Transcendental Realism, Empirical
Realism and Transcendental Idealism
HENRY E.ALLISON
University of California at Davis
The debate regarding the interpretation of Kant’s idealism is usually
seen as turning on the best way to understand his transcendental
distinction between appearances and things in themselves: that it
marks either a contrast between two types of thing (the ‘two-object’
or ‘two-world’ view) or one between two sides or aspects of ordi-
nary empirical objects (the ‘two-aspect’ view).1 But, even though I
have long been associated with the latter camp, I have also thought
for many years that this is not the most helpful way to frame the
issue. The problem lies in an ambiguity inherent in the two-aspect
view. It can be understood either metaphysically, as a thesis about
the kinds of properties attributable to empirical objects, that is, as a
form of property dualism in which these objects are assigned both
phenomenal and noumenal properties, or methodologically, as a
contrast between two ways in which such objects can be considered
in a philosophical reflection on the conditions of their cognition.
Accordingly, I take the fundamental question to be whether tran-
scendental idealism is to be understood in the latter way or as a form
of metaphysical dualism (whether as a thing or a property dualism
being a matter of relative indifference). And I have further thought
that the best way of addressing that question is through a considera-
tion of the view which Kant opposes to transcendental idealism,
namely, transcendental realism. If this realism is identified with a
particular metaphysical doctrine then transcendental idealism must
be as well; but if, as I maintain, transcendental realism cannot be so
understood, then neither can Kant’s idealism.2
I shall here argue somewhat obliquely for the latter alternative
by exploring the nature of the difference between transcendental
and empirical realism.3 The discussion consists of four parts and a
brief appendix. The first part maintains that rather than being
KANTIAN REVIEW, VOLUME 11, 2006 1
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either a distinct ontological doctrine or a mere label for everything
to which Kant was opposed, transcendental realism should be
understood as the view that spatiotemporal predicates are appli-
cable to things in general. Since this view is shared by all ontologies
(at least all those with which Kant was concerned), transcendental
realism is not committed to a particular ontology; but, since it is
contrasted with an empirical realism, which limits the scope of
these predicates to objects of possible experience, it is also not a
vacuous label. And from this I conclude that transcendental
idealism likewise does not constitute a distinct ontological posi-
tion, but instead provides a radical alternative to ontology.4 The
second and third parts deal with two possible objections to this
reading. The first is that it conflicts with Kant’s official account,
which charges transcendental realism with conflating appearances
with things in themselves rather than with inflating claims about
objects of possible experience into claims about things in general.
By examining the relationship between the concepts involved, I
show that there is no incompatibility between the two characteriza-
tions. The second line of objection is that such a non-metaphysical
interpretation of transcendental idealism trivializes it by reducing
it to a recommendation of epistemological modesty. I respond by
acknowledging that transcendental idealism, so construed, does
consist essentially in such a recommendation but denying that this
trivializes it. The point is further explored in the fourth part, which
analyses Kant’s indirect argument for transcendental idealism
drawn from his resolution of the mathematical antinomies and
explores the therapeutic function of this idealism in his treatment
of transcendental freedom. In the appendix, I surmise that one
reason why many contemporary Kantians are dismissive of tran-
scendental idealism is that they mistakenly assume that a central
concern of the Critique is to establish a robust realism in the face
of a radical sceptical challenge. I suggest instead that Kant argues
from rather than to such realism and that his central concern is to
limit its scope to objects of possible experience.
1.
Kant defines transcendental realism in two places in the Critique
and in each of them he contrasts it with transcendental idealism. In
HENRY E. ALLISON
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the first of these, he characterizes it as the view ‘which regards
space and time as something given in themselves (independent of
our sensibility)’ and suggests that such a realist ‘interprets outer
appearances . . . as things in themselves, which would exist inde-
pendently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside
us according to pure concepts of the understanding’. By contrast,
transcendental idealism is defined as ‘the doctrine that all appear-
ances are to be regarded as mere representations and not things in
themselves, and accordingly that time and space are only sensible
forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves
or conditions of objects as things in themselves’ (A369).5 In the
second, transcendental realism is accused of making ‘modifications
of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence
makes mere representations into things in themselves’, whereas
transcendental idealism affirms that ‘all objects of an experience
possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representa-
tions, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series
of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in
itself’ (A490–1/B518–19). Although it is much more explicit in the
first, both accounts indicate that the dispute between the two
forms of transcendentalism concerns primarily the nature of space
and time and, as a consequence of this, the nature of things
encountered in them – what Kant terms ‘appearances’. In essence,
Kant’s charge is that by viewing space and time as ‘given in them-
selves’, that is to say, independently of the conditions of sensibility,
transcendental realism conflates spatiotemporal entities, which for
the transcendental idealist are ‘mere appearances’, with things in
themselves.
