巴菲特经典名言英文版

巴菲特经典名言英文版“Whatcountsformostpeopleininvestingisnothowmuchtheyknow,butratherhowrealisticallytheydefinewhattheydon'tknow.Aninvestorneedstodoveryfewthingsrightaslongasheorsheavoidsbigmistakes.”就投资而言，人们应该注意的，不是他到底知道多少，而是应该注意自己到底有多少是不知道的，投资人不需要花太多时间去做对的事，只要他能够尽量避免去犯重大的错误。――1992LettertoBerkshireHathawayshareholders“Obviously,everyinvestorwillmakemistakes.Butbyconfininghimselftoarelativelyfew，easy-to-understandcases,areasonablyintelligent,informedanddiligentpersoncanjudgeinvestmentriskswithausefuldegreeofaccuracy.”当然每个投资人都会犯错，但只要将自己集中在相对少数，容易了解的投资个案上，一个理性、知性与耐性兼具的投资人一定能够将投资风险限定在可接受的范围之内。――1993LettertoBerkshireHathawayshareholders“Whenreturnsoncapitalareordinary,anearn-more-by-putting-up-morerecordisnogreatmanagerialachievement.Youcangetthesameresultpersonallywhileoperatingfromyourrockingchair.justquadruplethecapitalyoucommittoasavingsaccountandyouwillquadrupleyourearnings.Youwouldhardlyexpecthosannasforthatparticularaccomplishment.Yet,retirementannouncementsregularlysingthepraisesofCEOswhohave,say,quadrupledearningsoftheirwidgetcompanyduringtheirreign-withnooneexaminingwhetherthisgainwasattributablesimplytomanyyearsofretainedearningsandtheworkingsofcompoundinterest.”当资本报酬率平平，这种大堆头式的赚钱方式跟本没什么了不起，你坐在摇椅上也能轻松达到这样的成绩，好比只要把你存在银行户头里的钱，一样可以赚到加倍的利息，没有人会对这样的成果报以掌声，但通常我们在某位资深主管的退休仪式上歌颂他在任内将公司的盈余数字提高数倍，却一点也不会去看看这些事实上是因为公司每年所累积盈余与复利所产生的效果。――1985Chairman'sLettertoShareholders“Wehavetriedoccasionallytobuytoadsatbargainpriceswithresultsthathavebeenchronicledinpastreports.Clearlyourkissesfellflat.Wehavedonewellwithacoupleofprinces-buttheywereprinceswhenpurchased.Atleastourkissesdidn'tturnthemintotoads.And,finally,wehaveoccasionallybeenquitesuccessfulinpurchasingfractionalinterestsineasily-identifiableprincesattoad-likeprices.”我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，过去的 报告 软件系统测试报告下载sgs报告如何下载关于路面塌陷情况报告535n,sgs报告怎么下载竣工报告下载 多已提及，很明显的我们的吻表现平平，我们有遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时他们就已是王子了，而至少我们的吻没让他们变回蟾蜍，而最后我们偶尔也曾成功地以蟾蜍般的价格买到部份王子级公司的部份股权。――1981Chairman'sLetterstoShareholders“First,manyinWallStreet-acommunityinwhichqualitycontrolisnotprized-willsellinvestorsanythingtheywillbuy.”第一课，不论是什么东西，只要有人要买，华尔街那帮人都会想办法弄来卖给你。――2000LettertoShareholders“Themostcommoncauseoflowpricesispessimism-sometimespervasive,sometimesspecifictoacompanyorindustry.Wewanttodobusinessinsuchanenvironment,notbecausewelikepessimismbutbecausewelikethepricesitproduces.It'soptimismthatistheenemyoftherationalbuyer.”股价不振最主要的原因是悲观的情绪，有时是全面性的，有时则仅限于部份产业或是公司，我们很期望能够在这种环境下做生意，不是因为我们天生喜欢悲观，而是如此可以得到便宜的价格买进更多好的公司，乐观是理性投资人最大的敌人。――1990Chairman'sLettertoShareholders“Ben’sMr.Marketallegorymayseemout-of-dateintoday'sinvestmentworld,inwhichmostprofessionalsandacademicianstalkofefficientmarkets,dynamichedgingandbetas.Theirinterestinsuchmattersisunderstandable,sincetechniquesshroudedinmysteryclearlyhavevaluetothepurveyorofinvestmentadvice.Afterall,whatwitchdoctorhaseverachievedfameandfortunebysimplyadvising'Taketwoaspirins'?”