典当信用与金融排斥的重要性[外文翻译]

典当信用与金融排斥的重要性[外文翻译] 本科毕业 论文 政研论文下载论文大学下载论文大学下载关于长拳的论文浙大论文封面下载 (设计) 文 翻 译 外 原文: Pawn Credit and the Importance of Financial Exclusion The pawnbroking industry is thriving again. Recently, Reuters (2009) reported that the U.S. pawnbroking industry is growing at a rate not seen in the past 10 years. The Swedish pawnbroking industry forms no exception; in 2008 its outstanding loan balance rose by 20 percent for the second consecutive year to SEK 1.35 bn. In 2009 pawn credit is forecasted to grow to SEK 1.5 bn. Until recently, the demand for pawn credit in Sweden was relatively stable. As in the U.S., around four percent of the Swedish adult population uses the services of a pawnshop on a regular basis. Interestingly, given the presence of collateral and the higher interest rates typically charged on pawn credit, 90 percent of the customers pay back their loan. The average pawn loan in Sweden has a value of SEK 2500 (USD 350-400) and has a maturity of 141 days. The cost, including interest and fees, associated with such a loan amounts to 20 percent of the loan’s principal and two percent of the average after tax income earned during the maturity by the pawn borrowers. In order to justify borrowing at such high cost, standard life cycle consumption models requires very high discount rates or events that cause large unanticipated variation in the marginal utility of consumption. As Skiba (2007) point out, borrowing at such rates is even more difficult to explain if consumers would have lower-cost credit alternatives. Conventional economic theory says that consumer credit - even if it has high interest rates - is a means to alleviate temporary liquidity constraints and a facilitator of consumption smoothing. Many policy makers and consumer advocates have a different view, deeming the high interest credit loans, like payday loans and pawn credit, predatory and usurious. Compared to payday lending or "sms-loans", pawn credit lending has some particular characteristics that less likely lead borrowers onto a downward spiral of increased financial distress. The fact that the borrower physically hands over the collateral to the pawnbroker eliminates - if the collateral is adequately appraised - most of the credit risk in case of a default. This near absence of risk has eliminated the need for credit scoring or an information sharing system among pawnbrokers. As a result, the consequences of defaulting on a pawn loan for future credit access are limited in the pawn credit market and absent in the mainstream credit market. The costs that an average pawn credit borrower accumulates are nevertheless substantial. In Sweden, a pawn credit customer takes on average four loans per year and rolls over each loan once. For an average loan duration and size, this amounts to an annual cost of 80 percent of the principal amount, compared to an average effective APR of 5.40 percent on collateral free credit supplied by the mainstream banking sector in Sweden during the sample period. Why is it economically of interest that people are liquidity constrained? At a fundamental level, liquidity constraints influence the marginal propensity to consume out of liquid wealth (including available credit). Even when liquidity constraints are not binding momentarily, their