新形势下会计问题之探讨提纲 一、新形势之概览 二、新形势下的会计问题 三、新形势下会计问题之理论思考 四、新形势下会计问题之实务考量 五、新形势下会计研究之机遇一、新形势之概览 (一)企业所处环境 (二)会计理念与计量 (三)会计准则全球趋同 (四)全球金融危机的影响(一)企业所处环境 开放经济 买方市场 信用
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收益实现 币值、物价、汇率等因素的影响(二)会计理念与计量 旨在服务资本市场 资产负债表导向 估值不可或缺 公允价值与现值计量 配比正在逐渐弱化 主体观得以充分体现(三)会计准则全球趋同 基本理念本质上相同的经济业务,不管发生在何时何地,会计处理方法都应该相同。趋同的目
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则——IFRS 国际财务
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准则,由以下部分组成:国际财务报告准则(IFRS)国际会计准则(IAS)国际财务报告解释委员会拟定的解释公告(IFRIC)常设解释委员会拟定的解释公告(SIC)IFRS版本及其改进和修订IFRS在全球的采用或趋同情况 2005:欧盟当时25个成员国、澳大利亚、香港——全面采用 2007:中国——实质性趋同美国——认可非美国公司按IFRS编制的报表 2009:韩国——允许采用 2011:加拿大、巴西、印度、韩国——全面采用日本——全面趋同美国——完成与IASB的备忘录项目IASB工作的最新进展 国际会计准则委员会章程的修改 概念框架的改进 财务报表列报的重大变化 新发布或修订的主要准则和解释公告 处于征求意见阶段的有关项目国际会计准则委员会章程的修改 每五年进行一次全面审查,根据需要作出修改。 本次重大修改征求意见截止于2008年9月20日。 本次修改主要涉及两个方面:在国际会计准则委员会基金会之上设立一个监管小组将国际会计准则委员会委员人数由14人增加至16人监管小组所处层次 已颁布的章程修改建议稿建议在国际会计准则委员会基金会(或托管人委员会)之上成立一个主要由证券监管机构领导人组成的监管小组。成立该监管小组的主要原因 强化国际会计准则委员会公共责任 建立与公共监管机构间的正式联系 确保国际会计准则委员会按既定的目标运作 确保国际会计准则的贯彻实施 确保国际会计准则委员会的财政支持监管小组将由四方面组成 欧盟代表1人 国际货币基金组织执行董事1人 世界银行行长1人 证券监管机构的领导人4人: 美国证监会主席 日本金融监管委员会委员 国际证监会组织技术委员会主席 国际证监会组织新兴市场委员会主席监管小组的主要职责 参与并批准国际会计准则委员会基金会成员的任命。 审查基金会履行章程所规定职责的情况,并提供建议。 为此,基金会每年应向监管小组作出报告;监管小组每年至少一次会见基金会成员或其专门小组的成员。概念框架的改进 概念框架(ConceptualFramework) 基本质量特征(Fundamental):相关性(Relevance)如实表述(FaithfulRepresentation)概念框架的改进 组成要素(Components):预测价值(PredictiveValue)确证价值(ConfirmatoryValue)完整性(Completeness)免于重大差错(FreefromMaterialError)中立性(Neutrality)概念框架的改进 强化性质量特征(Enhancing):可比性(Comparability)可验证性(Verifiability)及时性(Timeliness)可了解性(Understandability)概念框架的改进 财务报告信息的广泛制约(PervasiveConstraints):重要性(Materiality)成本(Cost)财务报表列报的重大变化 IAS1——财务报表的列报重大修订 主要变化资产负债表名称的改变报告所有者权益变动和综合收益其他综合收益——重分类调整和相关税收影响股利的列报IAS1——财务报表的列报资产负债表的名称改为“财务状况表”当采用追溯调整法运用会计政策,或追溯重述、重分类财务报表中相关项目时,修订后的IAS1要求在一套完整的财务报表中包括一张“最早比较期间期初的财务状况表”。IAS1——财务报表的列报以所有者身份的交易而导致的权益变化,必须与非所有者交易导致的权益变化单独列报。以所有者身份的交易导致的权益变化,列示在权益变动表中;不允许将综合收益(即与非所有者交易导致的权益变化)列示在权益变动表中。收益和费用应当列示在一张单一的综合收益表中,也可以分别列在两张报表中,即:一张是单独的收益表,一张是综合收益表。IAS1——财务报表的列报要求主体披露其他综合收益各组成部分的所得税影响。要求主体披露前期在其他综合收益中确认的、本期重分类为损益的金额。例如:本期出售可供出售金融资产时,前期在其他综合收益中确认的公允价值变动,本期转入损益的金额要求主体在权益变动表或其附注中,列示分配给所有者的股利及其相关的每股金额,不允许列在综合收益表中。新发布或修订的主要准则和解释公告准则(IFRS或IAS)IAS1——财务报表的列报IFRS3——企业合并IFRS8——经营分部IAS23——借款费用IAS27——合并财务报表和单独财务报表解释公告(IFRIC)IFRIC12——服务特许权
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处于征求意见阶段的有关项目对《IAS31——合营中的权益》的修订:联合安排(JointArrangements)修订核心是采用权益法,取消比例合并法对《IAS24——关联方披露》的修订修订核心是豁免将仅同受控制的国有企业之间发生的交易作为关联方交易披露,这是我国企业会计准则与国际财务报告准则趋同的成果。(四)全球金融危机的影响 1.全球金融危机下的物价 2.全球金融危机下的币值 3.全球金融危机下的汇率 4.全球金融危机下的金融资产与负债 5.全球金融危机下的经营与市场1.全球金融危机下的物价 个别商品价格犹如过山车 CPI&PPI下行国际石油价格上天入地 与2008年7月11日创下的每桶147.27美元的历史最高纪录相比,国际油价在短短几个月的时间内下跌逾73%. 以12月26日纽约商品交易所的轻质原油期货收盘价为例,2009年2月份交货的合约价格为每桶37.71美元。2008年12月19日纽约商品交易所1月份交货的轻质原油期货价格收于每桶33.87美元,比前一交易日下跌2.35美元,处于近5年来的最低点。