葛拉汉的市场先生理论在现今的投资世界内或许显得有些过时，尤其是在那些大谈市场效率理论、动态避险与beta值的专家学者眼中更是如此，他们会对那些深奥的课题感到兴趣是可以理解的，因为这对于渴望投资建议的追求者来说，是相当具吸引力的，就像是没有一位名医可以单靠「吃两颗阿斯匹宁」这类简单有效的建议成名致富的。――1987Chairman'sLettertoShareholders“JohnMaynardKeynes,whosebrillianceasapracticinginvestormatchedhisbrillianceinthought,wrotealettertoabusinessassociate,F.C.Scott,onAugust15,1934thatsaysitall:Astimegoeson，Igetmoreandmoreconvincedthattherightmethodininvestmentistoputfairlylargesumsintoenterpriseswhichonethinksoneknowssomethingaboutandinthemanagementofwhichonethoroughlybelieves.Itisamistaketothinkthatonelimitsone'sriskbyspreadingtoomuchbetweenenterprisesaboutwhichoneknowslittleandhasnoreasonforspecialconfidence…One'sknowledgeandexperiencearedefinitelylimitedandthereareseldommorethantwoorthreeenterprisesatanygiventimeinwhichIpersonallyfeelmyselfentitledtoputfullconfidence.”著名经济学家凯因斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott上面写到，随着时光的流逝，我越来越相信正确的投资方式是将大部分的资金投入在自己认为了解且相信的事业之上，而不是将资金分散到自己不懂且没有特别信心的一大堆公司，每个人的知识与经验一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很难同时有两三家以上的公司可以让我感到完全的放心。――1991LettertoBerkshireHathawayshareholders“Iwouldratherbecertainofagoodresultthanhopefulofagreatone.”但与其两鸟在林，还不如一鸟在手。――1996LettertoBerkshireHathawayshareholders“Thelineseparatinginvestmentandspeculation,whichisneverbrightandclear,becomesblurredstillfurtherwhenmostmarketparticipantshaverecentlyenjoyedtriumphs.Nothingsedatesrationalitylikelargedosesofeffortlessmoney.Afteraheadyexperienceofthatkind,normallysensiblepeopledriftintobehaviorakintothatofCinderellaattheball.Theyknowthatoverstayingthefestivities-thatis,continuingtospeculateincompaniesthathavegiganticvaluationsrelativetothecashtheyarelikelytogenerateinthefuture-willeventuallybringonpumpkinsandmice.Buttheyneverthelesshatetomissasingleminuteofwhatisonehelluvaparty.Therefore,thegiddyparticipantsallplantoleavejustsecondsbeforemidnight.There'saproblem,though:Theyaredancinginaroominwhichtheclockshavenohands.”投资与投机之间永远是一线之隔，尤其是当所有市场的参与者都沉浸在欢愉的气氛当中时更是如此，再也没有比大笔不劳而获的金钱更让人失去理性，在经历过这类经验之后，再正常的人也会像参加舞会的灰姑娘一样被冲昏了头，他们明知在舞会中多待一会-也就是继续将大笔的资金投入到投机的活动之上，南瓜马车与老鼠驾驶现出原形的机率就越高，但他们还是舍不得错过这场盛大舞会的任何一分钟，所有人都打算继续待到最后一刻才离开，但问题是这场舞会中的时钟根本就没有指针!“Muchsuccesscanbeattributedtoinactivity.Mostinvestorscannotresistthetemptationtoconstantlybuyandsell.”“Whenamanagementwithareputationforbrilliancetacklesabusinesswithapoorreputationforfundamentaleconomics,itisthereputationofthebusinessthatstaysintact.”“Iwilltellyouhowtobecomerich.Closethedoors.Befearfulwhenothersaregreedy.Begreedywhenothersarefearful.”――WarrenBuffettlecturingtoagroupofstudentsatColumbiaU“ThereareallkindsofbusinessesthatCharlieandIdon'tunderstand,butthatdoesn'tcauseustostayupatnight.Itjustmeanswegoontothenextone,andthat'swhattheindividualinvestorshoulddo.”――WarrenBuffettinaMorningstarInterview“Ifyou'reaninvestor,you'relookingonwhattheassetisgoingtodo,ifyou'reaspeculator,you'recommonlyfocusingonwhatthepriceoftheobjectisgoingtodo,andthat'snotourgame.”