Since any number of views might be characterized as regarding
space and time as ‘given in themselves’ and since Kant himself
accuses philosophies of many different stripes of conflating
appearances with things in themselves, these characterizations of
transcendental realism seem much too vague to define a metaphys-
ical position with which transcendental idealism might meaning-
fully be contrasted.6 Alternatively, if, as is sometimes done, tran-
scendental realism is identified with the scientific realism of the
Cartesians and Newtonians (roughly what Berkeley understood by
‘materialism’), then the situation seems even worse. First, it implies
that Kant’s idealism is akin to Berkeley’s, something which Kant
vehemently and famously denied. Second, it invites the familiar
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charge of neglected alternatives.7 For, clearly, Kant did not intend
to suggest that such realism and his idealism exhaust the philo-
sophical universe. As we shall see, this issue becomes particularly
pressing in connection with Kant’s indirect argument for transcen-
dental idealism through the negation of transcendental realism.
Unless it is assumed that they are contradictory opposites, this
argument cannot get off the ground.
We thus appear to find ourselves confronted with a dilemma. If
transcendental realism is seen as an amorphous, ill-defined meta-
physical theory, it becomes difficult to see how it could contribute
to an understanding of transcendental idealism; whereas if we
identify it with a particular metaphysical theory it leads to the
outright dismissal of an argument which Kant thought to be
central to his project and, depending on the nature of this theory,
perhaps to a highly unattractive view of transcendental idealism as
well. My proposed way out of this dilemma is through a considera-
tion of the difference between a transcendental and an empirical
realism. In so doing, I hope to show that the former is not to be
understood as a distinct metaphysical or, more properly, ontolog-
ical theory, while at the same time giving it enough shape to
preserve the significance of its contrast with transcendental
idealism.
The operative question is what makes transcendental realism
transcendental, which, in turn, calls for an investigation of Kant’s
multiple uses of this highly elusive, yet ubiquitous, term. But since
anything approaching an adequate treatment of the topic is well
beyond the scope of the present article, it must suffice to note that
Kant seems to work with at least two competing conceptions of the
transcendental. The first and featured conception is the one that he
introduces in his stipulative definitions of ‘transcendental cogni-
tion’ (A12/B25). According to these definitions, such cognition may
(very roughly) be characterized as a second order activity
concerned with an investigation of the a priori elements of our
cognitive apparatus and the conditions and limits of our a priori
cognition of objects.8 The second conception is the traditional one,
according to which transcendental cognition is concerned with the
nature of things in general, that is, with the subject matter of
ontology or metaphysica generalis, as understood by the Wolffian
school.9 And, just as Kant’s contemporaries were quite familiar
with the latter but had great difficulty understanding the former, so
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for many present day readers the situation is virtually the reverse.
Nevertheless, as we shall soon see, the recognition of the continued
presence in the Critique of vestiges of this earlier conception is
crucial for the understanding of transcendental realism and, there-
fore, transcendental idealism as well.10
A good illustration of the juxtaposition of these two concep-
tions of the transcendental is to be found in Kant’s remark
concerning the meaning of ‘transcendental cognition’, a remark
which Kant advises the reader to keep well in mind, since its import
extends to everything that follows (A56/B80). The bulk of this
remark is devoted to underscoring the distinction between tran-
scendental and a priori cognition. Although the former is
obviously a priori, it differs from ordinary, first order a priori
cognition, such as is provided in mathematics, by the fact that it is
concerned with the possibility of the latter. Our present interest,
however, lies in the concluding and less frequently noted portion of
this remark, where Kant adds parenthetically:
Likewise the use [Gebrauch] of space about all objects in general would also
be transcendental; but if it is restricted solely to objects of the senses, then it
is called empirical. The difference between the transcendental and the
empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not
concern their relation to their object. [A56–7/B81]
Whereas the contrast between transcendental and a priori cogni-
tion is a matter of level, that between a transcendental and an
empirical use is a matter of scope, which is why it pertains to a
critique of cognition. Accordingly, it is here that Kant’s employment
of ‘transcendental’ overlaps with the traditional understanding of
the term. Moreover, this is not an isolated occurrence or regression
on Kant’s part to a pre-Critical standpoint, since, as we shall soon
see, he systematically uses the term in precisely this way in
contrasting a transcendental with an empirical use of the cate-
gories and principles of pure understanding. In both cases, it
amounts to a contrast between a generic use with respect to all
objects and one restricted to a particular domain of objects,
namely, phenomena or objects of possible experience.
This has two implications, which are essential to the proper
understanding of both transcendental realism and transcendental
idealism. The first is that the difference between transcendental
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and empirical realism consists in the scope assigned to spatiotem-
poral predicates rather than the degree or kind of reality attributed
to them. In other words, it is not that empirical realism assigns a
lesser degree of reality to such predicates, but merely that it
restricts their applicability to the domain of possible experience.
The second is that, though transcendental realism is committed to
the proposition that spatiotemporal predicates are ontological in
the traditional sense of applying with strict universality, it is not, as
such, committed to any particular ontology of space and time.