工业国平均通货膨胀率(CPI)亚洲新兴市场平均通货膨胀率(CPI)拉美新兴市场平均通货膨胀率其他新兴市场平均通货膨胀率新兴市场平均通货膨胀率(CPI年度环比) 中值四分位工业国平均通货膨胀率(消费物价指数,%)中国居民消费价格指数(CPI)2009年2月CPI同比降1.6%6年来首次负增长中国工业品出厂价格指数(PPI)中国CPI与基准利率变动图2.全球金融危机下的币值 人民币 美元 英镑 澳币 ……3.全球金融危机下的汇率 英镑:2008.12.31外汇交易中心公布1英镑对人民币9.8798元,再创新低,上一日中间价9.8975元为英镑对人民币的中间价首次破10。与2007年底14.5807元的中间价相比较,同样1英镑所兑换的人民币已经缩水了4.7元。 欧元:2008.10.28欧元对人民币的中间价报8.4890元,再创历史新低。 澳元:从2008.7的1:6.6跌至1:4.5左右,跌幅超过25%。 ……澳元对人民币一年走势图人民币对美元汇率再创新高 2008-9-1银行间外汇市场美元对人民币汇率的中间价为:1美元对人民币跌破 6.8320元,再创汇改以来新高。4.全球金融危机下的金融资产与负债 股票、债券、期货、…… 套期损失惨重的例子比比皆是次贷是怎么来的? 次级住房抵押贷款(SubprimeMortgageLoans):借款人没有稳定可靠的收入来源、没有信用记录或信用级别低下、债务负担沉重、还款能力极低或缺失。 次贷打造:次级市场-住房抵押贷款机构-政府发起企业(GSE)和投资银行-次级债券-放大20倍。 售与:社保基金、投资基金、对冲银行、商业银行、保险公司;再卖给最穷的国家。 根本原因:缺乏监督的金融创新滋生严重的道德风险次贷影响的外溢 中国政府持有“两房”发行的3763亿美元债券,次贷危机以来增持了640亿美元,成为全世界持有“两房”债券最多的政府。 截止2008.8,中国政府持有5410亿美元美国国债,仅次于日本(5859),高于英国(3074),三国占80.7%。5.全球金融危机下的经营与市场 金融行业大幅收缩 资本市场萎靡不振 实体经济举步维艰 消费情绪空前低迷 企业资金岌岌可危 人力市场极不景气09年解禁股的供给将是解禁规模最大的一年。全年总计有约6852亿股各类限售股份解禁,按12月1日收盘价计算,市值规模为33379亿元。上证指数攀升至6124.082007.10.16上证指数探底至1664.912008.10.28深成指数走势上证沪综指周跌8%创九年最大单周跌幅中国股市过山车 从2007年10月16日中国A股(沪)创下6124点以来,仅仅五个半月,中国股市已大跌46%以上,而有不少股票已跌掉一半,甚至三分之二。 如中国平安从149元跌到48.3元,云南铜业从98元跌到28元. 中国石油按2008.9.5最低价11.92元计算,较上市首日的48.46元下跌了36.54元,跌幅高达75.4%。新形势有感 世事难料 及时调整 与时俱进 逆市求生二、新形势下的会计问题 货币计量单位伸伸缩缩难以把握 计量属性与历史成本渐行渐远 稳健计量与财务信息相关性的矛盾尖锐 会计数据融入更多职业判断 外币货币性项目风险敞口加大 监管面临更为严峻的挑战三、新形势下会计问题之理论思考 会计准则理论之分野 财务报告目标之层次 会计计量属性之争论 会计计量单位之困惑 财务信息质量之评价四、新形势下会计问题之实务考量 财务报告可能存在的问题 持有资产及其风险 举债及其限度财务报告可能存在的问题 契约和监管临界点财务操纵几率增加 上市公司操高利润动机应该更为强烈 提前确认收入或推迟确认费用和损失 操纵可能从应计项目和期末重估值入手 关注商誉和使用寿命不确定的无形资产 其他长期资产减值损失准备计提不足 递延所得税资产、弃置费用和预计负债持有资产及其风险行业风险无形损耗风险处置风险内含价值与供求债权是否带息?债权利息是否随通货膨胀调整?债权利息是否涉税及税率?是否涉及外币及其汇率走势?举债及其限度 合理利用财务杠杆还款贬值?债务是否带息?债务利息是否随通货膨胀调整?是否涉及外币及其汇率走势? 在财务风险可控之内举债五、新形势下会计研究之机遇和挑战 充满机遇的研究领域 实证研究的严峻挑战充满机遇的研究领域会计准则研究盈余管理研究公允价值研究金融工具研究审计质量研究充满机遇的研究领域 研究选题——KatherineSchipper:会计准则执行在实现会计国际协调中的角色 研究选题——MaryBarth:研究、准则制定和全球财务报告 研究选题——WayneR.Landsman:公允价值会计信息相关且可靠吗?——来自资本市场研究的证据(《当代会计评论》 研究选题——“公允价值研究”研讨会充满机遇的研究领域 研究选题——KatherineSchipper 会计准则执行在实现会计国际协调中的角色 TheRoleofImplementationsofAccountingStandardsinAchievingInternationalAccountingConvergence 作者讨论假定:单一的一套高质量财务报告准则,适用于所有司法管辖区,并一贯严格的实施,这是一个理想的结果。这并非所有人都会同意。 Implementationsoffinancialreportingstandardsareonestepinaprocess Standards Implementationdecisions Auditing Oversight(governance) Enforcement Publicscrutiny Implementationsareshapedby(amongotherthings)expertise,availabledataandmeasurementtechnology,andincentives.Theycanbecharacterizedas: Conscientiousandskilledapplication Goodfaithbutuninformedorunskilledapplication Subversiveapplication WillfulviolationImplementationsareonestepinfinancialreportingQuestionstoconsider: Whichcharacterizationofimplementationsismostempiricallydescriptive? Doesthemostempiricallydescriptivecharacterizationvarybyjurisdiction? Whatshouldstandardsettersassumeaboutimplementations? Whatdoaccountingresearcherstendtoassumeaboutimplementations?Accountingresearchoftenimplicitlyorexplicitlyassumesthatonlydifferencesinincentivesmatterforaccountingimplementations,orthatothereffectsaresecond-orderandcanbesafelyignored(i.e.,implementersareexperts).Thisassumptionmaynotbecorrect.AnobservationaboutexpertiseandincentivesExample1:KurtEichenwald,ConspiracyofFools,p.11:…[C]rimeatEnron…wasjustoneingredientinthetoxicstewthatpoisonedthecompany.Shockingincompetence,unjustifiedarrogance,compromisedethics,andanuttercontemptforthemarket’sjudgmentallplayeddecisiveroles.Ultimately,itwasEnron’stragedytobefilledwithpeoplesmartenoughtoknowhowtomaneuveraroundtherules,butnotwiseenoughtounderstandwhytheruleshadbeenwritteninthefirstplace(emphasisadded).Example2:ReportoftheSpecialExaminationofFannieMae,May2006,emphasizestheadverseconsequencesoffailingtoinvestthenecessaryresourcesinaccountingandfinancialreporting.Fromp.238:Thefailuretoinvestadequatelyledtocriticalresourceshortagesandalackoftechnicalaccountingexpertise….(emphasisadded)Example3:GeneralMotors200610Kreportacknowledgesmaterialweaknessesininternalcontrolsoverfinancialreporting.TheCorporationlackedthetechnicalexpertiseandprocessestoensurecompliancewithSFASNo.109…..andincertaininstanceslackedthetechnicalexpertiseanddidnotmaintainadequateprocedurestoensurethattheaccountingforderivativefinancialinstrumentswas….appropriate(emphasisadded) Complexityofthetransaction,ofthestandard,oroftherequiredmeasurementprobablyimplieslargerconfidenceintervalsaroundthereportednumbers(whicharepointestimates). Conjecture:Widthofconfidenceintervalsinreportednumbershasincreasedirretrievablybecauseofthenatureofcommercialarrangementscombinedwithlimitationsofavailablemeasurementtechnology.Together,theselimittheprecisionofimplementations,butnotnecessarilytheirconsistency. Varioushigh-levelcommitteesandtaskforcesintheUSarechargedwithreducing“complexityinfinancialreporting”(althoughtheredoesnotappeartobeagreementastohowcomplexityistobedefinedandmeasured,letalonereduced).AnobservationaboutcomplexityQuestionstoconsider: Whatisthelevelofuncertaintyofmeasurementthatshouldresultineitherachangeintheaccountingornoaccountingatall? Aresomestandardsparticularlydifficulttoimplementandifso,whataretheimplicationsforconsistencyofreportingoutcomes?Examples:SFAS133,IAS39 Whataretheimplicationsforeducationandtrainingofaccountants? Non-neutralstandards Accounting“subsidies”createincentivesforimplementationsthatobtainthesubsidy(standardaffectsimplementation) Examples:SFAS13andIAS17(leasing),portionsofSFAS133thatpertaintothe“short-cut”methodforhedgeaccounting