influence can be reinforced by precautionary motives because of a possibility that they will become binding in the future. The presence of liquidity constraints also has important implications in many areas of economics. For instance Hubbard (1986) demonstrates that they can amplify the effects of fiscal policy and other business cycle shocks. Pagano (1999) shows that while they increase savings they can delay investment in human capital and thus slow growth. Gross and Souleles (2002) quantify the importance of liquidity constraints and precautionary motives. They find that the long run average elasticity of debt to the interest rate is -1.3 and that it is smaller for increases in interest rates and liquidity constrained people, who start near their credit limits. According to this, pawn credit customers increase their marginal propensity to consume because their liquidity constraints are temporarily eased, but this positive effect might be undercut by the fact that they pay such high interest rates. Pawnshop customers are typically thought of as using pawn credit to mitigate the effects from very short-lived liquidity constraints. I find two pieces of evidence, both based on the timing of the decision to take and repay their pawn loan, that indicate, given the small loan amounts at stake, the presence of tough constraints. First, I document an increased demand right before - and a higher repayment rate right after the two nation-wide monthly paydays. Overall, demand is 20 percent higher in the week before payday and repayments are almost 120 percent higher in the three 7days after each of the two paydays. Second, I find a higher repayment rate after the annual tax returns in June. Taken together these findings point to an important role for pawn credit plays in alleviating credit constraints. As I show later on, pawn credit is used both as a substitute for and complement to regular credit. Conditional on being rejected, the probability of obtaining a pawn loan is 11.3 percent and conditional on being accepted the probability is 7.8 percent. However, the vast majority of all pawn loans, 73 percent, is taken without first trying to get cheaper credit at a regular bank. In other words, 73 percent of all pawn credit is obtained by so called discouraged borrowers. Compared to medelsvensson, the average Swede, a typical pawnshop customer is more likely to be young, female, and living in a big city. She may be currently married, but is more likely to have experienced a divorce or widowhood in the year before taking the pawn loan. Her income is lower and she is less likely to have income from capital or own a house. If she does own a house, then her house is likely having a value below-average. Her regular bank history looks worse, with more loan denials, a higher debt to income ratio and more payment remarks. In addition, she is also more likely to have utilized at least 90 percent of her existing credit lines at mainstream banks or have no credit line available. Discouraged borrowers broadly conform to this profile but have a credit score that is even lower. The objective of this paper is threefold. First, it aims at improving our understanding of the factors that lead consumers in potentially very different economic situations to apply for sources of