――1997BerkshireHathawayAnnualMeeting“Itisourjobtohelpourclientsbefearfulwhenothersaregreedy,andlookatopportunitieswhenothersarefearful.”“Ifyouunderstoodabusinessperfectlyandthefutureofthebusiness,youwouldneedverylittleinthewayofamarginofsafety.So,themorevulnerablethebusinessis,assumingyoustillwanttoinvestinit,thelargermarginofsafetyyou'dneed.Ifyou'redrivingatruckacrossabridgethatsaysitholds10,000poundsandyou'vegota9,800poundvehicle,ifthebridgeis6inchesabovethecreviceitcovers,youmayfeelokay,butifit'sovertheGrandCanyon,youmayfeelyouwantalittlelargermarginofsafety...”――1997BerkshireHathawayAnnualMeeting“Youpayahighpriceforacheeryconsensus.”“Ifyouunderstoodabusinessperfectlyandthefutureofthebusiness,youwouldneedverylittleinthewayofamarginofsafety.So,themorevulnerablethebusinessis,assumingyoustillwanttoinvestinit,thelargermarginofsafetyyou'dneed.Ifyou'redrivingatruckacrossabridgethatsaysitholds10,000poundsandyou'vegota9,800poundvehicle,ifthebridgeis6inchesabovethecreviceitcovers,youmayfeelokay,butifit'sovertheGrandCanyon,youmayfeelyouwantalittlelargermarginofsafety...”――1997BerkshireHathawayAnnualMeeting“Theonlywaytobelovedistobeloveable,whichreallyirritatesme.”――WarrenBuffettspeakingattheCityClubinSeattle(July21,2001)“Whentheyopenthatenvelope,thefirstinstructionistotakemypulseagain.”――2001AnnualMeetingaftermentioningthattheinstructionsofhissuccessionaresealedinanenvelopeatheadquarters“CharlieandIdecidedlongagothatinaninvestmentlifetimeit'stoohardtomakehundredsofsmartdecisions.ThatjudgmentbecameevermorecompellingasBerkshire'scapitalmushroomedandtheuniverseofinvestmentsthatcouldsignificantlyaffectourresultsshrankdramatically.Therefore,weadoptedastrategythatrequiredourbeingsmart-andnottoosmartatthat-onlyaveryfewtimes.Indeed,we'llnowsettleforonegoodideaayear.”“Thefactthatpeoplewillbefullofgreed,fearorfollyispredictable.Thesequenceisnotpredictable.”――WarrenBuffett,FinancialReview,1985“Iamoutofstepwithpresentconditions.Whenthegameisnolongerplayedyourway,itisonlyhumantosaythenewapproachisallwrong,boundtoleadtotrouble,andsoon.Ononepoint,however,Iamclear.IwillnotabandonapreviousapproachwhoselogicIunderstand(althoughIfinditdifficulttoapply)eventhoughitmaymeanforegoinglarge,andapparentlyeasy,profitstoembraceanapproachwhichIdon'tfullyunderstand,havenotpracticedsuccessfully,andwhichpossiblycouldleadtosubstantialpermanentlossofcapital.”――WarrenBuffettinalettertohispartnersinthestockmarketfrenzyof1969.“We'velongfeltthattheonlyvalueofstockforecastersistomakefortunetellerslookgood.Evennow,CharlieandIcontinuetobelievethatshort-termmarketforecastsarepoisonandshouldbekeptlockedupinasafeplace,awayfromchildrenandalsofromgrown-upswhobehaveinthemarketlikechildren.”“Thekeytoinvestingisnotassessinghowmuchanindustryisgoingtoaffectsociety,orhowmuchitwillgrow,butratherdeterminingthecompetitiveadvantageofanygivencompanyand,aboveall,thedurabilityofthatadvantage.”