Conservativestandardsintendedtocounteractperceivedincentivestooverstateassetsandincome(thestandardsetter’sperceptionsaboutimplementationaffectthestandard) Examples:ImpairmenttestinginbothIFRSandUSGAAPAnobservationaboutneutralityQuestiontoconsider: Inlightofwellrecognizedincentivestooverstateincomeandassetsandevidencethatoverstatementsoccur,shouldstandardsbenon-neutral(conservativelybiased)soastocounteracttheseincentivesforabiasedimplementation? Thisquestionspeakstowhatthestandardsettershouldassumeaboutimplementations. Management’simplementationstakeaccountofandareconstrainedby: Standardsthemselves—neutrality,complexityandrequiredknowledge Expertiseandavailabledataandmeasurementtechnologies Auditingandoversight Enforcement Publicscrutiny Implementationsofcertainauditing,taxandfinancialreportingstandardsareinterrelated Example:Auditor’sjudgmentaboutthefinancialreportingtreatmentofanuncertaintaxposition.SummarycommentaboutotherelementsofthefinancialreportingprocessObservations: Researchthatfocusesonmanagers’financialreportingincentivescontrolsfortheseothereffects,assumestheydonotvaryacrosstreatmentconditions,orassumestheyaresecondordereffectsthatcanbesafelydisregarded. HowlikelyisitthattheseotherelementsdonotvaryacrossthejurisdictionsthatapplyIFRS? Potentiallyobservableinexperimentalsettings Capturethejudgmentsanddecisionsofimplementersdirectly Notobservableingeneralinarchivaldata Observation:Inprinciple,archivalrecordsofPCAOBinspectionscouldprovideindirectevidenceonimplementationdecisionsintheUS.IamnotawareofanequivalentsourceofinformationoutsidetheUS. Observation:Analysesofdiscoveredfraudsprovidedirectevidenceofoutcomesofimplementationdecisionsthatinvolvewillfulviolationsofreportingstandards Archivalresearchusuallyselectsoutcomeindicatorsthatarepresumedtocapture,summarizeorreflectimplementations Propertiesofreportednumbers Auditordecisiontoqualifyareport Numberofsegmentsreported Propertiesofanalystsforecasts Statisticalmeasuresoftherelationbetweenreportednumbersandmarketvariables Archivalresearchalsoselectscorrelatedindicatorsthatarepresumedtoberelatedtoimplementations Feesforauditandnonauditservicesareviewedascorrelatedwith(orevencausing)lackofauditorindependence.Fromaresearchperspective,implementationsarebehaviors Outcomeindicatorsandcorrelatedindicatorscaptureboththeinfluenceofimplementationdecisionsandtheinfluenceofotherelementsofthefinancialreportingprocessthatarerelatedto(andaffect)implementations Example:Businessoraccountingfundamentals. Aftertheresearchercontrolsforfundamentals,theremainingportionoftheoutcomeindicatorispresumedtocapturetheinfluenceofimplementationdecisions Example:Accrualsthatarenotexplainedbyaccountingfundamentalscaptureearningsmanagement(anoutcomeindicator) Example:Auditfeesthatarenotexplainedbybusinessfundamentalscaptureauditor-clientbonding(acorrelatedindicator) Example:Natureofthestandardthatisbeingimplemented