南亚：安全、发展与援助

The Stanley Foundation Beyond Boundaries in South Asia: Bridging the Security/ Development Divide With International Security Assistance By Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Esha Mufti Beyond Boundaries in South Asia: Bridging the Security/Development Divide With International Security Assistance The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation By Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, and Esha Mufti Table of Contents Acknowledgments ..........................................................................................................................3 Executive Summary........................................................................................................................4 Development and Security Flashpoints in South Asia ....................................................................6 Money Laundering ..................................................................................................................6 Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation ........................................................................8 Drug Trafficking ....................................................................................................................10 UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540: Proven Platforms for Bridging the Security/Development Divide ............................................................................12 Development and Regional Security Capacity Building in South Asia with Dual-Benefit Assistance ................................................................................................................18 Prospects for South Asian Regional Burden and Capacity Sharing ..............................................19 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................22 Endnotes ......................................................................................................................................23 About the Project ........................................................................................................................30 About the Authors ......................................................................................................................30 The Stanley Foundation............................................................................................................31 The Stimson Center ..................................................................................................................31 2 Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the Government of Finland, the Carnegie Corporation of NewYork, and the Stanley Foundation for their keystone support of the broader initiative fromwhich this report emerges. We are especially indebted to Markku Virri at the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Carl Robichaud and Patricia Moore-Nicholas at Carnegie, and to Keith Porter and Veronica Tessler from Stanley for their unwavering confidence in this initiative. We would also like to thank Heidi Hall, David Slungaard, Hunter Murray, and Emily Hill, interns with the Managing Across Boundaries program, for research and editorial assistance. The content of this report was significantly informed by the first-hand experiences of Umar Riaz, who served as a visiting fellow with the Managing Across Boundaries program in the summer of 2011. Umar is a law enforcement officer who currently serves as Head of Investigations in Peshawar, Pakistan. In 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki offered a seed grant to the Stimson Center’s Managing Across Boundaries program to bring together national governments, regional and sub- regional organizations, and nongovernmental experts in an innovative effort, “The Beyond Boundaries Initiative.” Our initial goal was to more effectively and sustainably promote imple- mentation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which mandates a sweep- ing array of supply-side efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. We believe that by breaking down the artificial barriers between the security and development communities, whose goals are often similar but whose methods rarely intersect, a more sustainable and ultimately less costly approach to proliferation prevention would result. Over time, that initiative grew into a successful multifaceted outreach effort, stretching from the Caribbean Basin and Central America to East Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Almost six years later, the informal consortium of interests born from that effort has helped to ini- tiate a pragmatic series of regional initiatives that promise to advance the cause of sustainable non- proliferation and counterterrorism in corners of the globe that are increasingly viewed as potential links in the proliferation supply chain. In so doing, we believe that we and our partners have helped breathe new life into not only global nonproliferation efforts but also an array of citizen security and economic development objectives in key strategic regions around the world. Additional information on The Beyond Boundaries Initiative can be found at: www.stimson.org /research-pages/bridging-the-divide-between-security-and-development-3/. A comprehensive source for information on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 can be found at http://1540.collabora tiontools.org/about. Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas, Esha Mufti 3 Executive Summary Although even the most cursory survey of the human condition today reveals wild geograph-ic disparities in virtually every economic, social, and political measure, at no other point inhistory have people worldwide lived longer, had greater access to health services, or had more opportunities to acquire a basic education. These unprecedented improvements in the quali- ty of life have driven down global poverty rates in the last half-century. Yet despite this remarkable improvement in the human condition, not everyone has benefitted equally. South Asia’s predicament reveals an especially complex story. Despite a long period of eco- nomic growth, the region is home to the world’s largest concentration of poor people—more than 500 million continue to live on less than USD 1.25 a day.1 Moreover, across much of South Asia, economic growth has not been accompanied by corresponding gains in human development. More than 250 million children in the region remain undernourished, of whom more than 30 million are unable to attend school, and more than one-third of South Asian women are anemic largely due to a lack of dietary iron.2 Underdevelopment