论文论文论文资料顾亚琴 毕业论文外文资料翻译

淮 阴 工 学 院 毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译 系 （院）： 江淮学院 专 业： 国际经济与贸易 姓 名： 顾亚琴 学 号： 3062102236 外文出处： C. P. Chandrasekhar, Jayati Ghosh, The (用外文写) Green Barrier to Free Trade,July2006 附 件： 1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。 指导教师评语： 选 题 快递公司问题件快递公司问题件货款处理关于圆的周长面积重点题型关于解方程组的题及答案关于南海问题 符合要求，翻译语句通顺，符合原意，比较准确，达到要求。 年 月 日 签名： 陶 捷 注：请将该封面与附件装订成册。 附件1：外文资料翻译译文 绿色壁垒的自由贸易 截至3月31日完成的“方式”中所建议的对全球农产品贸易新一轮谈判阶段临近最后期限， 协议 离婚协议模板下载合伙人协议 下载渠道分销协议免费下载敬业协议下载授课协议下载 希望日益减弱。在这一回协议中,处长钱德拉萨卡和戈什审查因素制约和选手实现这一协议。 最新一轮结束的世贸组织中的农业谈判委员会们乐观地认为，谈判将满足制定数字指标， 公式 小学单位换算公式大全免费下载公式下载行测公式大全下载excel公式下载逻辑回归公式下载 和其他“模式”，通过这种框架的国家可以在其开放市场的承诺3月31日最后期限的最新一轮委员会会议新的全面的贸易谈判的正式一轮几乎消失。这一目标是有两个重要原因。 首先，现在越来越清楚，这甚至超过了真正的乌拉圭回合中，建立了在农业领域的协议，必将证明极为困难。 在农业谈判取得进展的关键是说服不相信一个新的`多哈回合贸易谈判'是有用的，可行的。 第二，多哈宣言提出的“一揽子承诺”由2005年1月1日完成，是农业谈判的一部分。也就是说，在采取“全或无” 计划 项目进度计划表范例计划下载计划下载计划下载课程教学计划下载 ，国家已经达成并约束，协议中的所有谈判将在发起新一轮的地区。这意味着，如果协议不能同意关于农业的部分，就没有在多边贸易体制的变革管理业，服务或相关领域，如竞争政策，外国投资和政府采购没有，新领域的进展，所有这些都是至关重要的发达国家的经济议程。 这次农业问题的关键因素是多方面的。如最后一轮，在发达国家中对全球农业贸易制度适当自己减少的协议。 在美国欧盟及其他发达农业出口国议程中对关于凯恩斯集团有很大的差别。当有钱有势的不同意，一项全球共识并不容易获得。 但这还不是全部。即使协议被迎富裕国家之间，通过演习，如布莱尔宫协议，这一次得到了世界其他国家一起会更困难。 这是因为自乌拉圭回合农业协定开始执行在农业贸易领域的成果，远远未能达到预期。在协定过程中，乌拉圭回合政权的主张承诺的全球生产调整，将增加世界农产品贸易的价值，以及在发展中国家这种贸易的份额增加。 全球生产量继续上升，1994年后在乌拉圭回合开始实施与逐渐减少只在2000和2001年底的迹象。众所周知，造成产量的增加发生也只在发达国家。毫不奇怪，因此，世界贸易量继续增长，以及1994年后。真正的变化发生在农产品价格的，经过1993年至1995年的浮力，此后有所下降，特别是1997年后大幅。正是这种单位，在这种情况下，导致世界贸易额下降停滞，然后1995年后，当执行乌拉圭回合开始贬值。 在全球与20世纪80年代和90年代后半期农业贸易的增长速度急剧下降，与在暂时在1998至2001年，由于表现欠佳，尤其是20世纪90年代下降期。 价格下降和在乌拉圭回合农业协议后，农业贸易值停滞陪同，部分由世界坚持区域化农产品贸易的影响。 这种百分之三十二到百分之十一，占全球农产品贸易正在内部西欧和亚洲内部贸易分别为。值得注意的，然而，对农产品出口的商品都和初级产品在北美和西欧的贸易（除拉丁美洲和非洲）高得多的份额比亚洲一样。 因此，目前世界发达地区，农业生产和出口，北美和西欧的经济表现是有重要影响的。毫不奇怪，欧洲是通过保护维持农业部门积极，而美国是扩大补贴本国农民，迫使其他国家开放其市场的作用，在世界农产品市场的激烈。问题是，美国已经更加开放的发展中，在被撬，比欧盟大市场的国家的市场成功。 因此，出于在2001年104亿美元从北美的出口总值，到亚洲34亿美元和到拉美15亿美元，而对欧洲出口，达14亿美元。 出口国的凯恩斯集团（阿根廷，澳大利亚，玻利维亚，巴西，加拿大，智利，哥伦比亚，哥斯达黎加，危地马拉，印度尼西亚，马来西亚，新西兰，巴拉圭，菲律宾，南非，泰国和乌拉圭），对其中一些人至少在农产品出口是非常重要的，想在世界市场上被释放保护以及过剩造成巨大的美国和欧盟的国内支持。 我们必须指出，35美元的63美元，从拉丁美洲出口30亿到美国和欧盟。更加开放的市场，少了在这些目的地的国内支持，形势会很严峻，因此是至关重要的地区。 事实上，欧洲已成功地在维系一个共同农业政策，既支持和资助，帮助其农业生产，农业用地的努力表明欧共体内部贸易中占百分之七十四，占明显1990年欧盟的出口，继续占欧盟总在1995年和2001年出口总额的百分之七十三。 但是，北美地区，其折叠的国家少得多，也比较封闭。接近对北美出口的三分之一是跨区域。乌拉圭回合农业协定对其几乎没有改变化。 人们普遍认为有三个行动组，在这方面农产品协议失败的帐户： 首先，为了推动通过一项协议，在有迹象表明，乌拉圭回合处于动荡之中，在发达国家的农业贸易自由化未被远远的推动; 其次，是能够使用的“漏洞”，特别是那些在欠佳的好形式，明确绿和蓝箱措施，在农产品协议，继续支持和保护，理由是这种支持是不扭曲贸易的农民; 最后，还有的甚至在执行，已经由协议，以确保实施的透明度失败资助课程宽松回合规则的行为。 毫不奇怪，一些国家，特别是出口国的凯恩斯集团，提出在农业领域的贸易自由化的雄心勃勃的议程。 关税将大幅下降，使用“瑞士公式”，这将确保在一个国家实行的关税削减比例将更大，更高的是一个很普遍的约束，或适用于该国的关税。 该公式到达了对居住在一个国家的关税将削减水平乘以现有的（或适用的约束）数值关税因素，除以当前的关税税率之和计算的原因。 在由凯恩斯集团提出的发达国家因素是25。因此，一个特定产品百分之百的关税率的国家将不得不降低利率至百分之20，而一个有百分之75的关税税率的国家，将不得不减少其比例少百分之18.75。 此外，与特殊和差别待遇的规定保持一致，对发展中国家的因素，建议50，使他们减少需求要小得多（33.3以及在100和关税百分之七十五的比例是百分之三十）。 除了降低关税，凯恩斯集团呼吁对特定商品的最低进口水平的提高使用较低的关税（税率配额），一个在总体支持，可以提供使用不允许的支持措施，大幅度减少主张，支持对所谓的蓝箱措施，老式取消在乌拉圭回合安抚欧盟国家，并建议更严格的评估准则是否属于特别措施的支持下，充分允许的绿箱规定。 尽管有这些雄心勃勃的要求，但显然对的方式，为3月31日最后期限的时间协议是不可能成为现实。 围绕1月22号至24号的农业谈判会议的时间，欧盟农业专员菲施勒先生，明确表示说，截止3月底将被错过。 据菲施勒先生宣布，截止3月31日在多哈设立是为农业谈判小组主席提出自己的工作方式的建议，并没有“并不意味着自动，第二天所有世贸组织成员将同意这项建议。 在任何情况下，预期与欧盟共同农业政策改革的讨论将持续到夏季好，教统会还没有完全制定能够通过在谈判过程中。因此，3月31日最后期限无法满足。 蒂尔的时间，因为这些问题是清除它并不一定是对农业，这是为发射和'多哈回合贸易谈判'，可在2005年确保完成的先决条件协议。 急于得到实现这一目标的这些是在令人失望。但是，这并不是新的前景。世贸组织成员已经错过了一个关于专利的协定和基本商品的供应期限12月，由于美国的不妥协。他们还错过了最后期限，以制订特殊和差别待遇的发展中国家的方式。 