Researchtypicallydoesnotcontrolforthedifficulty(orcomplexity)ofimplementinghestandardFromaresearchperspective,implementationsarebehaviors Choiceofoutcomeindicatordictatedbytheresearchquestion Example:Doabnormallylargeauditfeesleadtoauditor-clientbondingand(therefore)less-rigorousauditingwhichinturnimplieslessrigorousimplementations? Outcomeindicatorshouldcaptureeffectsofless-rigorousauditing,presumedtobelower-qualityfinancialreporting Examples:Restatements,enforcementactions Examples:Abnormalaccruals;earningsresponsecoefficients;explanatorypowerofearningsforreturns Testvariableisauditfees(predictedtoincreasewithpresumedbonding,takentoimplyless-than-independentimplementationofauditingstandards) Researchdesignmustcontrolforothereffectsontheoutcomeindicatorandforothereffectsonauditfees Example:Abnormalauditfeesarefeesnotexplainedbyfundamentalssuchassize,mergeractivity,leverageandauditortenure(e.g.,Ashbaughetal.,TheAccountingReview,2003).Choosingoutcomeindicators Choiceofoutcomeindicatorconstrainedbyavailabledata Notpossibletoobserveauditor-clientbondingdirectly Measurebondingasauditfeesthatarenotexplainedbyfundamentals Notpossibletoobserveauditimplementationdecisionsdirectly However,good(poor)auditsshouldincrease(decrease)earningsquality Wellknowndifficultiesinthiskindofsetting Uncontrolledfactorsthataffecttheobservedrelationbetweenanoutcomeindicator(earningsquality)andthetestvariable(auditfees) Associationbetweenearningsqualityandauditfeesmaybeduetoauditor-clientbonding,failuretocontrolforfundamentaldeterminantsoffeesandearningsquality,ormisstatementoftherelation Example:Highauditfeesmightbecausedbyauditors'assessmentsofhigherriskinfirmswithpoorerearningsquality(e.g.,Gul,ChenandTsui,ContemporaryAccountingResearch,2003),asopposedtohigherauditfeesbeingacauseofauditor-clientbonding. Conjecture:Areauditfeesandimplementationqualityjointlydetermined(thatis,mutuallydependentandalsodrivenbymanyofthesamefundamentals)? Size,losses,businessmodelcomplexityappearasdeterminantsofbothauditfeesandaccrualsquality(DechowandDichev,TheAccountingReview,2002)Choosingoutcomeindicators Choiceofoutcomeindicatoraffectstheanswertotheresearchquestion Anincome-basedmeasureofaccountingqualitycoulddeclinewhileothermeasuresincrease Incomebasedmeasuresincludesmoothness(volatility),predictabilityandpersistence Marketbasedmeasuresincludeearningsresponsecoefficientsandexplanatorypowerofearningsforreturns Analystbasedmeasuresincludeanalystforecasterror,dispersionandbias Example:KohlbeckandWarfield(workingpaper2005)examinetheinfluenceoffourUSaccountingstandardsonaccountingquality Standardspertaintopensions(SFAS87),otherpost-retirementbenefits(SFAS106),investments(SFAS115)andtaxes(SFAS109) Outcomemeasuresofaccountingqualityincludeanalystforecasterrorandforecastdispersion,earningspersistence,andexplanatorypowerofbookvaluesandearningsforprices