and “soft security” challenges, including money laun- dering, small arms and light weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking, together conspire to undermine the significant strides South Asian states have made in the last two decades. These trends clearly demonstrate that additional work is required to promote increased security and more inclu- sive growth patterns across the region. While these are the security and development issues that dominate domestic and regional dialogue, among Western audiences “hard” security concerns, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons (especially to nonstate actors) and terrorism, absorb much of the discourse on South Asia. It was against this backdrop that the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). Promoted as part of a broader tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms to prevent ter- rorism and proliferation globally, the resolutions were seemingly ill-connected to the more pressing challenges facing much of the world. Asking developing nations and emerging economies to divert attention and resources from more immediate national and regional challenges to the seemingly distant threat of WMD terrorism or terrorist attacks on Western targets is not only unreasonable but also unlikely to succeed—if not for a lack of political will, then from a sheer lack of implementation capacity. In the end, however, without the sustained buy-in of countries viewed as prominent potential links in the global prolif- eration supply chain—either as emerging dual-use technology innovators and manufacturers, as critical transshipment points and financial centers, or as breeding grounds for terrorist sympa- thies—it is infeasible to exercise sufficient preventative controls over the movement of sensitive nuclear, chemical, and biological materials and/or technologies, or the malicious activities of ter- rorist entities. To that end, the growing interconnectedness and interdependence between the traditionally-siloed threat portfolios suggest that effectively addressing regional security and underdevelopment chal- lenges is key to preventing them from metastasizing into international security challenges—espe- cially in a nuclear-armed region that remains home to Al Qaeda’s central command. The reality is that the capacity needed to prevent WMD proliferation and undermine the conditions conducive to 4 The author prepared this report as part of a larger project on regional implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The report has been informed by meeting discussions and contains the author’s views and recommenda- tions, and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation. terrorism is intimately connected to the capacity needed to fulfill economic, development, and human security objectives of national governments throughout the region. Thus, there exists a strong link between implementing Resolutions 1373 and 1540 and overcoming higher priority chal- lenges of South Asian states. This realization offers a unique opportunity to capitalize upon “dual- benefit” assistance that leverages long-term international security and human security and sustainable regional development. As such, our first objective must be to better understand the priority concerns of partners across the Global South. The effectiveness of this approach has been proven around the globe, most notably in the Caribbean and Central America. For donors and partners alike, the growing confluence of security and devel- opment challenges at a time of strained financial resources means that neither can be sustainably treated—or resolved—in isolation. For this reason, bridging the security/development divide in order to foster collaboration and develop common strategies, ameliorate proliferation concerns, reinforce counterterrorism efforts, and provide an agenda of opportunity for all countries involved will be cen- tral to not only defending international security in the long term but also to facilitating sustainable economic growth and development. It is this development and security model that this report seeks to communicate. 5 Project Report Development and Security Flashpoints in South Asia Money Laundering The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that develops and promotesnational and international policies to combat money laundering, financing of terrorism, andproliferation of terrorism, has placed three South Asian countries—Iran, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—on its blacklist of nations that fail to meet international standards with regard to the task force’s recommendations.3 Indeed, widespread money laundering activities permeate both the pub- lic and private sectors of South Asia. Countries from barely developing Afghanistan to economi- cally booming India suffer from the deleterious effects of such activities. India alone lost over USD 125 billion in illicit outflows between 2000 and 2008, and total estimated capital flight accounted for approximately 16.6 percent of India’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008.4 To the east, the challenge is even more formidable. According to Afghan customs records, nearly USD 3.18 billion has been taken out of the country since 2007. Customs officials believe this declared sum to be only a fraction of the money actually moving out of Afghanistan.5 Considering that the declared total is almost 20 percent of GDP in a country where the major sources of money are international aid projects and drug money, it is highly likely that a significant portion of the money leaving the country stems from these sources, and thus, is illicit.6 Afghanistan cannot hope to develop any sort of independent capacity to strengthen and develop a formal economy or to ful- fill basic security needs, national and transnational, with such gross unaccountability and outflow of cash. On a regional scale, moreover, with such marked losses of capital, it is impossible for any South Asian country to fully reach its economic and development potential. The historical hawala system plays an essential role in the proliferation of money laundering activ- ities. Hawala is an informal value transfer system that operates outside the banking and finance sec- tor, avoiding taxes, customs duties, and currency controls. It is most widely used in Afghanistan, where only five percent, at most, of the population uses licensed banks. Rather, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of all money transfers are made through hawala. These include foreign fund transfers to and from the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Pakistan.7 Traditionally, South