在媒体的指责的游戏设法查明凶手举起迈向农业，再次领先竞争者协议的进展是欧盟。这对欧盟然而，摇摇欲坠重点的理由。 美国对他的农民也提供了大力支持，并大幅上调此项目通过农场安全和农村投资法2002年的支持。 在美国农业项目支出，主要收入和价格支持计划，平均1996至2002年超过150亿美元，并触及达323亿元高点2000。 2002年法案在纸上的承诺保持这种高支持将通过授权的支出总额超过6截止2007年一千一百八十五万点零万美元。 实际数字预计要高得多。众所周知，这种支持去不成比例地掌握在少数大型商业农场，它们是为大多数物资向美国和国际市场的会计赞成票。这种支持，即使提供的直接收入支付斩件“形式”，从实际生产，间接地影响农民的生产和定价决策，他们的影响力在世界市场供应和价格。也就是说，他们扭曲了世界贸易即使在乌拉圭回合回合协议要求他们不要。 2002年农业法表明的是，美国没有削减这种支持的承担，并不会加入任何协议，支持这样的削减。 之所以这种隐含的立场，美国不会导致作为农业目前的谈判瓶颈身份查验的是，这种支持几乎所有的绿色方框措施，或支持措施的形式是乌拉圭正在接受回合协议，因为它们表面上的“非贸易扭曲”。 毫不奇怪，美国的建议先进的工作 方案 气瓶 现场处置方案 .pdf气瓶 现场处置方案 .doc见习基地管理方案.doc关于群访事件的化解方案建筑工地扬尘治理专项方案下载 ，2002年3月开始，结合课程：对取消出口补贴的请求;通过取消配额，降低关税和增加关税率配额增加市场准入的建议（或一对每个需要与降低关税，确保商品）进口的最低水平; 要么做一个国内支持，取消不属于绿盒类别或与新绿箱措施支持替代支出等情况。 也就是说，美国的建议，显然已经不减少国家对农业的支持方向，但操纵在这个被界定为非贸易在乌拉圭回合中扭曲的农业支持制度的方向。 在这一背景下看，对仍在讨论了欧盟成员国之间的农业支持的新的立场决不是怪异。 欧盟委员会最近发表的共同农业政策（CAP）的改革建议，不承诺总支出中的任何削减。但他们不指向任何要么大幅增加，因为欧盟领导人去年同意以百分之一的农业预算年度的上限。 此外，目前正在努力讨论作出，联系不那么直接补贴与生产，从而使他们的非贸易扭曲的建议。 在欧盟所面临的困难是，模拟法庭并赢得其成员之间的举动，出口补贴，并作出全面过渡到远离绿箱措施的协议。 由于给予欧盟国家的农业支持是多方面的，一个完整的过渡并不容易做到。 法国为例，接收来自共同农业政策的钱比其他任何国家更多，坚决反对这一转变，由希拉克总统的口头支持。作为结果，在12月提交给委员会的农业谈判的建议欧盟，呼吁保留蓝箱和与和平条款的持续，蓝箱的保护措施，是在乌拉圭回合的执行期的挑战。 也就是说，欧盟希望以公开和透明的权利支持和保护本国农民，并希望协议按此做足够准备。但事实上，这是不愿意到美国去的方式，对缺乏透明度的支持，已被接受的选择明确的措施，帮助那些谁画作为关于自由贸易道路上的绊脚石了。 特殊情况的原因是，通过在乌拉圭回合中作出的演习，特别是著名的布莱尔宫协议，设法得到凯恩斯集团的同意，并制定一项协议，支持国家的富裕国家提供足够的市场准入和保护方面几乎没有减少在农业领域的发达国家。 如果没有达成任何协议和承诺是，他们会举行贸易混乱威胁： 这是一种临时安排，评估在开始的一年执行期间完成;国内支持的最恶劣，如蓝箱措施的形式将被丢弃在该点;及开始在2000年开放将进一步加强。 不幸的是，不仅具有与实施经验的非自由乌拉圭回合农业协议多条条款，而且强大的压力与操纵继续绿色的支持措施，如同美国的情况，或者只是拒绝履行乌拉圭回合的承诺，同样欧盟也是如此。 这使得它很难再次赢得凯恩斯集团的同意和发展了农业，这只是提供一个较旧的保护主义沿路线前进小新协定的国家的支持。 不幸的是发达国家，他们走了以后的“单一承诺”，并希望他们能够使用诸如农业，药品专利以及特殊和差别待遇小的让步，赢得重大战役全或无战略竞争政策领域，外国投资和公共采购。 但它们之间也没有就这些让步和对证明的绊脚石农业的协议，贪婪出生的愿景正在威胁模糊。 对企业全球化的威胁不仅来自反全球化运动之外以及似乎出于内一个的重要敌人。 附件2：外文原文（复印件） The Green Barrier to Free Trade As the March 31 deadline for completing the "modalities" stage of the proposed new round of negotiations on global agricultural trade nears, hopes of an agreement are increasingly waning. In this edition of Macroscan, C. P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh examine the factors and the players constraining the realisation of such an agreement. At the end of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons. First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult. Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new `Doha Round' of trade negotiations is useful and feasible. Second, the Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a `single undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take `all-or-nothing' scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries. The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime. There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to come by. But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time. This is because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade. Global production volumes continued to rise after 1994 when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began, with signs of tapering off only in 2000 and 2001. As is widely known, this increase in production occurred in the developed countries as well. Not surprisingly, therefore, the volume of world trade continued to rise as well after 1994. The real shift occurred in agricultural prices which, after some buoyancy between 1993 and 1995, have