Resultsindicatethatsomemeasuresincreasewhileothersdecreaseorareunchanged ResultsdifferacrossthefourstandardsexaminedChoosingoutcomeindicatorsChoosingoutcomeindicatorsObservation: Researchthatconsidersoutcomemeasuresasafunctionofaccountingstandardsmakes(implicit)assumptionsaboutimplementations,particularlyifthestandardpermitschoices. Example:SFAS133andIAS39allow(butdonotrequire)hedgeaccountingasanincomesmoothingtreatment. Implementationsthatchoosehedgeaccountingwouldbeexpectedtoaffectearningspropertiesdifferentlyfromapproachesthatdonot Example:SFAS115andIAS39allow(butdonotrequire)investmentstobeclassifiedasavailable-for-sale(AFS),withunrealizedchangesinfairvalueexcludedfromearnings,andrealizedchangesrecycledfromashareholdersequityaccounttoearnings ClassifyinginvestmentsasAFS(insteadoftrading)eliminateschangesinfairvaluefromearningsuntiltheinvestmentsaresold. Whatpropertiesofreportednumbersareaffectedbyimplementations?FromtheFASB'sConceptualFrameworkandtheIASB’sFramework Reliability(representationalfaithfulness,verifiability,neutrality) Outcomeindicatorsbasedontherelationbetweenreportednumbersandmarketvariablescapturecombinedrelevanceandreliability Relevanceisnotmuch(ifatall)affectedbyimplementations Comparability Tocaptureimplementationeffectsoncomparability,needabenchmarkforimplementationsthattreatsimilaritemssimilarly Conjecture:Doaccrualsthatcannotbeexplainedbyaccountingfundamentals(presumedtocapturetheunderlyingeventsandtransactions)indicatenoncomparability?Fromresearch Smoothness,conservatism,persistence,predictability,relationtoindicatorsofeconomicfundamentalssuchascashflowsChoosingoutcomeindicators:reportednumbersQuestion:CanpropertiesusedinresearchbelinkedtopropertiesfromtheIASB’sFrameworkandtheFASB'sConceptualFramework? Marketbasedoutcomeindicatorsarederivedfromregressionsofmarketvariablesonaccountingvariables(orreverseregressions) Valuationmultiples(regressioncoefficients) Explanatorypower Examples DofairvaluesandbookvaluesoftradingsecuritiesandAFSsecuritiesexplainthedifferencebetweenbookvalueandmarketvalueofequityforbanks?(Park,etal.,JournalofAccounting,AuditingandFinance,1999) DidSFAS131(segmentreporting)affectthestockmarket'sabilitytopredictfutureearnings?(Ettredge,etal.,TheAccountingReview,2005) Dodeferredtaxliabilities(perSFAS109)haveincrementalexplanatorypowerforequityvalues(comparedtoAPB11measures)?(Ayers,TheAccountingReview,1998). Dodisclosedfairvaluesoffinancialinstrumentsexplaincross-sectionalvariationinnonfinancialfirms'equityvalues?