The latter point is reflected in the Transcendental Aesthetic,
where Kant begins by raising the purportedly ontological question:
What are space and time? Four possibilities are introduced. They
might be: a) actual entities (substances); b) determinations of
things (accidents); c) relations of things that ‘would pertain to them
even if they were not intuited’; or d) ‘relations that only attach to
the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution
of our mind, without which these predicates could not be attached
to anything at all’ (A23/B37–38).11 The first three represent the
traditional ontological options and, therefore, apply to things in
general. And of these the second and third correspond respectively
to the Newtonian and Leibnizian views, which were the main
competitors at Kant’s time.12 The fourth is Kant’s Critical view and
reflects his rejection of the whole ontological framework in which
the question has traditionally been posed, one in which it is
assumed that whatever status is given to spatiotemporal predicates
they apply with strict universality. Thus, from Kant’s more compre-
hensive point of view, the dispute between the Newtonians and the
Leibnizians is reduced to a family quarrel.
Seen in this light, Kant’s basic charge against transcendental
realism (in all its forms) is that it erroneously assumes that
spatiotemporal predicates, which he limits to the domain of
possible experience, have an unrestricted scope. Moreover, since
Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of space and time provides the
warrant for his scope restriction, this further suggests that tran-
scendental idealism, even as it appears in the Aesthetic, is best seen
as a deflationary proposal rather than as an ontological thesis in
direct competition with the various forms of transcendental
realism.13 Otherwise expressed, inasmuch as the first three of the
four possible accounts of space and time that Kant introduces
exhaust the recognized ontological alternatives, the fourth, which
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represents Kant’s Critical position, might be regarded as proposing
a radical alternative to ontology rather than, as it usually taken to
be, a novel move within ontology. Specifically, the alternative is to
consider space and time as ‘two sources of cognition’ (A38/B55),
that is, as conditions of our cognition of things, rather than as
themselves either things (substances), properties, or relations of
things as such.14
Nevertheless, this does not suffice to establish Kant’s restriction
thesis, since, for all that has been said so far, it might still be the
case that space and time are conditions of the cognition of things
in general. Thus, it is essential for Kant to demonstrate their
connection with human sensibility. What must be shown is that the
universality of space and time within human experience, a point on
which the empirical and the transcendental realist agree, can be
understood only on the assumption that their representations are a
priori contributions of human sensibility, from which the scope
limitation to objects of possible human experience (or at least to
the experience of cognizers with our forms of sensibility) follows
immediately.15 Whether Kant actually succeeds in showing this is
another and more contentious question, which I cannot consider
here.16
2.
Even setting aside the question of the cogency of Kant’s arguments,
however, it might be objected that this analysis misrepresents
Kant’s actual accounts of transcendental realism, which make no
explicit reference to things in general, but refer instead to things in
themselves. In fact, rather than accusing transcendental realism of
a simple scope confusion, we have seen that he charges it with the
seemingly more heinous crime of making ‘modifications of our
sensibility’ or ‘mere representations’ into things in themselves.
How, then, it may be asked, are these accounts to be reconciled?
Although dealing with this question will unavoidably require a
digression from the main line of argument, my hopes are that this can
be done fairly expeditiously and that it will eventually help to put the
argument in a somewhat clearer light. To anticipate, I shall claim
that even though the concepts of a thing (or something) in general
and of a thing in itself occupy distinct spheres of philosophical
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reflection, they are related in such a way that if spatiotemporal (or,
indeed, any) predicates were applicable to the former, they would
ipso facto be applicable to the latter as well.
As textual support for this reading, I shall rely primarily on
Kant’s account of the putative transcendental use of the categories
and their associated principles, by which he understands one with
regard to the cognition of things in general.17 As was the case with
spatiotemporal predicates, this is contrasted with an empirical use,
which is restricted to the cognition of objects of possible experience
or appearances. Although Kant defines the categories (nominally)
as concepts of an object in general, he denies that they could have
the former employment, since they would then lack the schemata
necessary to link them up to the world.18 But he also suggests that
if (per impossibile) they had such an employment, ‘as conditions of
the possibility of things in general, they [could] be extended to
objects in themselves (without any restriction to our sensibility)’
(A129/B178). Similarly, Kant states that, ‘The transcendental use
of a concept in any sort of principle consists in its being related to
things in general and in themselves’ (A238/B298), which suggests
that he considered the relation of a concept to things in themselves
to be a direct consequence of its relation to things in general and,
therefore, as not requiring any further explanation.19
However, since this connection may not be as obvious to
contemporary readers as it apparently was to Kant, it will be useful
to take a closer look at the concepts involved. To begin with, we
have seen that Kant takes the concept of a thing in general over
whole cloth from the ontological tradition and that it encompasses
whatever pertains to the thought of a thing as such. Accordingly,
the project of ontology, traditionally understood, is to provide
cognition of things by means of an analysis of this concept. And
since this involves an illicit transcendental employment of the
understanding, Kant proclaims famously that, ‘[T]he proud name
of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions
of things in general in a systematic doctrine . . . must give way to
the modest one of a mere analytic
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