Asian expatriate com- munities have used the system to transfer remittances home; however, the use of formal channels by emigrants has increased exponentially in the last decade.8 As such, governments face an array of complex challenges, including capacity shortfalls, the wide- spread use of informal economies, porous borders, pervasive corruption, and a lack of regional cooperation, in effectively addressing the threat, making the region a particularly fertile environ- ment for money laundering activities. The money laundering industry not only inherently weakens economic development by undermining the financial sector and foreign investment but also threat- ens security. Nefarious groups take advantage of the challenges facing regional governments to finance illicit activities, including drug and human trafficking, small arms proliferation, transna- tional organized crime, and terrorism, all of which are major sources and beneficiaries of laundered funds in South Asia.9 For instance, criminal and terrorist organizations rely on hawala as a means of transferring illicit funds to finance their activities. Hawala transactions offer these entities “an extensive but unmoni- tored (international) network” through which to move critical resources.10 In addition to using hawala, they often prop up charities as fronts, as well as using trade-based money laundering and 6 physically smuggling cash across borders in order to acquire and circulate funds.11 For instance, Indian authorities have linked Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a charity front for Pakistani-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, to the 2008 Mumbai attack. JuD would seek donations for charitable causes such as building schools at inflated costs and then launder the excess money to fund terrorist activities.12 While Pakistani authorities did initiate a crackdown on JuD after the UN Security Council placed sanctions against the organization in December 2008, their efforts were seriously hampered by difficulties in track- ing and seizing JuD funds. Without adequate legal authority or enforcement capacity, pervasive corruption and lax financial controls create a reinforced loop, making reigning in transnational money laundering across the region a particularly nettlesome challenge. Border insecurity presents an additional obstacle. As noted above, launderers often physically carry cash across national boundaries.13 Afghanistan’s borders are especially notorious for being fluid and insecure with mil- lions, perhaps billions, of undeclared dollars being smuggled into Iran and Pakistan, where Afghan hawalas have branches.14 Most states, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, have passed anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) laws, and are members of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Nonetheless, meas- ures to counter money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as investigations into both, have been hampered by a lack of capacity and political commitment, which can be directly attributable to the corruption that pervades local and national governments. The low rates of money launder- ing convictions and terrorism-related suspicious transaction reports throughout the region are dif- ficult to reconcile with the high threat profiles of the countries.15 Recently however, countries have shown increased initiative on the issue, including acknowledging the need for enhanced regional and global cooperation and seeking increased mutual legal assistance.16 Specific recommendations among regional stakeholders to improve financial, legal, and technical mechanisms to address money laundering include: • Co-option of hawaldars into formal banking and financial sectors—a strategy that may have helped Pakistan improve the use of formal channels in remittance transfers in the 2000s.17 • Promotion of advanced anti-money laundering training for police, judges, and prosecutors.18 • Creation of formal legal mechanisms for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and information sharing across the region.19 • Improved awareness among key constituencies, including prosecutors, judges, and law enforce- ment of national and regional anti-money laundering objectives and strategies.20 • Improved interdepartmental cooperation at the national level and sufficient coordination at the regional and international levels.21 • Improved communications infrastructures.22 • Improved personnel and technical capacity at border points, such as more and better-trained and equipped guards as well as surveillance systems and scanners.23 • Inducements against corruption and lack of political will in government, as well as demotivated staff, to implement current legal and enforcement AML and CFT structures.24 7 Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking and Proliferation India’s statement at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Aspects read in part: The problem that illicit small arms and light weapons constitute is well known. During the past decade, these weapons have been the weapons of choice in 46 out of 49 major con- flicts, most of which have been armed insurgencies and intra-state conflicts, claiming on average 300,000 deaths… In India we are particularly aware of their lethality: in the past twenty years about 35,000 innocent persons have been killed by terrorists, all using illicit small arms and explosives…25 In addition to playing a major role in terrorism and insurgency-related deaths across South Asia, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are also used in killings related to organized crime and drug trafficking, communal tensions, gender-based aggression, and the like. In 2009, there were 32,369 homicide victims in India alone, where 90 percent of gun-related killings are carried out using unli- censed guns.26 Having an extensive number of small arms at large indicates a lack of government capacity and a heightened sense of insecurity that is anathema to sustainable development.27 Indeed, out of the 63 million SALW in circulation among nonstate actors in South Asia, the major- ity is illegal.28 According to the Small Arms Survey, the number of illegal small arms pouring into South Asia esca- lated in the latter half of the 20th century. Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand—each with a surplus of SALW provided by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War—are major sources of illicit weapons for South Asian nonstate actors operating especially in Northeast India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh is also a major transit point to India and elsewhere in the