declined thereafter, and particularly sharply after 1997. It is this decline in unit values that resulted in a situation where the value of world trade stagnated and then declined after 1995, when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began. There was a sharp fall in the rate of growth of global agricultural trade between the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, with the decline in growth in the 1990s being due to the particularly poor performance during the 1998 to 2001 period. Price declines and stagnation in agricultural trade values in the wake of the UR Agreement on Agriculture were accompanied and partly influenced by the persisting regionalisation of world agricultural trade. The foci of such regionalisation were Western Europe and Asia, with 32 and 11 per cent of global agricultural trade being intra-Western European and intra-Asian trade respectively. What is noteworthy, however, is that agricultural exports accounted for a much higher share of both merchandise and primary products trade in North America and Western Europe (besides Latin America and Africa) than it did for Asia. Thus, despite being the developed regions of the world, agricultural production and exports were important influences on the economic performance of North America and Western Europe. It is, therefore, not surprising that Europe is keen on maintaining its agricultural sector through protection, while the US is keen on expanding its role in world agricultural markets by subsidising its own farmers and forcing other countries to open up their markets. The problem is that the US has been more successful in prising open developing country markets than the large EU market. Thus, out of $104 billion worth of exports from North America in 2001, $34 billion went to Asia and $15 billion to Latin America, whereas exports to Europe amounted to $14 billion. The Cairns group of exporting countries (Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay), for some of whom at least agricultural exports are extremely important, want world market to be freed of protection as well as the surpluses that result from huge domestic support in the US and the EC. We must note that $35 billion of the $63 billion of exports from Latin America went to the US and the EU. More open markets and less domestic support in those destinations is, therefore, crucial for the region. The fact that Europe has been successful in its effort at retaining its agricultural space with the help of a Common Agricultural Policy that both supports and subsidises its agricultural producers is clear from Chart 4, which shows that intra-EC trade which accounted for 74 per cent of EU exports in 1990, continued to account for 73 per cent of total EU exports in 1995 and 2001. But North America, with far fewer countries in its fold, has also been quite insular. Close to a third of North American exports are inter-regional. Little has changed since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. It is widely accepted that three sets of actors account for this failure of the AOA: First, in order to push through an agreement when there were signs that the Uruguay Round was faltering, the liberalisation of agricultural trade in the developed countries was not pushed far enough; Second, is the ability to use "loopholes", especially