credit with substantially higher costs than mainstream bank credit. This paper cannot give a final answer to the question why, for example, consumers with sound financial track records and available lines of credit use expensive pawn credit. However, my results make it clear that pawn credit demand is mainly driven by people who have not recently experienced a rejection when applying for mainstream credit. This implies that either expectations, e.g., an adequate or inadequate calculation by the borrower that he is ineligible for mainstream bank credit, or other behavioral factors, such as reputational concerns and repayment commitments, are likely to be important determinants of high-cost credit. These findings have important implications for policy makers who aim at increasing the access of households to lower-cost finance. Second, this paper attempts to document the factors behind households’ demand for pawn credit. Third, it provides an estimate of the effect that discouraged borrowers have on credit demand. Pawnshops make small loans collateralized by tangible personal property, such as jewelry, consumer electronics, musical instruments and art. The pawn lending business has a very long history, with informal pawnbroking dating back to ancient China. Pawnbroking came to Europe in the 14th century; it started in Lombardy (now Italy) and from there it spread to the rest of Europe. Its Swedish origins can be traced back to the 17th century. In Sweden it was a government-owned business until the 1850s when it was gradually privatized. The most recent reform is from 1995 when a new pawn credit law abolished both entry restrictions and interest rate ceilings. Since then the number of pawnbroking companies operating in Sweden has increased from eight to 20; together they operate 46 pawnshops around Sweden of which eleven are located in Stockholm. The three largest players in the pawnbroking market jointly have a national market share of 80 percent. In Sweden gold is by far the most commonly used collateral: 80 percent of all loans have gold as pledged collateral. Pawnbrokers do not attempt to assess the creditworthiness of their customers; rather, they rely upon the estimated value of the collateral in making their loan decisions. The amount loaned is determined as a percentage of the estimated resale value of the pledged collateral. In Sweden this percentage typically lies between 70 and 80 in the case of gold and between 50 and 60 in the case of collateral with a more uncertain resale value. As I mentioned before, pawn loans have an average maturity of 141 days and the costs associated with such a loan amount to 20 percent of the loan’s principal. Pawnbrokers and pawn credit are typically governed by industry-specific laws that differ from the ones that apply to mainstream financial institutions. Pawnbrokers in Sweden, for example, are legally forbidden to offer loan contracts with a duration longer than four months, but the usual loan is past due when paid. As a result, many customers repeatedly incur fixed costs because fees are charged every time the loan is rolled over, e.g. three times per year for a loan that has an effective duration of one year. For an average-sized pawn loan with an effective duration of one year the effective interest rate is