaving machines which were putting them out of work. The widespread view of the Luddite movement is that its members, while justifiably aggrieved, were being irrational. They say: "The problem was not with the machines, but with the social order which produced the industrial revolution, converted persons to commodities,..." Most fundamentally, the desire of the Luddites to be weavers, especially, is thought to reveal short- sightedness about their real human potentialities. It is said: "How much more appropriate if Ned Lud, realizing that his unalienated desires are to fish in the morning and hunt in the afternoon, had worked to achieve a just economic order rather than smashing Leicestershire stocking frames. The machines themselves are actually a liberating technology, at least potentially. The Luddite energies should have gone toward developing just and humane uses of technology." In this paper, I suggest that Ned Lud and the Luddites who trashed in his name had a correct perception of their problem, if not the most permanently effective methodology. The Luddite insight about the situation of weavers in the industrial revolution, once our scales fall and the realities emerge, applies to the general human situation of the near future. Most distressingly, even intellectuals are directly threatened. I Why Were The Luddites Against Machines? According to the standard accounts, the Luddites were basically responding to their economic problems. But economics alone doesn't explain the particular form that the Luddite reaction to their economic problems took. In fact, the routine economic explanation makes 1the Luddites out to be irrational, since the smashing of some individual machines would not very directly increase the demand for skilled weavers. The standard explanations treat the fact that the Luddites smashed machines as explainable only by the ignorance and naivete of the uneducated persons involved. The Luddites in their ignorance thought they could hold up 2progress and destroy technology by destroying some hosiery frames. The "fit of insane rage" 1 (Hall, et al. characterize the union movement as "...More intelligent than breaking machines". Hall, Warren; Albion, Robert; and Pope, Jenny; @un[A History of England and the Empire-Commonweath], fourth edition, Ginn and Company, New York, 1961) 2 The Oxford English Dictionary so describes Ned Lud's original work, while characterizing Ned himself as "a person of weak intellect"(entry under "Luddite", L-volume, p.489. Luddism reappraised page 2 that leads a person to break into factories and smash machines rather than attacking the owners of the machines or working to organize the proletariat is treated as just berserk or silly. The real core of Luddite theory is more spiritual and less crazy, even though no Luddite seems to have been articulate and leisured enough to have left documents that would establish this case. The Luddites correctly saw that the existence of weaving frames diminished their status as human beings. Think of the situation of a weaver before the invention and wide-spreading of weaving frames. A weaver did something that was done only by humans. Weaving was a skill only a human being had, and a weaver was something only a human being could be. Weaving was worth doing and a weaver was worth being. Once machines do the job, it loses value as something worthy of one of God's children. The worthiness issue can be put economically. The human is now replaceable by a piece of machinery, whose value now defines what the value of some number of persons really is. If a hundred dollar machine replaces five weavers, those weavers become twenty-dollar entities. The economic way of putting things should not be confused with the claim that the Luddites were only protesting financial hardship. The Luddites were protesting the loss of their jobs, indeed, but the protest was, at least in part, against the loss of their Job as Occupation and Human Niche. Two final points about the Luddites: First: In order for a job to be worthy of a human being, it is only necessary that it actually be something that a machine does not do. The economic evaluation of the weaver's worth depends, not on the abstract possibility of a weaving machine's coming to exist, or even on its technological feasibility. It depends on the weaver's doing something that in fact is not done by a machine. (If we allow that the mere possibility of a weaving machine suffices to destroy the profession of weaver as something truly human, then the Preacher will have been right. If it destroys a career that a person could be replaced by a machine, then none of our life's works are safe.) A further barrier to treating the Luddites as rational is that their action of destroying actual machines does nothing to the technology, and even less to the mere possibility that such machines could exist. If the Luddite plan of action makes sense as problem- confrontation, it must be that the actual existence of machines destroys persons. Second: What the weavers accomplished before the machines arrived was worth doing and worth having done. (Relative to the conditions of the culture, etc.) When the machines arrived, weaving was still worth having done. A humanly worthwhile activity must be more than just something that only humans do. Guinness Book of Records accomplishments, such as learning to play the flute while riding a bicycle (no hands, of course), may be something no machine will do, but they do not constitute activities worthy of a human being of our culture. (One needn't be an absolutist. Given a history of prestige, such an activity could have been worth doing.) Perhaps in the case of the historical Luddites, the destruction of the selves they had defined by their trade was justified by the benefit in commodities for the rest of us. The Luddism reappraised page 3 evaluation of this argument depends heavily on whose self is threatened. II The Meaning of Life A few years ago, I was deeply engaged in struggling toward mediocrity at chess. For a human, serious chess requires much study and