(Simko,JournalofAccounting,AuditingandFinance,1999)Choosingoutcomeindicators:marketbasedChoosingoutcomeindicators:marketbasedObservationsaboutmarketbasedoutcomeindicators:Widelyused,heavilyscrutinizedandfrequentlycriticizedViewedassummarizingmanystepsinthefinancialreportingprocess,beginningwiththestandards,throughinvestoruseofthereportednumbersCaptureinvestorresponsetotheinformationbeingtestedUseofmarketbasedoutcomeindicatorsrequiresassumptions Abouthowinvestorsuseinformationtomakedecisions Abouttheabilityofthemarketmeasurestocaptureactualinvestordecisions Outcomeindicatorsderivedfromanalystforecasts Accuracy,dispersion,bias,privateversuscommoninformation Settingswhereanalystforecastsaredesirableoutcomeindicatorsofimplementationdecisions Newinformation:provisionofnewinformationtoanalysts RegulationFD(FairDisclosure)intheUS Disaggregationsthatprovidenewinformation(e.g.,segmentdisclosures) Recognitionstandardsthatprovidenewinformation(e.g.,otherpost-retirementbenefits) Changedinformation:e.g.,changeinameasurementattribute Example:Shiftfromamortizedcosttofairvalueforfinancialinstruments Lessclearlydesirablesettingthana“newinformation”setting Changedlocation:requirerecognitionforitemspreviouslydisclosed Requiresassumptionsaboutanalysts’cognitiveprocessesChoosingoutcomeindicators:analyst-forecastbased Selectastandardwhichcanbeimplementedinmorethanoneway Examineoutcomemeasuresthatshoulddifferdependingonthemethodofimplementation Canbenew(e.g.,RegFD)orexisting(freechoiceperthefairvalueoptioninIAS39;estimatesusedinpensionreporting) Selectanewstandardthatshiftedimplementationexpectations Example:SFAS131(USGAAP)requiressegmentstobebasedontheorganizational/reportingstructureoftheentity Examinesettingswhereincentiveshavepredictableeffectsonimplementationdecisions Examples:Muchoftheresearchonearningsmanagement TestforimplementationdifferencesbetweenrecognizedanddisclosednumbersExamplesofresearchdesignstoinvestigateimplementationissuesusingarchivaldataAnexampleofimplementationindiversejurisdictions:EuropeanUnionrequirementtouseIFRSasadoptedbytheEuropeanUnion Implementationdecisionsbymanagersofthousandsofentitiesinover20politicaljurisdictionsthatvarygreatlyin: Laws(securities,taxation,governance) Developmentofcapitalmarkets Wealth Entitiesdifferincharacteristicsthatresearchhasshowntoaffectfinancialreportingoutcomes Size Capitalstructure,includingrelianceonpublicequitymarketsforcapital Governancearrangements Ownership Structure Concentration(includingdualclassshares) Questiontoconsider:HowdothesedifferencesaffecttheconsistencyofimplementationofIFRS?ImportanceoftheEuropeanUnionadoptionofIFRS Naturallyoccurringexperimenttoanalyzetherelativeimportanceofstandardsversusothereffectsonfinancialreportingoutcomes Incentives:researchonearningsmanagementhasdocumentedstrongincentiveeffects Expertise:mostevidenceisanecdotal Informationsystems:mostevidenceisanecdotal Governance:researchintheUShasdocumentedmixedeffects Enforcement:researchintheUSismostlyanecdotalObservation:Researchislikelytofocusonoutcomeindicatorsoffinancialrepor