approximately 72%. Previously existing legal limits on the interest rates charged by pawnbrokers in Sweden and entry restrictions were abolished in the middle of the 1990s. These liberalizations coincided with a drop in interest rates that was ascribed to increased competition. Typically, pawn credit transactions are carried out as follows: After receiving a piece of collateral, appraising its value and dispensing cash, a pawn shop gives a borrower a pawn ticket. This ticket includes a loan number, a description of the pledged collateral, the date on which the loan was made, the loan amount, the maturity date and the interest rate charges that must be paid to redeem the collateral. If the loan is not repaid at or prior to maturity, the customer is given a legally determined grace period of two months within which the pledged property can be redeem by paying the loan amount and all accrued charges. If at the end of the grace period, the customer has neither redeemed his property nor extended, the loan then the collateral is forfeited to the pawnshop. The pawnbroker then sells the property at an auction or in their stores to recover the principal amount of the loan. In the case that the revenues from the sale of the collateral exceed the borrower’s obligations, the pawnbroker is legally obliged to return the excess proceeds to the pawnshop customer, minus the auction and transaction costs. The pawnbroking industry is often thought to be an easy outlet for criminals to dispose of their stolen goods. This association is enforced by the media's underexposure of the pawnbroking industry in general and overexposure of rare cases of illegal practices. The fact that more than 90 percent of all loans are paid back and the pledge retrieved suggest otherwise. Moreover, the whole system is set up to make it difficult to deal with stolen goods in a structural way. To start with, when taking a pawn loan the customer has to show their ID and their personal number is subsequently registered in the pawnbrokers’ administration together with the pledged collateral. The police compares systematically their own list of stolen goods with the auction and inventory lists of the pawn brokers. But most importantly, pawn brokers themselves have no incentive to take stolen goods as a pledge. First they make the most money if customers keep returning, taking new loans and/or rolling over their loans so that they pay more fees and interest. A pawn loan based on a stolen pledge, however will typically default. Second, if the police identifies the pledged collateral as stolen, which is likely given the regular checks, it is confiscated and the pawnbroker has to write off the loan, plus that risks negative media attention what will decrease future profits. Source: Marieke Bos,2010.“Pawn Credit and the Importance of Financial Exclusion”. Doctoral Dissertation.Stockholm University.June.pp.2-11. 译文: 典当信用与金融排斥的重要性 典当行业又兴旺了。最近，路透社(2009)报道了美国典当行业以过去10年里前所未有的速度增长。瑞典典当行业的产生也不例外;在2008年，未支付贷款余额连续两年增长百分之二十至1.35亿克朗。2009年典当信贷预计将增长到1.5亿克朗。直到最近，瑞典典当信贷的需求才相对稳定。正如在美国，大约百分之四的瑞典成年人定期使用典当行服务。有趣的是，考虑到附属担保物的存在和更高的利息率，特别是从典当贷款中收取的，百分之九十的客户会偿还他们的贷款。 在瑞典，平均典当贷款的价值为2500克朗(350-400美元)，期限为141天。成本包括利息率和费用，与等于贷款资金百分之二十和贷款者贷款期内平均税后收入百分之二的贷款相关联。为了证明贷款的成本之高， 标准 excel标准偏差excel标准偏差函数exl标准差函数国标检验抽样标准表免费下载红头文件格式标准下载 的生命周期消费模式需要非常高的贴现率或者在消费边际效用中引起不曾预料的大变化的事件。