concentration. The reward is an occasional actual elegant game. As an art form, chess requires actuality. The art object doesn't exist just because an abstract object exists, any more than is the case for other art forms. (Pace Keats' earnest speculations.) After all, the configuration of colors and forms that constitutes any possible painting also exists as an abstract object. It doesn't bring about a beautiful game that a better move would have allowed a beautiful combinatory finish to the game instead of the routine win which in fact ensued. Merely possible games, even when thought of, are much less interesting and marvelous than the actual games. Chess is not a catalogue of abstract objects. Chess artistry creates products which did not exist before. I finally gave up chess, not for the sensible reason that it was displacing concerns with Plato and a full professorship, but because of creeping doubts about whether chess was worth a person's time. My doubts didn't arise from the philistine considerations advanced by my family and associates. After all, even though I would never become a Grandmaster, I would join the many saintly persons who have sacrificed material concerns in the hopeless pursuit of their art. No, what bothered me was that home computer programs existed which played better games than mine. For reasons that were then totally obscure and are now only slightly less dark, I lost interest in busting my cerebral stones to accomplish what a one hundred and forty- nine ninety five item from Radio Shack can do. The future of chess as a human art form seems not bright. The next world champion may well be a computer program. Being the human chess champion will then be of no more interest than having calculated and memorized a substantial table of logarithms. It's a lot of work and hard to do, but not a worthy career. For the moment, a human Master can feel that he's OK and the machine is OK, since only superfast liquid-helium-cooled mainframes compete at the master level. Soon, though, chess masters are going to be in the position of people who can, by great effort and training, derive square roots very quickly in their heads. Since a six ninety five calculator can do the same thing, the great effort and training is worth six ninety five--and not worth a human's time. Chess, perhaps, most of us can live without. What twentieth century calculating machines threaten, though, is the worthiness of intellectual activity and creation generally. If it is reasonable to stop working at chess because cheap machines can play much better, then nothing that we intellectuals regard as worth doing may be for long, given the way we think about what is worth doing. Consider what is perhaps the highest form of intellectual life, writing philosophical essays. Suppose that a mainframe is able to absorb texts and generate articles about as well as most of us. Perhaps the second generation actually does as well as Quine and Kant. We can Luddism reappraised page 4 feel perhaps no worse than we now feel about the existence of Quine and Kant--outclassed, but not degraded. They're two of us. The mainframe is so big and expensive and has such a large and talented team of programmers teaching the machine how to draw the subtle and hitherto- unnoticed connections that we can take being surpassed with equanimity. Now, think about the IBM PC PhiloGraph software package, which operates on 512K and guarantees a Journal of Philosophy-acceptable reply if you input a Journal of Philosophy article. We begin to wonder whether it's worth writing articles by hand, struggling months to think things out, revising, and so forth. Given the existence of that software, writing philosophy papers by oneself would be no more worth doing than solving enormous long- division problems on paper. If I divide 678,986,345,652,376 by 1265.567 on paper, I very likely arrive at a result never previously arrived at by hand or machine. But so what? My product is no better than what a cheap machine could do with similar projects. If it is a requirement of a career worth a lifetime that no machine under two hundred dollars can accomplish the same thing, then very few intellectual careers seem entirely safe for humanity. In fact, among rational activities generally, there seems to be little that is in principle out of the reach of sufficiently talented and dedicated cadres of programmers and 3hardware technologists. The rational machine can do for rational skills and strengths what physical machines did for physical strengths and skills. If Artificial Intelligence progresses apace, human intellectual skills, accomplishments and creations will be of interest only as Guinness curiosities. (It's not an especially good painting, but its quite remarkable, since the guy painted it with his tongue.) Now, the mere possibility of these programs is no threat to the human importance and worthiness of the intellectual accomplishments. Otherwise nothing was ever important and worthwhile among intellectual accomplishments, since in principle no intellectual accomplishment is safe from the mere possibility of machine duplication. Presumably, Kant and Plato will have spent their lives well, even if later we can surpass their 4accomplishments using GerEnlitePhil and ClaGrePhil software on our home Atari. The actual existence and use of such programs, though, does seem to ruin the satisfaction to be gained by these activities. (If this admittedly shaky argument does not stand, and the mere possibility of six dollar equivalents to skills and talents ruins them, then Ecclesiastes was right.) 3 Hope rests on the fragile edifices of proofs that certain tasks are in principle beyond any computer. While I admire the authors of such proofs, and have no refutations of their arguments, I am not comforted by them. Arguments whose conclusions are that certain projects are in principle impossible so frequently suffer from the Fallacy of False Conclusion that they cannot reasonably be depended on, even when they look very strong. I do not want to bet my grandchildren on the conjecture that some such argument has a true conclusion. 