――July1999atHerbAllen'sSunValley,IdahoRetreat“Themostcommoncauseoflowpricesispessimism-sometimespervasive,sometimesspecifictoacompanyorindustry.Wewanttodobusinessinsuchanenvironment,notbecausewelikepessimismbutbecausewelikethepricesitproduces.It'soptimismthatistheenemyoftherationalbuyer.”Idon'treadeconomicforecasts.Idon'treadthefunnypapers.Thestockmarketisano-called-strikegame.Youdon'thavetoswingateverything--youcanwaitforyourpitch.Theproblemwhenyou'reamoneymanageristhatyourfanskeepyelling，'Swing,youbum!'――1999BerkshireHathawayAnnualMeetingSuccessininvestingdoesn'tcorrelatewithI.Q.onceyou'reabovethelevelof25.Onceyouhaveordinaryintelligence,whatyouneedisthetemperamenttocontroltheurgesthatgetotherpeopleintotroubleininvesting.――BusinessWeekInterviewJune251999Ourfutureratesofgainwillfallfarshortofthoseachievedinthepast.Berkshire'scapitalbaseisnowsimplytoolargetoallowustoearntrulyoutsizedreturns.Ifyoubelieveotherwise,youshouldconsideracareerinsalesbutavoidoneinmathematics(bearinginmindthattherearereallyonlythreekindsofpeopleintheworld:thosewhocancountandthosewhocan't).我们未来的成长率将远不及过去所创造的水准，Berkshire现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事业务员的工作，而不是去教数学(请永远记住，世界上只有三种人，一种会算术，另一种不会算术)。――1998Chairman'sLettertoShareholdersThereareallkindsofbusinessesthatCharlieandIdon'tunderstand,butthatdoesn'tcauseustostayupatnight.Itjustmeanswegoontothenextone,andthat'swhattheindividualinvestorshoulddo.――WarrenBuffettinaMorningstarInterview“Investorsmakingpurchasesinanoverheatedmarketneedtorecognizethatitmayoftentakeanextendedperiodforthevalueofevenanoutstandingcompanytocatchupwiththepricetheypaid.”――BerkshireHathaway1998AnnualMeeting“Wedon'tgetpaidforactivity,justforbeingright.Astohowlongwe'llwait,we'llwaitindefinitely.”――BerkshireHathaway1998AnnualMeetingTimeistheenemyofthepoorbusinessandthefriendofthegreatbusiness.Ifyouhaveabusinessthat'searning20%-25%onequity,timeisyourfriend.Buttimeisyourenemyifyourmoneyisinalowreturnbusiness.――1998BerkshireAnnualMeetingIfyouexpecttobeanetsaverduringthenext5years,shouldyouhopeforahigherorlowerstockmarketduringthatperiod?Manyinvestorsgetthisonewrong.Eventhoughtheyaregoingtobenetbuyersofstocksformanyyearstocome,theyareelatedwhenstockpricesriseanddepressedwhentheyfall.Thisreactionmakesnosense.Onlythosewhowillbesellersofequitiesinthenearfutureshouldbehappyatseeingstocksrise.Prospectivepurchasersshouldmuchprefersinkingprices.假设你预估未来五年内可以存一笔钱，那么你希望这期间的股票市场是涨还是跌?这时许多投资人对于这个问题的 答案 八年级地理上册填图题岩土工程勘察试题省略号的作用及举例应急救援安全知识车间5s试题及答案 就可能是错的，虽然他们在未来的期间内会陆续买进股票，不过当股价涨时他们会感到高兴，股价跌时反而觉得沮丧，这种感觉不等于是当你去买汉堡吃时，看到汉堡涨价却欣喜若狂，这样的反应实在是没有什么道理，只有在短期间准备卖股票的人才应该感到高兴，准备买股票的人应该期待的是股价的下滑。――1997Chairman'sLettertoShareholders“Thestrategy(ofportfolioconcentration)we'veadoptedprecludesourfollowingstandarddiversificationdogma.Manypunditswouldthereforesaythestrategymustberiskierthanthatemployedbymoreconventionalinvestors.Wedisagree.Webelievethatapolicyofportfolioconcentrationmaywelldecreaseriskifitraises,asitshould,boththeintensitywithwhichaninvestorthinksaboutabusinessandthecomfort-levelhemustfeelwithitseconomiccharacteristicsbeforebuyingintoit.”