those in the form of inadequately well-defined Green and Blue Box measures, in the AOA, to continue to support and protect farmers on the grounds that such support was non-trade distorting; Finally, there are violations of even the lax UR rules in the course of implementation, which have been aided by the failure of the agreement to ensure transparency in implementation. Not surprisingly, some countries, especially the Cairns group of exporting countries, have proposed an ambitious agenda of liberalisation in the agricultural area. Tariffs are to be reduced sharply, using the "Swiss formula", which would ensure that the proportionate reduction in the tariffs imposed by a country would be larger, the higher is the prevailing bound or applied tariff in that country. The formula arrives at the level to which tariffs in a country would be reduced by multiplying the existing (bound or applied) tariff by a numerical factor, and dividing the result by the sum of the current tariff rate and the numerical factor. The factor for developed countries proposed by the Cairns group is 25. Thus, a country with a tariff rate of 100 per cent on a particular product would have to reduce the rate to 20 per cent, whereas a country with a 75 per cent tariff rate would have to reduce it proportionately less to 18.75 per cent. Further, in keeping with the Special and Differential treatment requirement, the factor for the developing countries is proposed at 50, making their reduction requirements much smaller (to 33.3 and 30 per cent respectively in the case of a 100 and 75 per cent tariff). Besides tariff reduction, the Cairns group has called for an enhancement of the minimum import levels of particular commodities by using lower tariffs (tariff rate quotas), argued for a sharp reduction in the aggregate support that can be provided using impermissible support measures, supported the scrapping of the so-called Blue Box measures fashioned during the Uruguay Round to appease the EU countries, and recommended stricter guidelines for assessing whether particular measures of support fall under fully permissible Green Box provisions. These ambitious demands notwithstanding, it is clear that an agreement on modalities in time for the March 31 deadline is unlikely to materialise. Around the time of the January 22-24 meetings of the agricultural negotiators, the European Union Agricultural Commissioner, Mr Franz Fischler, made it clear that that the late March deadline will be missed. Mr Fischler reportedly declared that the March 31 deadline set at Doha was for the chairman of the agricultural negotiating group to present his proposal for modalities and that did "not mean automatically that the next day all members of the WTO will agree to that proposal." In any case, with discussions on the reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy expected to continue well into the summer, the EC does not yet have a fully formulated position to adopt in the course of the negotiations. Thus, the March 31 deadline cannot be met. Till such time as these issues are cleared it is not at all certain that an agreement on agriculture, which is a prerequisite for the launch and completion of the 'Doha Round' of trade negotiations, can be ensured by 2005. Those in a hurry to get to that goal are in for a disappointment. But that