4 We certainly do not want to contemplate the possibility that nothing that has been done was worthwhile, in the universal register of Great Deeds. The thought that the intellect is just gooshy hardware with extremely floppy disks is too humiliating to be taken seriously. So we will let the "presumably" in the text stand. Luddism reappraised page 5 Most of us are brought up to believe that we should accomplish something in life. Apart from human relationships and sensitivities, most of us feel that the main component of a life's accomplishments has something to do with rational activities, with thinking things through, being creative, having good ideas, and so forth. If it should turn out that doing these things on our own is just quaint, like weaving your own blue jeans or building a kiln to manufacture your own cat litter, much on which we currently pride ourselves is threatened. Even going beyond the merely rational may not help. Programmers may well duplicate our moral sensitivities and such. When a six ninety five device can be as responsive to our loved ones as we are, the special human meaning and significance of this sensitivity would depend on a peculiar significance about being based on protein gels rather than electronics. III What Now? Smash or Be Smashed? Pass the Lotuses? It seems there are two ways to go. The first path: We can accept the view that the possibility of cheap machine replacement undermines achievement. This is to decide that the definition of human accomplishment in terms of something special to humans is a mistake, perhaps a deviation in Western Man or the Patriarchal Tradition. The second path: Hoping that actuality is what counts, we can take steps to keep the now merely possible merely possible. The first path treats the normative concept of the human as an historically contingent concept whose conditions for application no longer obtain. The notion of human achievement as a special realm of value can exist only when a culture convinces itself that there is a domain of products that nothing but a human could make. (This has something to do with the loss of the God who creates people in His image, making them Very Special beings. Uniquely human achievement is thus the secular approximation of chosenness. It may be just as credible.) The neo- Luddite takes the second path, hoping that preventing actuality will suffice. Being human is a matter of being creative and thoughtful in a way that nothing under one hundred dollars can be. Artificial Intelligence researchers are perhaps well- meaning, but they are threats to the spiritual survival of human beings. They must be stopped. The neo- Luddite believes that the actual existence of the machine is what diminishes the human accomplishment, not the merely possible existence of the machine. Chess would not have been destroyed by the mere counterfactual possibility that a great machine could in principle be built to play a better game of chess than any human-- that has been known from the very beginning of the realization that chess was finite. Chess was not destroyed by mere possibility but by a massive project. It took teams of researchers many years to accomplish what they have accomplished in chess programming. Should the mere possibilities quell our pride, then? If so, the counterfactual which would have to dishearten us, given that AI researchers or research projects are smashed, is a counterfactual of the form: "If thousand of researchers devoted decades to searching for a program to do x, then..." But, given the non- existence of those thousands of researchers so devoted, your career is safe, since you're doing something only you and your fellow humans are Luddism reappraised page 6 actually in a position to do. The fact that I could be replaced by a national research project is not too discouraging. If vast resources are required to destroy us, our destruction is not easy or 5cheap, so what we do is still valuable. Once such a particular research project has been completed, of course, the realm of activity in question is trivialized for all subsequent persons. Since actuality is what matters, it behooves us to stop the programmers before they finish their work. Since programs are too subtle to be destroyed once they have been written, the attack must be on the research projects, not on the hardware. In a way, the research team which designs the program appropriates all the worthwhile activity that the activity has. Once chess is trivialized, the only remaining worthily creative chess persons will be the programmers. Analogous remarks apply to the poetry and love letter programs. Tolerance for the continued existence of AI researchers allows a small group to seize the resources for worthy activity not only of all of their contemporaries, but of all future generations as well. The defense may be made that we have become our own God, creating beings whose accomplishments are ours. But what do you mean "we," Mr. Programmer? But maybe the accomplishments of the programmers are really our accomplishments, so that "humanity" has created entities which surpass itself, so that it's all ok. This would to amount to a kind of trickle- down theory of worth (with the drawbacks of such theories), or to a theory of vicarious accomplishment. The Luddites seemed naive and foolish. One was tempted to say: "They were concerned with mere work of the hands, not the fully human work of the mind. They didn't realize that what they took to define themselves as persons, their trade, was not really worthy of a human being." Well, it's one thing when the proles are displaced. But when higher forms of life are threatened, it is time for action. Now that the grandchildren of the current generation of machines threaten intellectuals as well, it is time to reassess Luddism. Where is my axe handle? Samuel C. Wheeler III November 28, 1984 5 Maybe. I don't see how the fact that no-one has bothered to write a program to wipe out the Masters of gin rummy enhances the worth of that activity.