我们采取的这种策略排除了依照普通分散风险的教条，许多学者便会言之凿凿说我们这种策略比起一般传统的投资风险要高的许多，这点我们不敢苟同，我们相信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。――1993Chairman'sLettertoShareholders“In1971,pensionfundmanagersinvestedarecord122%ofnetfundsavailableinequities-atfullpricestheycouldn'tbuyenoughofthem.In1974,afterthebottomhadfallenout,theycommittedathenrecordlowof21%tostocks.”“Webelievethatapolicyofportfolioconcentrationmaywelldecreaseriskifitraises,asitshould,boththeintensitywithwhichaninvestorthinksaboutabusinessandthecomfort-levelhemustfeelwithitseconomiccharacteristicsbeforebuyingintoit.Instatingthisopinion,wedefinerisk,usingdictionaryterms,as'thepossibilityoflossorinjury.'”我们相信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。――1993LettertoBerkshireHathawayshareholders“Wethinkdiversification,aspracticedgenerally,makesverylittlesenseforanyonewhoknowswhatthey'redoing.Diversificationservesasprotectionagainstignorance.Ifyouwanttomakesurethatnothingbadhappenstoyourelativetothemarket,youshouldowneverything.There'snothingwrongwiththat.It'saperfectlysoundapproachforsomebodywhodoesn'tknowhowtoanalyzebusinesses.“Butifyouknowhowtovaluebusinesses,it'scrazytoown50stocksor40stocksor30stocks,probablybecausetherearen'tthatmanywonderfulbusinessesunderstandabletoasinglehumanbeinginalllikelihood.Toforegobuyingmoreofsomesuper-wonderfulbusinessandinsteadputyourmoneyinto30or35onyourlistofattractivenessjuststrikesCharlieandmeasmadness.”――1996BerkshireHathawayAnnualMeeting“Themostimportantthingintermsofyourcircleofcompetenceisnothowlargetheareaofitis,buthowwellyou'vedefinedtheperimeter.Ifyouknowwheretheedgesare,you'rewaybetteroffthansomebodythat'sgotonethat'sfivetimesaslargebuttheygetveryfuabouttheedges.”――“WarrenBuffettTalksBusiness,”TheUniversityofNorthCarolina,CenterforPublicTelevision,ChapelHill,1995“Priceiswhatyoupay.Valueiswhatyouget.”“Yourgoalasaninvestorshouldsimplybetopurchase,atarationalprice,apartinterestinaneasily-understandablebusinesswhoseearningsarevirtuallycertaintobemateriallyhigherfive,tenandtwentyyearsfromnow.Overtime,youwillfindonlyafewcompaniesthatmeetthesestandards-sowhenyouseeonethatqualifies,youshouldbuyameaningfulamountofstock.Youmustalsoresistthetemptationtostrayfromyourguidelines:Ifyouaren'twillingtoownastockfortenyears,don'teventhinkaboutowningitfortenminutes.Puttogetheraportfolioofcompanieswhoseaggregateearningsmarchupwardovertheyears,andsoalsowilltheportfolio'smarketvalue.”――1996ShareholdersLetter“Ourpolicyistoconcentrateholdings.Wetrytoavoidbuyingalittleofthisorthatwhenweareonlylukewarmaboutthebusinessoritsprice.Whenweareconvincedastoattractiveness,webelieveinbuyingworthwhileamounts.”我们的政策是集中持股(ConcentrateHoldings)。当我们决定了后便买进「一大笔」，而非这也买一点、那也买点，但事后却漠不关心。――1978LettertoBerkshireHathawayshareholders“Iputaheavyweightoncertainty.Ifyoudothat,thewholeideaofariskfactordoesn'tmakesensetome.Riskcomesfromnotknowingwhatyou'redoing.”――“BuffettTalksStrategywithStudents”,OmahaWorld-Herald1994