prospect is not new. WTO members have already missed a December deadline for an agreement on patents and the supply of essential commodities, because of US intransigence. They have also missed the deadline to work out modalities for special and differential treatment of developing countries. In the media's blame game seeking to identify the culprit holding up progress towards an agreement on agriculture, once again the lead contender is the European Union. The grounds for this focus on the EU are, however, shaky. The US, too, offers substantial support to its farmers, and has significantly hiked this support through the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. Outlays on farm programmes in the US, principally income and price support programmes, averaged more than $15 billion a year between 1996 and 2002, and had touched a high of $32.3 billion in 2000. The 2002 Act promises on paper to keep this high support going, by authorising expenditures totalling $118.5 billion over a six-year period ending 2007. The actual figure is expected to be much higher. It is well known that this support goes disproportionately in favour of a few large commercial farms, which are the ones accounting for a majority of supplies to the US and international markets. nasmuch as such support, even if provided in the form of direct income payments "decoupled" from actual production, indirectly affects farmers' production and pricing decisions, they influence availability and prices in world markets. That is, they do distort world trade even if the UR round agreement claims they do not. What the 2002 Farm Act indicates is that the US has no intention of cutting back on such support, and is unlikely to accede to any agreement that warrants such a cut. The reason why this implicit stance of the US does not lead to its identification as a bottleneck in the current negotiations on agriculture is that almost all of this support is in the form of Green Box measures, or measures of support that are acceptable under the Uruguay Round agreement because they are ostensibly "non-trade distorting". Not surprisingly, the US proposals advanced in the course of the work programme that began in March 2002, combine: a plea for export subsidy abolition; recommendations for increased market access through quota abolition, tariff reduction and enhanced tariff-rate quotas (or a minimum level of imports of each commodity that needs to be ensured with lower tariffs); a case for either doing away with domestic support that does not fall in the Green Box category or the substitution of such support with outlays on new Green Box measures. That is, the US proposals are clearly not in the direction of reducing state support for agriculture, but of manipulating the agricultural support regime in the direction of what was defined to be non-trade distorting in the course of the Uruguay Round. Seen in this background, the new stand on agricultural support still being discussed among EU members is by no means bizarre. The European Commission's recently released proposals for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) do not promise any cut in total spending. But they do not point to any substantial increase either, since the EU leaders agreed last year to a 1 per cent ceiling on annual increases in the farm budget. In addition, the