就像斯基巴(2007)指出，如果消费者有更低成本的贷款可供选择，在这种利率下的借款更难以解释。 传统经济理论认为，消费信贷——即使它具有较高的利率——是一种以缓解暂时的资金流动性限制的手段和平滑消费的促进者。许多政策制定者和消费者权益保护组织有不同的看法，认为高息贷款就像是工资日贷款和典当信贷，掠夺的和放高利贷的。相较于发薪日贷款或“短信贷款”，典当信用贷款有一定的特殊性，不太可能导致借款人财务困境的继续恶性循环。事实上，借款人将抵押品移交给典当商消除了——如果典当物被充分地评价——大部分的信用风险。这种几乎不存在的风险已经消除了对信贷计分或在典当商中信息共享 制度 关于办公室下班关闭电源制度矿山事故隐患举报和奖励制度制度下载人事管理制度doc盘点制度下载 的需要。因此，典当融资违约的后果是在未来典当融资市场上信贷的取得受到限制且缺席主流信贷市场。平均一个典当融资者积累的成本仍然是巨大的。在瑞典，一个典当融资者平均一年四次贷款，每一笔贷款展期一次。对于平均一笔贷款的期限和规模，这相当于年度成本是理论成本的80%，与瑞典主流银行界在样本期间提供免费抵押信贷的平均有效年利率5.40%相比。 为什么是经济上的利益约束了人们的流动资金,在基础层面上，流动性约束影响了边际消费倾向没有影响流动性财富(包括可行性信贷)。即使流动性约束 暂时没有约束力，他们的影响可以被预防动机加强，因为他们可能将在未来结合在一起。流动性约束的存在也对经济的许多领域产生了重要影响。例如哈伯德(1986)表明，它们可以放大财政政策和其他经济周期冲击的影响。帕加诺(1999年)显示，他们在增加储蓄的同时他们可以延迟人力资本的投资，从而增长缓慢。格罗斯和苏勒雷斯(2002)量化流动性约束和预防性动机的重要性。他们发现，从长期来看，债券的平均利率弹性是-1.3，这在提高利息率和靠近信用额度的人的流动性约束方面较小。根据这一点，典当融资者提高他们的边际消费倾向，因为他们的流动性约束是暂时缓解，但这种积极影响可能会因为他们支付高利率而削弱。 典当行的客户一般认为利用典当贷款可以减低寿命极短的流动性限制的影响。我发现两个证据，在进度安排上都决定采取和偿还典当贷款，这表明，在危急关头筹集少量资金，存在强硬的限制。首先，我记载了刚好在全国每月发薪日之前的需求增加和刚好在全国每月发薪日之后的更高还款率。总体而言，需求是在发薪日前每周高20%，还款额在每两个发薪日间每三周几乎高120%。第二，我发现在每年6月份的年度纳税申报后有较高的还款率。结合这些调查结果指出典当信贷在缓解信贷约束中扮演着重要角色。 正如我后面显示的，典当贷款被用来作为常规信贷的替代和补充。有条件被拒回，能获取典当贷款的概率为11.3%，有条件被接受的概率是百分之7.8%。然而，大量的典当贷款，73%，不会先试图取得比一个普通银行更便宜的信贷。换句话说，典当信贷的73%是被气馁的借款人得到。 相比瑞典，平常的瑞典人，一个典型的典当行客户更可能是年轻人，女性，和生活在大城市。她可能是目前已婚，但更可能有离婚经验或是在采取典当贷款的前一年寡居。她的收入较低，她是不太可能有资本收入或拥有自己的房子。如果她拥有自己的房子，那么她的房子价值很可能低于平均水平。她的普通银行历史记录看上去不好，有较多贷款拒绝记录，较高的债务与收入的比例和更多的付款备注。此外，她也更可能已经利用了在主流银行现有信贷额度的至少90%或没有可用的信用额度。气馁的借款人大致符合此类描述，但有一个更低的信用分数。 本文的目的有三。首先，它旨在提高我们对因素的理解，在潜在的非常不同的经济情况下导致消费者申请信贷来源比主流银行信贷成本高很多。本文不能给 问题提供最后的答案，例如，消费者提供良好的金融信用纪录和使用昂贵的典当信贷提供可行的信贷最高限额。然而，我的结果清楚表明典当信贷需求主要是由最近在申请主流信贷时没有经历过拒绝的人驱动的。这意味着，或抱有期望，例如，一个没资格进行主流银行信贷的借款人充分或不充分的计算，或其他行为因素，如声誉的关注和还款承诺，很可能是高成本信贷的重要决定因素。这些研究结果对目的在增加家庭获得较低成本融资的政策制定者有重要意义。其次，本文试图记录家庭典当信贷需求背后的因素。第三，它提供了对气馁的借款人对信贷需求的估计。 小额贷款，抵押有形个人财产，如珠宝，电子消费产品，乐器及典当行推出 艺术品。典当贷款业务有非常悠久的历史，非正式的典当业可以追溯到古代的中国。典当业在14世纪来到欧洲;开始于伦巴第(现在意大利)，并从那里蔓延到欧洲其他国家。其瑞典起源可以追溯到17世纪。在瑞典，它是政府拥有的企业，直到19世纪50年代被逐步私有化。最近的改革是从1995年，一个新的典当行信贷法取消了登记限制和利率的上限。自那时开始，典当公司在瑞典的数目从8增加至20;他们在瑞典开了46家典当行，其中11家位于斯德哥尔摩。这三个最大的典当市场参与者共同拥有全国百分之八十的市场份额。 在瑞典，黄金是最常用的抵押:所有贷款中的百分之八十用黄金作为担保物。典当商不企图估计客户的信誉;他们宁愿依赖于估计附属担保品的价值来作他们的贷款决定。贷款的数量是估计的抵押品转售价值的百分比。在瑞典，在抵押品是黄金的情况下，这个百分比通常在70到80之间，在更加不确定转售价值的抵押品情况下是50到60之间。就像我之前提到的，典当贷款平均期限为141天，成本包括典当数量到百分之二十的典当资本。典当商们和典当借贷典型地被行业细分规则所统治，又区别于那些申请主流金融机构的贷款案例。瑞典的典当商，例如，在法律上禁止提供比四个月更长的贷款 合同 劳动合同范本免费下载装修合同范本免费下载租赁合同免费下载房屋买卖合同下载劳务合同范本下载 ，但是通常的贷款是逾期支付的。因此，许多客户一再引起固定成本因为每一次收取费用贷款就会延缓付款，例如，一年中一项贷款有三次有效期限。对于一项有一年有效期的普通典当贷款，利息率接近于百分之七十二。以前在瑞典典当商在利息率收费问题上存在的合法限制和进口限制在十九世纪九十年代中期被废除。这些自由化和利息率下跌同时发生归因于竞争的加剧。 通常情况下，典当信贷交易按如下进行:在收到抵押品后，评价其价值和提领现金，典当行提供给借款人一张当票。此当票包括贷款数字，质押物的描述，贷款日期，贷款金额，到期日和赎回抵押品必须支付利率费用的日期。如果在到期日当天或之前不偿还贷款，客户被给予依法确定的两个月的宽限期，期间该财产可以通过支付贷款金额和所有应付费用赎回。如果在宽限期结束时，客户既没有兑现自己的财产也没有延期，那么贷款的抵押品被典当行没收。然后典当商会在拍卖会上或在他们的商店里出售的财产以收回贷款本金。万一抵押品的销售收入超过借款人的义务，典当商在法律上有义务退还减去拍卖和交易成本的超额收益给典当行客户。 典当行业通常被认为是一个罪犯销赃的简单途径。被媒体对普通典当业曝光 不足和对非法业务的过度曝光催生了这个协会。事实上，超过百分之九十的贷款还清了，抵押品重新得到不同方面的建议。另外，整个系统是为了使赃物在结构上难处理而建立的。当办理典当贷款时客户不得不出示身份证，其次将他们的个人号码和抵押品一起登记在典当商管理部门。警方将他们拥有的被盗物品列表与典当商拥有的拍卖品和存货清单系统地比较了。但是最重要的是，典当商们本身没有动机将赃物作为抵押品。第一他们赚的大部分钱来自于客户保持回头率，办理新的贷款和/或延缓偿还贷款，因此他们支付更多的费用和利息。一桩典当贷款业务基于一个偷来的抵押品，不管怎样将会引起典型的违约。第二，如果警察鉴别出这个抵押品是偷来的，将会给予例行的检查，它会被没收，典当商不得不取消这笔业务，再加上风险和消极的媒体关注，这些将会减少未来的利润。 出处:,瑞典,玛丽博斯，《典当信用与金融排斥的重要性》，斯德哥尔摩大学博 士论文.2010(6):2-11.