proposals currently being discussed make an effort to link subsidies less directly with production, thereby rendering them non-trade distorting. The difficulty the EU faces is that of mooting and then winning agreement among its members on doing away with export subsidies and on making a complete transition to Green Box measures. Since the support afforded to agriculture in EU countries is large and multifarious, a complete transition is not easy to achieve. France, for example, which receives more money from the CAP than any other country is vehemently opposed to that transition, with vocal support from President Chirac. As a result, the EU in its proposals submitted in December to the agricultural negotiations committee, has called for retaining the Blue Box and for continuing with the Peace Clause, which protected Blue Box measures from being challenged during the implementation period of the Uruguay Round. That is, the EU wants the right to openly and transparently support and protect its farmers, and wants adequate elbowroom within the agreement to do so. But the fact that it is unwilling to go the US way, by opting for less transparent support measures that have been defined as acceptable helps those who paint it as the stumbling block on the road to free trade. The reason for the peculiar situation is that through the manoeuvres made during the Uruguay Round, especially the famous Blair House accord, the rich nations managed to obtain Cairns group concurrence and developing country support for an agreement that provided inadequate market access and little reduction in protection in the developed countries in the agricultural area. This they did by holding out the threat of trade chaos if no agreement was reached and by promising that: this was an interim arrangement which would be assessed starting a year before the completion of the implementation period; the worst form of domestic support such as the blue box measures would be dropped at that point; and liberalisation would be further intensified starting in 2000. Unfortunately, not only has the experience with the implementation of the not-so-liberal Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture been wanting on many counts, but there is strong pressure to continue with the manoeuvring by dressing up all support measures in Green, as is the case with the US, or by just refusing to meet the Uruguay Round commitments, as is true of the EU. This makes it extremely difficult to once more win Cairns group concurrence and developing country support for a new Agreement on Agriculture, which offers merely a small advance along an older protectionist route. Unfortunately for the developed countries, they had gone for the "single undertaking", all-or-nothing strategy with the hope that they can use small concessions in areas such as agriculture, drug patents and special and differential treatment to win major battles in the areas of competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement. But with no agreement among them even on those concessions and an agreement on agriculture proving a stumbling block, those visions born of greed are threatening to blur. The threat to the forces of corporate globalisation comes not just from the anti-globalisation movement outside. An important enemy seems to lie within, as well.